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ABSTRACT
Runaway: A History of Postwar New York in Four Factories
by
Andy Battle
Advisor: Joshua B. Freeman
At midcentury, New York City was among the preeminent manufacturing centers in the
United States. Within a generation, this manufacturing economy suffered an extraordinary
collapse. Beginning in the 1950s, workers and their unions began to use the term “runaway” to
describe factories that pulled up stakes in New York and set them back down in other climes.
This dissertation explores the deindustrialization of New York City through case studies of
“runaway” plants, or factories that left New York for the American South or abroad between the
years 1945 and 1975.
In general, the manufacturers that remained in New York at midcentury were
concentrated in labor-intensive, highly competitive industries where wage suppression was a
key—and sometimes the only—means of survival. For this reason, these employers sought the
socially vulnerable—those whose subordinate positions, conditioned by race, gender, migration
status, and sometimes all three, compelled them to accept the substandard wages and conditions
required to maintain profitability in cut-throat competitive environments. When workers sought
to reduce their vulnerability through collective action, joining the industrial unions buttressed by
the New Deal, their firms responded by fleeing the Northeast in search of a new, low-cost
workforce defined by its relative isolation and vulnerability.
The present work explores one runaway plant for each postwar decade. Each factory I
investigate represents a different industry, a different union, and a different strategy for
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addressing the problem of capital mobility. This differentiated approach is designed to account
for New York’s unique manufacturing economy, where, unlike in Pittsburgh, Detroit, or other
Rust Belt cities, no one industry dominated the scene. Through closely observed accounts of
these struggles, we can understand how manufacturers confronted a crisis of profitability by
seeking a “spatial fix” rooted in regional difference as well as how industrial relocation helped to
induce the collapse of New York’s unique municipal social democracy, which consisted in an
attempt to secure a minimally decent and collectively determined standard of living for the city’s
workers along with tolerable levels of profitability for their employers.
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Introduction
In November 2018, General Motors announced it would close five large assembly plants
in the US and Canada, eliminating the jobs of 15,000 workers. At the same time, the carmaker
ramped up production at its Mexican facilities, where “low wages, generous government
incentives and favorable trade agreements” have helped to transform that country into “an autoindustry powerhouse,” automotive journalists explained. “All trends point south,” remarked an
industry expert. 1
To anyone familiar with the history of industrial relocation since World War II, the
episode played like a re-run. Workers’ advocates pilloried the “callous and indifferent” company.
Elected officials at all levels, whether thundering and impotent, like US President Donald
Trump, or “passive and indifferent,” as labor leaders sneered at local officeholders, proved
unable or unwilling to influence the company’s decision. The Canadian autoworkers’ union
sparred with the company in the courts and the media and threatened a boycott of Mexican-built
GM vehicles. Investors, on the other hand, cheered—the plant closures had met with “anger,
except on Wall Street,” reported Automotive News. Industry consultants deployed customary
truisms—“at the end of the day, GM answers to the shareholders,” they reminded readers. “And
when profitability is being hampered, you’re looking at your portfolio and what’s not making it.”
“At the heart of this mess is the company pitting workers against each other in a competition to
save jobs,” explained more sympathetic observers. From the other side of the class struggle,
Stephen Roach, Morgan Stanley’s chief economist, writing in 2003, agreed. “In an era of excess
supply, companies lack pricing leverage as never before. As such, businesses must be
unrelenting in their search for new efficiencies,” he wrote. “Not surprisingly, the primary focus
1

Dana Flavelle, “Tracking GM's Manufacturing Move to Mexico,” Automotive News Canada, February 11, 2019.
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of such efforts is labor, representing the bulk of production costs in the developed world …
Consequently, offshore outsourcing that extracts product from relatively low-wage workers in
the developing world has become an increasingly urgent survival tactic for companies in the
developed economies,” Roach concluded. 2
Anger, betrayal, desperation, bitterness, boycotts, communities left bereft, the winners
intoning there is no other way—look back seventy years, and one could be talking about New
York City in the decades that followed the Second World War, when manufacturers fled the city
en masse for the American South and beyond. By the 1950s, industrial relocation had wormed its
way into the consciousness of anyone who cared about New York’s economy, especially those
who depended on it for sustenance and the unions that had emerged to represent their interests.
Before long, a language of relocation began to materialize. Its most dramatic expression was the
term “runaway,” which workers and their advocates attached to those factories that pulled up
stakes in New York and set them back down in other climes. This project explores the
deindustrialization of New York City through case studies of “runaway” plants, or factories that
left New York for the American South or abroad between the years 1945 and 1975.
At midcentury, New York City was among the preeminent manufacturing centers in the
United States. During the late 1940s, the city housed 37,000 manufacturing firms that
collectively employed nearly a million people. Another 400,000 worked in the port and related
jobs. If one overlooked local political boundaries to appraise the region as a whole, the number
of manufacturing workers rose to nearly two million. The city looked and felt different than it
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“GM Shutters Plants,” Jacobin Radio, December 5, 2018; Susan Taylor, “Canada Union Calls for Boycott of GM
Mexico-Made Vehicles,” Reuters, January 25, 2019; “Unifor Airs Super Bowl Ad Despite GM’s Cease and Desist
Letter,” CBC News, February 3, 2019; Michael Wayland, “Unlike 2008, GM Cutting Jobs, Plants Proactively,”
Automotive News, December 3, 2018; Gerard Di Trolio, David Bush and Doug Nesbitt, “Buckle Up: GM Declares
War on Oshawa,” Rankandfile.ca, November 26, 2018; Stephen S. Roach, Outsourcing, Protectionism, and the
Global Labor Arbitrage (New York: Morgan Stanley, 2003), 5–6.
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does today. The waterfronts of Manhattan and Brooklyn were lined with piers behind which lay
factories—printers; brewers; coffee roasters; apparel manufacturers of all kinds; firms that made
boxes, buttons, and clasps; firms that made paint, thermometers, candy, light fixtures, aircraft
gauges, naval supplies, and hundreds upon hundreds of other goods. During the recentlyconcluded world war, the Brooklyn Navy Yard had employed 75,000 to build and repair
battleships and aircraft carriers. During this era, manufacturing employed a greater proportion of
New York City’s workforce than any other category of employer, including wholesale and retail
trade, services, and the finance, insurance and real estate industries. As historian Joshua Freeman
points out in Working Class New York: Life and Labor Since World War II, New York City in
1947 had “more manufacturing jobs than Philadelphia, Detroit, Los Angeles, and Boston put
together.” 3
The roots of New York’s prominence, goods-producing and otherwise, lie in its
geography. The city’s location, the topography of its harbor, and its waterborne connections to
the interior combined to make New York City the country’s dominant port during the years
between independence and the Civil War. Manufacturers clustered around this crucial
transportation infrastructure. Railroads jeopardized but did not vanquish the city’s advantages,
which included the county’s largest home market. Newer, capital-intensive industries, like steel
and automobile manufacturing, tended to locate away from New York since they needed more
space and relied less on the shared infrastructure furnished by the city’s dense industrial districts.
Smaller, more labor-intensive industries remained, whether highly-skilled precision
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6–8, 18; Edgar M. Hoover and Raymond Vernon, Anatomy of a Metropolis: The Changing Distribution of People
and Jobs within the New York Metropolitan Region (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 25; Temporary
Commission on City Finances, The City in Transition: Prospects and Policies for New York (New York: Arno Press,
1978), 22.
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manufacturing or less-skilled mass production industries subject to unpredictable market forces
that demanded both flexibility—the ability to quickly scale production up or down, or to change
the product in significant ways—and access to a large, low-wage labor force perpetually
replenished by migration. The classic industry of this type was New York’s largest—the
manufacture of clothing, especially women’s wear. The result was that “New York’s
manufacturing sector of 1945 in some respects looked more like its manufacturing sector of 1845
than like contemporaneous centers of mass production like Pittsburgh or Detroit,” as Freeman
observes. The most appropriate comparison might be London, another maritime, industrial,
financial, political, and cultural capital where similar dynamics governed the relationship
between industrial mix, land use, and working conditions. 4
Not only the city’s employment landscape but something of its cultural and political
character derived from this concentration of manufacturing and port activity. The blocks
surrounding the docks, for example, were great “proletarian zones,” inhabited by tens of
thousands of longshoremen and others who depended on the port for sustenance. It was a world
depicted in minute detail on the letterheads of the manufacturers that lined the docks and mined
for dramatic purposes in films like On the Waterfront, dreamt up by Arthur Miller as he pedaled
his way around the dockside neighborhood of Red Hook, a motley district whose maritime
cosmopolitanism so provoked the New England-bred writer H. P. Lovecraft that he sought
revenge by composing a tale in which its inhabitants—“a hopeless tangle and enigma; Syrian,
Spanish, Italian, and negro elements impinging upon one another, and fragments of Scandinavian
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Edward L. Glaeser, “Urban Colossus: Why is New York America's Largest City?” Economic Policy Review 11, no.
2 (December 2005), 7–24; Temporary Commission on City Finances, The City in Transition, 32–36; Freeman,
Working-Class New York, 15; Benjamin Chinitz, “Contrasts in Agglomeration: New York and Pittsburgh,”
American Economic Review 51, no. 2 (May 1961), 279–89; Gareth Stedman-Jones, Outcast London: A Study in the
Relationship Between Classes in Victorian Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).
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and American belts lying not far distant”—doubled as the guardians of a literal gateway to hell.
New York’s geographical position and commercial significance also meant that it would be the
primary port of entry for the tens of millions of immigrants to the United States who have given
the city’s cultural fabric an inimitable shape. 5
It was not only the docks that lent the city its proletarian character. New York City labor
organizations came to enjoy significant political power, drawn ultimately from their ability to
interrupt production, commerce, and daily life in order to protect the well-being of their
members. In 1945–46, during the largest strike wave in US history, stevedores, telegraph
operators, tugboat workers, elevator operators, and tens of thousands more ceased to work,
depriving the city, for example, of ninety-five percent of its fuel oil. By withholding their labor,
workers could hurl wrenches into the basic operating procedures of life in the country’s biggest
city. At the peak of its power, the International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union (ILG), the city’s
largest, operated a resort for workers, a suite of medical clinics, and several radio stations. More
importantly, the ILG and its garment-industry cousin, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers
Union, were able to make at least partial steps toward walling off the sphere of reproduction of
life and labor from the logic of the market, financing tens of thousands of low-income
cooperative apartments across the city’s five boroughs. Public and cooperative housing, free
public higher education, institutionalized worker power, and a host of other shared, collectively
funded amenities—all told, New York City in the postwar era was the closest thing the United
States has ever had to a social democratic polity. 6

Marco D’Eramo, “Dock Life,” New Left Review II, no. 96 (December 2015): 85–99; Arthur Miller, “The Year It
Came Apart,” New York, December 30, 1974; H. P. Lovecraft, “The Horror at Red Hook,” Weird Tales, January
1927.
6
Freeman, Working-Class New York, 3–6; 43; Tony Schuman, “Labor and Housing in New York City: Architect
Herman Jessor and the Cooperative Housing Movement” (Association of Collegiate Schools of Architecture,
Washington, DC, 1997).
5

5

The close of the Second World War marked the crest of this arrangement. While trends
towards decentralization of production had been discernible since the 1920s, the Great
Depression, when few new plants were constructed, and the Second World War, whose
emergency footing kept New York factories thrumming, worked to slow this dynamic. After the
war, however, New York’s manufacturing economy began to collapse. Between 1950 and 1975,
employment halved. “In little more than a decade and a half the economy of New York was
transformed from a diverse production site in which 45 percent of its workers made or moved
tangible goods and structures to one in which only half that proportion did so,” writes historian
Kim Moody. Today, fewer than two percent of the nearly four million jobs counted in New York
City by the state Department of Labor are in the manufacturing sector. The consequences for the
city were great. New York became “less economically diverse and more vulnerable to
fluctuations in the world economy,” coming to rely almost wholly on the success of the finance,
insurance, and real estate industries, which now enjoyed a virtual monopoly on land use
decisions. Tax revenues wavered. And the newest migrants—African Americans, Puerto Ricans,
and, after 1965, arrivals from hundreds of other countries—faced an employment crisis
characterized by the substitution of low-paid service work or, for many, no work at all. 7
The runaway shop phenomenon followed closely on the heels of the unionization of the
mass production industries enabled by New Deal legislation and accomplished in the main under
the banner of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) during the 1930s and 40s.
Industrial unions raised wages, shortened working hours, fostered job security, regulated the

Temporary Commission on City Finances, The City in Transition, 22, 34; Kim Moody, From Welfare State to Real
Estate: Regime Change in New York City, 1974 to the Present (New York: New Press, 2007), 12–14; New York
State Department of Labor, “Labor Statistics for the New York City Region,” March 2019,
https://www.labor.ny.gov/stats/nyc/; Freeman, Working-Class New York, 144; Samuel Stein, Capital City:
Gentrification and the Real Estate State (New York: Verso, 2019), 37, 53.
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intensity of production, and unsettled the prerogatives of managers accustomed to absolute
authority in the service of cost-cutting. In the broadest sense, the unions, like all such
organizations, built shelters from competition in the labor market to blunt the effects of what
Marx called the “industrial reserve army”—the “constant presence of a substantial pool of
unemployed workers,” as the economist Howard Botwinick defines the term. Runaways, which
expanded the geography of production and ushered new groups of workers into the available
labor pool, effected the creation of new reserve armies that helped to set workers against one
another in a competition to sell themselves more cheaply in terms of wages, working conditions,
and less quantifiable riches like pride, dignity, and autonomy. 8
An important precondition for runaway shops was the development of transportation
technologies that permitted the rapid shipment of goods at low cost. These technologies were
“inherently political,” argues political scientist John Mollenkopf. They grew out of conflicts
between owners and workers in the transport industries themselves and permitted not only the
escape of manufacturers from the urban industrial districts that sustained worker militancy, but
the creation of new, suburban subjectivities that augured against a resurgence of that militancy.
“We are going to get away from tenements, traffic jams, high taxes, crowded street-cars, and
transient labor, with all the economic waste and irritation those things involve,” boasted one
candid manufacturer in 1948. Today, extraordinary reductions in the cost of international
shipping make possible a global labor arbitrage premised on an industrial reserve army nearplanetary in scope. In this way, logistics, concludes one scholar, has been “one of the key
weapons in a decades-long global offensive against labor.” 9

Howard Botwinick, Persistent Inequalities: Wage Disparity under Capitalist Competition, rev. ed. (Chicago:
Haymarket Books, 2018), 124.
9
John H. Mollenkopf, “The Post-War Politics of Urban Development.” Politics & Society 5, no. 3 (September
1975): 247–95; Marc Levinson, The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller and the World
8

7

When manufacturers left the Northeast, then, they did not simply leave a geographical
region—they left a particular urban formation, a set of political institutions, a culture, an idea.
When machinist Sidney Mason defected from the Communist-affiliated leadership of his local
union, he told CIO officials he would have to leave Williamsburg, a working-class neighborhood
nestled against the water at Brooklyn’s northwest edge, for fear of the opprobrium that would
attach to the family of a “rat.” In southern Alabama, on the other hand, garment worker Fay
Madden could be beaten up for advocating even a politically moderate union like the ILGWU.
Not every case was as stark, but in the Northeast, union power and everything that went with it—
collective bargaining, job security, influence in politics—made workers assertive and weakened
the ability of managers to deploy the traditional tools of intimidation and stoking competition
among workers. The New Deal, a metonym for this political dispensation, weakened when one
crossed the Mason-Dixon line. It was the differences between regions—economically, socially,
politically, culturally—that attracted northern manufacturers, who happily Southern-ized
themselves in the quest for higher profits. “From now on we’re strictly Confederate,” joked a
manager of the American Safety Razor company when the firm’s owners abandoned Brooklyn
for a new factory in Virginia’s Shenandoah Valley. 10
In his book Working-Class New York, Joshua Freeman charts the role of New York
City’s working class and its unions in making postwar New York “a social democratic polity

Economy Bigger (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 18–35, 61; David M. Gordon, “Capitalist
Development and the History of American Cities,” in Marxism and the Metropolis: New Perspectives in Urban
Political Economy, 2nd ed., ed. William K. Tabb and Larry Sawers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 21–
53; Jasper Bernes, “Logistics, Counterlogistics and the Communist Prospect,” Endnotes no. 3 (2013),
https://bit.ly/2Hn1nED.
10
Les Finnegan to James Carey, August 30, 1949, Box 30, Folder 35, International Union of Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers, President’s Office, Special Collections and University Archives, Rutgers University Libraries;
“Brief of Petitioner Brewton Fashions, Inc.,” Box 41, Folder 1, ILGWU Southeast Region Records, Collection
5780/058, Kheel Center for Labor-Management Documentation, Catherwood Library, Cornell University, Ithaca,
NY; Pointz Tyler, “The Happy Fugitives from Flatbush,” Saturday Evening Post, March 9, 1957.
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unique in the country in its ambition and achievements.” If social democracy consisted in the
“the desire to extend democratic precepts to society at large, including the organization of the
economy,” as historian Geoff Eley describes it, this project issued concretely in the elaboration
of a set of institutions designed to “contain the expansion of the market and protect society from
its chaotic and ‘disorganizing’ logic,” in the words of political economist Jerome Roos. At the
point of production, collective bargaining, enshrined in law by the National Labor Relations Act
of 1935, was the institution thought to reconcile what the sociologist Wolfgang Streeck calls
“social justice”—the idea, for example, that people who work should be paid enough to live
according to a minimally decent and collectively determined standard—with “market justice,” or
the assurance of tolerable levels of profitability for their employers. This balancing act in turn
underpinned the political coalition that built and guarded New York’s unique municipal welfare
state. The ultimate goal of social democracy, according to political scientist Sheri Berman, is
“the reconciliation of things long viewed as incompatible: a well-functioning capitalist system,
democracy, and social stability.” 11
In New York’s privately-owned manufacturing industries, this dispensation—what I call
in this work the “New Deal settlement”—was remarkably short. At American Safety Razor, for
example, a mere twelve years elapsed between unionization, achieved during the Second World
War with the help of the federal government, and the runaway that ensued in the 1950s. Other
industries held on longer, but they did so to the extent that workers acquiesced in the erosion of

Freeman, Working-Class New York, 55; Geoff Eley, Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe,
1850–2000 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 22; Jerome Roos, “From the Demise of Social Democracy
to the ‘End of Capitalism’: The Intellectual Trajectory of Wolfgang Streeck,” Historical Materialism, forthcoming;
Wolfgang Streeck, “How to Study Contemporary Capitalism?” European Journal of Sociology 53, no. 1 (2012): 1–
28; Sheri Berman, The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe’s Twentieth Century
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 17. For an elaboration of the logical and historical relationship
between capitalism and social democracy, see Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985).
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the living standards collective bargaining was meant to protect. This was the “return of the
sweatshop” identified by State Senator Franz Leichter in 1979. Whether he knew it or not,
Leichter was channeling Marx, who observed a hundred years prior that “capital is by nature a
leveller, since it insists upon equality in the conditions of exploitation of labor in every sphere of
production as its own innate right.” By the late 1960s, attempts to shoehorn employers into a
fading system, as the United Auto Workers tried to do with P & D Manufacturing during the
struggles described in Chapter Three of this work, resulted in near-immediate runaways that
jumped not only state lines but national borders. If New York’s unions were determined to
organize a working class evolving along lines of race, gender, and migration, companies
responded by tapping desperate reserve armies well beyond the reach of such efforts. 12
The social-democratic settlement, an attempt to secure rising wages and living standards
as well as the profitability without which firms cannot survive in a capitalist economy, emerged
as a cumulative result of collaboration between workers, their employers, and the state. This
collaboration was never smooth or stable—more often than not, it was antagonistic. The term
“runaway” connotes the souring and ultimately the breakdown of these relationships. For this
reason, I prefer “runaway” to its more abstract equivalents, like deindustrialization,
globalization, or even capital flight. It is the term that evokes most concretely the history of
struggles over who would dictate the terms of the labor market—terms which themselves shaped
the health, well-being, and non-working lives of those who toiled for wages in New York City’s
factories—as well as the issues of power, leverage, and exploitation that shaped their course. For
factory owners, unlike workers, each wage increase, each reduction in hours, each safety

Franz S. Leichter, “The Return of the Sweatshop: A Call for State Action,” unpublished report, 3 vols., 1979–82;
Karl Marx, Capital: Volume I, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin, 1976), 520.
12
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measure could only represent one thing—a cost. In the competitive fray, people become things,
lives become numbers.
In news reports, runaways appeared as discrete events—the factory closes, the workers
lose their jobs—but each was the climax of years and sometimes decades of confrontation. In
tracing these struggles, this dissertation offers a kind of hidden social history of
deindustrialization. The break-ups were painful, and for many, contrary to the placid assurances
of orthodox economists, adjustment was slow, the pain drawn out. Runaways were a
culmination—a last straw, a desperate technique to break unions’ shelters, to reinstate
competition in the labor market. What accounts for their precise timing? In his book Persistent
Inequalities, Howard Botwinick offers a general theory of capital mobility:
Yet, although gaining access to low-wage workers in the reserve army may often involve
substantial costs to certain capitals, it nevertheless remains an important option that becomes
increasingly attractive to all capitals as the range of wage differentiation grows. As the wage
differential between the currently employed workforce and capital’s potential labor reserves
continues to widen, and as fixed capital structures begin to depreciate, it will eventually become
cost effective for capital to tap into those low-wage reserves. 13

Some industries, like clothing or the unskilled, labor-intensive auto parts manufacture
that took place at P & D Manufacturing, had few fixed costs and could respond assiduously to
the cost savings made available in new, far-flung production sites. For firms in more capitalintensive industries, like American Safety Razor, running away was likely to coincide with
retooling and new capital investment that augured both a wage reduction in the absolute sense
and the additional savings made possible by mechanization. Even garment firms, whose work
was notoriously resistant to mechanization, took advantage of what economies of scale they
could manage, increasing the size of their factories, extending the division of labor, and
installing new capital equipment where possible. All were lured by local and state governments

13
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eager to put surplus labor to work. And each took advantage of a burgeoning infrastructure of
runaways—factory relocation services, local development corporations, private investigators
who specialized in union-busting—that helped them forge what the historian Mike Davis calls “a
new union-resistant geography of American industry.” This infrastructure helped firms share and
spread the cost of relocation, marking one of the ways in which capital flight became a class
project. It became a class project, too, in the ways that desperate, laid-off workers in New York
became willing to take any job on offer, at whatever wage, as an alternative to personal collapse.
Runaways represented a return of competition, a reversion to market justice, on both
geographical sides of the equation. 14
Nearly all works written by historians about New York City during the postwar era
acknowledge deindustrialization as a key force shaping the city’s politics and the lives of its
inhabitants. Oftentimes, the retreat of manufacturing employment is treated as a given, forming a
backdrop to the unfolding dramas of municipal politics, urban renewal, racial conflict, or classinflected identity formation. Such works are illuminating in many respects, but relatively few
attempt to explain why manufacturing did not survive in New York City.
Two works published in the 1990s do offer causal explanations for the deindustrialization
of New York. Both focus on the decisions of politicians, planners, and real estate developers at
the municipal level. In The New York Approach: Robert Moses, Urban Liberals, and the
Redevelopment of the Inner City, Joel Schwartz argues that local politicians were aware of the
ongoing departure of manufacturing from the city but remained sanguine because they believed a
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series of planners and “theorists” who told them that such changes were “naturally ordained.”
Schwartz’s critique runs thus:
Complacency towards the health of New York’s manufacturing sector ended during the 1970s.
The city had been hemorrhaging factory jobs for years, but the 1975 fiscal crisis, along with
postmortems about the War on Poverty, put the loss in alarming perspective. Social theorists noted
the drain of blue-collar jobs and the need of the city’s black and Hispanic newcomers for
unskilled, entry-level opportunity. Using a favorite catchword, they warned about the growing
“mismatch” in the labor market between job seekers and available jobs and the explosive pressures
felt by minorities who searched for jobs in vain. Analysts explained that manufacturing’s woes
were the result of what they called the “structural” shifts in that realigned American cities with
global economic trends. New York had evolved into a postindustrial metropolis whose blue-collar
trades had been replaced by white-collar services. The disappearance of entry-level slots would
cause dislocations, but vigorous manpower strategies … might ease the transition. Theorists
alternated between acceptance of the inevitable and responses within established limits.

Schwartz goes on to argue that decisions made at the municipal level in the 1940s and 50s—
namely, “when the city chose redevelopment housing and civic centers over manufacturing”—
“cast the fate” of manufacturing in New York. In other words, the mayor, city council, borough
presidents, and others could have ensured the ongoing vitality of small manufacturers in the city
had they not been seduced by academics who dangled “monumental public buildings and
splendid plazas” to replace the small-scale manufacturing they assured civic leaders was passé.
According to Schwartz, these planners, driven by “Victorian moralism” and a “snooty sense of
hierarchy,” not only sanctioned but helped to cause the erosion of the city’s erstwhile economic
engine. Schwartz’s argument assumes the form of a retroactive plea on behalf of the city’s petitbourgeoisie, channeling their complaints about taxation, city government, and public housing. 15
Schwartz asserts, correctly, that the city’s manufacturing sector appeared strong
immediately following World War II. He is also correct to suggest that many politicians either
assumed it would remain so indefinitely or that its gradual dissolution would not present social
problems of undue intensity. And he shows that several urban renewal projects did in fact
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displace manufacturing jobs. His estimate of anywhere between 18,000 and 30,000 jobs
eliminated due to redevelopment along the East River from 1945 to 1955 is tentative, includes
non-manufacturing workers (mainly small retail) and is subject to several other caveats having to
do with difficulties of enumeration. But even if we accept the maximum, the figure cannot
explain why the city lost at least 50,000 manufacturing jobs in total during this period—at the
height of the presumptive postwar boom—and why the trend continued in dizzyingly accelerated
fashion in the ensuing decades. Moreover, Schwartz connects job loss with specific municipal
policies only in these cases. The remainder of his argument rests on a correlation between what
planners were predicting and what actually occurred. This does not mean, however, that the
planners caused the deindustrialization of New York. It is equally possible, for instance, that
they simply predicted correctly on the basis of observable trends. 16
Schwartz’s critique reflects both nostalgia for the prewar industrial city and the desire to
identify individual culprits for its demise—hence the use of scare quotes around words like
“structural.” The romantic critique of deindustrialization reached fever pitch in a book published
the same year as The New York Approach—this one titled The Assassination of New York, by
Robert Fitch, a radical journalist with roots in the New Left. The book’s title reflects its essential
contention—that industrial New York was not merely permitted to die but actively
“assassinated” by a coalition of planners, bankers, and real estate interests who conspired to
purge the city of factories in order to increase the value of their real estate holdings and create
opportunities for further speculation. This “conscious policy of structural transformation,” in
Fitch’s telling, was remarkably durable, surviving more or less unchanged through a series of
twists and turns from 1929, the date of the first Regional Plan, until the 1990s, when Fitch was
Ibid., 237–39; Employment, Hours, and Earnings, States and Areas, 1938–82: Volume II (Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 1984).
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writing. In his account of the deindustrialization of New York, Fitch locates causality less in the
dynamics of an evolving capitalist economy than in a series of intra-elite conflicts. 17
Fitch’s account represents a more muscular version of Schwartz’s thesis. The two
arguments share a common logic—certain of the city’s elite predicted or even desired the decline
of manufacturing in New York; because this eventually occurred, they were the cause. In
general, the arguments rest on presenting side-by-side the visions of these elites and the eventual
deindustrialized city that supposedly fulfilled their ambitions. In other words, they demonstrate
correlation but not necessarily causation. In a typical passage, Fitch argues that
A New York City purged of its manufacturing, and stripped of its port, was the dream of the
Regional Plan’s directors—Morgan bankers, Rockefeller Foundation executives, New York
Central and Jersey Central railroad directors, outer borough real estate developers … Today, of
course, New York City does closely resemble the whited-out version. Bankers’ dreams won out
over a gritty manufacturing reality … What explains the striking correspondence between the
RPA’s plans and their materialization? Was it their power or their prescience?

And in summation:
Certainly an explanation which refers only to external, objective, impersonal factors can’t account
for the rate, timing and nature of New York’s manufacturing job loss. New York lost too many
jobs, it lost them at times when the rest of the US wasn’t losing them, and it shed types of jobs—
those based on external economies—that are relatively hard to lose. It’s not that New York wasn’t
affected by market and technological forces. But something different, something in addition to the
decentralization and de-industrialization that’s been going on in the rest of the country has
happened here. 18

There are issues with all of the above arguments—it is debatable, for example, whether
New York lost proportionally more jobs than other industrial centers or whether the external
economies fostered by the city’s density necessarily endured in the face of new transportation
and communications technology. The main point is that Schwartz downplays and Fitch ridicules
the idea that anything like “objective” developments in the global economy—“academic
globaloney,” in Fitch’s words—could affect the power of elites at the municipal level to shape
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the city according to their preferences. The main problem with this narrow, instrumentalist
explanation of deindustrialization is that it cannot explain the breadth of the phenomenon—if
deindustrialization in New York City was the product of such localized imperatives, why did
virtually the same thing occur across the Northeast, the United States, and eventually the entire
advanced capitalist world during the postwar era? 19
A more robust explanation resides in grasping the dynamics of capitalist competition.
Capital mobility, and therefore interregional competition for manufacturing, is an expression of
capitalist competition in general. 20 While rarely smooth or automatic, it is a feature of all
capitalist economies. States rely on the investment decisions of private capitalists, while
capitalists themselves operate in a web of pressures that Marx characterized as “the coercive
laws of competition.” “The immanent laws of capitalist production manifest themselves in the
external movement of the individual capitals, assert themselves as the coercive laws of
competition, and therefore enter into the consciousness of the individual capitalist as the motives
which drive him forward,” Marx wrote in Capital: Volume I. 21 Because geographical space is
physically and socially uneven, locational advantages become elements in this struggle. As
David Harvey, a pioneer in developing the spatial implications of Marx’s analysis, writes:
The advantage of a particular location to the individual capitalist depends on the cost of constant
and variable capital, of transportation to markets with sufficient effective demand, the cost of
interest-bearing capital, the cost and availability of a wide range of ancillary services, as well as
land price. These costs vary according to the munificence of nature (so-called 'natural' resource
endowments), social, political and economic conditions which affect the value of labour power,
costs of intermediate inputs, levels of effective demand, etc. Producers also engage in spatial
competition—that is, competition for favourable sites and locations, for domination of particular
market areas, and the like. 22
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The cost of transportation, the cost of labor, the availability of large pools of desperate workers,
access to state repression in service of wage restraint—all of these differ across time, for they are
always changing, and at any given moment they differ across space, offering those capitalists
who can manage it an opportunity to produce at a lower cost, seize growing portions of the
market, and wound their competitors. Places are crystallizations of habits, customs, regulatory
regimes—in short, of concrete histories. Over time, as capitalists mimic their cost leaders or die,
capital begins to shape those places in its own image. As Harvey writes:
Capital thus comes to represent itself in the form of a physical landscape created in its own image,
created as use values to enhance the progressive accumulation of capital on an expanding scale.
The geographical landscape which fixed and immobile capital comprises is both a crowning glory
of past capital development and a prison which inhibits the further progress of accumulation
because the very building of this landscape is antithetical to the “tearing down of spatial barriers”
and ultimately even to the “annihiliation of space by time.” 23

Lives, landscapes, and experiences converge even as an evolving global division of labor
distinguishes one place from another in what the geographer Neil Smith, following Marx, calls
“the dialectic of geographical differentiation and equalization.” The cost advantages derived
from leveraging regional differences are necessarily temporary—this too is a function of the
incessant competition that is the motor of growth in a capitalist economy. While the cost
advantages last, however, those unique histories become weapons. Each place described in this
dissertation—New York City, the coal fields of northeastern Pennsylvania, Virginia’s
Shenandoah Valley, the pine forests of southern Alabama, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, the plateaus of
central Mexico—had, during their manufacturing heydays, something that factory owners
wanted, could reach, and could exploit.24

David Harvey, “The Geography of Capitalist Accumulation,” Antipode 7, no. 2 (September 1975): 9–21.
Neil Smith, Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space, 3rd ed. (Athens: University of
Georgia Press, 2008), 132.

23
24

17

Investment in fixed capital—machines, buildings, and the like—can complicate
relocation, producing what Harvey calls “geographical and temporal inertia,” which in economic
terms means the persistence of relatively inefficient producers. This inertia—a pause in the
creative destruction—gives us the landscapes we see at any given time. The industrial building
that, from the perspective of one person’s working life, seems a permanent feature of the
landscape, in fact lives on borrowed time. Already in the nineteenth century, Marx had noted
how differential reliance on fixed capital could speed or retard geographical mobility. “This
constant equalization of ever-renewed inequalities,” he wrote, “is accomplished more quickly …
the more mobile capital is, i.e. the more easily it can be transferred from one sphere and one
place to others.” New York’s most important industry, the manufacture of clothing, is a case in
point. The industry was famously resistant to technological rationalization and thus notoriously
easy to enter. “A contractor with six sewing machines, operating out of a basement … can enter
the industry,” ILG educational director Gus Tyler wearily explained. For this reason, as soon as
garment unions began to erode their ability to access a nearly limitless labor pool, manufacturers
radiated outward in space—to Staten Island, to northeastern Pennsylvania, to the American
South, to East Asia, South Asia, the Caribbean, and beyond. Fitch’s notion that the garment
industry was “comparatively immune to decentralizing forces” would have come as a surprise to
the garment union officials who, as early as 1935, asserted that “the single most important
problem confronting the organization was the movement of factories to small towns in outlying
areas.” The connection between capital mobility and wage suppression meant that their jobs
entailed a ceaseless struggle to slow the anxious churn of competition, to fix manufacturers in
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space, and to combat the dampening effect on bargaining power exerted by the injection of vast
new pools of labor competing for the right to sew clothing. 25
While geographical relocation is a basic feature of capitalism, the Great Depression, New
Deal, and Second World War marked a turning point in the historical geography of American
manufacturing. The depression temporarily froze investment and thus relocation. The New Deal
safeguarded, to a point, the position of the unions in the mass production industries. Other New
Deal measures, like the controlled retirement of farmland, unsettled the old agricultural
economy. The war accelerated changes in North and South. The industrial unions grew swiftly,
often with the help of the federal government, which demanded a series of trade-offs that
guaranteed their existence while curtailing their strategic options. In the South, meanwhile, one
in four farmworkers left the industry. Massive government investments partially industrialized
the region, begetting an enlarged class of manufacturing workers. An emerging interstate
highway system helped to smooth earlier transportation frictions. A new generation of industrial
boosters emerged to court Northern manufacturers stung by the tenacity of the new unions. Now
they had a place to go. 26
The postwar era intensified these challenges, marking a new internationalization of
production, finance, and trade with the United States as guide and hegemon. The worldwide
depression of the 1930s had marked the end of a previous era of globalization, as country after
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country pursued autarchic policies, including tariffs, capital controls, restrictions on foreign
investment, and abandonment of the gold standard. In 1944, once an Allied victory seemed
certain, representatives from forty countries met at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire to hammer
out the principles and institutions upon which a new international economic order would be
constructed. The system that emerged underpinned a resurgence of both international trade and
foreign investment. The stability of the system was underwritten by the economic power of the
United States, whose currency served as an international reserve pegged to gold. Moreover, the
US actively pursued the rehabilitation of the European and Japanese economies via loans, direct
aid, the transfer of technology, and the suppression of militant, left-wing trade unionism. This aid
to the capitalist classes of their respective countries was undertaken not out of charity but as a
matter of both economic and political strategy. In other words, US policymakers consciously
promoted the development of their eventual competitors in service of the greater goal of
preserving capitalism itself. Allen Dulles made a typical statement when, in 1947, he spoke of
the US “desire to help restore a Europe which can and will compete with us in the world
markets.” It wasn’t just Europe. Japanese firms, which flooded the United States with
manufactured goods beginning in the 1950s, helped to jeopardize manufacturing profits in a
cascading series of industries, including the blouse industry explored in Chapter Three of this
work. 27
During the ensuing decades, the US doubled down on this strategy by accepting an
uneven playing field, tolerating protectionism, state support for and coordination of industry, and
the consistent undervaluing of currencies on the part of its rivals while eschewing these strategies
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for the US economy. In this way, writes Robert Brenner in the most comprehensive economic
history of the period, the US government “helped to create the conditions for the secular decline
of competitiveness of US domestic manufacturing.” At the same time, liberalized trade and
capital flows permitted the expansion of foreign direct investment on the part of US firms,
allowing them to secure cost advantages that derived from the combination of advanced
technology with relatively low-waged labor, often drawn from what remained of the countryside
in Germany and Japan. As a result, the German and Japanese economies embarked upon exportled booms that allowed them to “catch up” to the United States with remarkable speed. The
period between 1965 and 1973 marks roughly the point where what had been a rising tide
transformed into a zero-sum game, as the ability of the US to absorb the exports of its rivals
reached an absolute limit. Manufacturing profitability in the US collapsed, falling by 40.9
percent between 1969 and 1973, and the world economy as a whole entered what Brenner has
described as a “long-term and system-wide economic downturn” that persists to this day. The
long downturn has been characterized by slowed growth, reduced productivity, stagnant real
wages, and the return of periodic financial crises. In this environment, the likelihood of a revival
of New York City as a site for profitable manufacturing sank to virtually nil. In general,
international competition, whether from US or foreign firms, augmented the pressures exerted by
interregional competition. The politics of crossing national boundaries were more complex than
crossing regional ones, but the two phenomena derive from the same motive and represent a
“continuation of earlier patterns and strategies,” as the historian Jefferson Cowie emphasizes in
his account of the peregrinations of one important manufacturing firm. Those patterns and
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strategies were pioneered in older manufacturing centers like Brooklyn, the subject of Chapter
Two of this dissertation. 28
Just as the crisis has been worldwide, so, at a basic level, have been the solutions. They
help explain crisis-era geographical differentiation—why, in other words, New York is not
Detroit or Youngstown. In a recent work, Wolfgang Streeck has proposed a tripartite
periodization for the long downturn based on the successive monetary fixes employed by the
world’s wealthiest economies. First, governments employed inflationary monetary policy to
compensate for declining real growth. They then reversed course, permitting deflation and
recession, inaugurating a new era characterized by levels of unemployment unthinkable during
the postwar period and the accumulation of public debt to stave off harsh conflicts over
entitlements agreed upon in happier days. The third fix, signaled in the United States by the
balanced-budget initiatives of the Clinton administration, was to sustain demand via an
unacknowledged regime of what some call “privatized Keynesianism” and others “asset-price
Keynesianism”—in other words, consumer debt. 29
None of these solutions could be a substitute for real growth. However, each helped
prompt the dramatic expansion of the financial sector that has occurred since the 1980s. New
York City, because of its history, was uniquely well-positioned to benefit from these
developments, which served to insulate it from the fate of other US manufacturing centers. The
reasons for this can be traced back to the city’s earliest history as the premier deep-water port in
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what would become the United States. The clustering of manufacturers around the port gave rise
to agglomeration economies that eventually made New York both the manufacturing and the
financial capital of the United States. “The city’s great fortune,” argues economist Edward
Glaeser, “was that at the same time that it was suffering from an exodus of the garment trade, the
international financial sector boomed.” Glaeser dates New York’s near-total reliance on the
financial sector to around 1980. The world’s capitalist democracies might be “buying time,” as
Streeck argues, but insofar as that buying is coordinated in the United States, it tends to be
administered from New York City—for the time being, at least. From this perspective, the shift
to finance, insurance, and real estate as an employment and revenue base for the city appears less
the result of a localized conspiracy to fill office buildings, as Fitch argued, than the byproduct of
a large-scale shift in patterns of capital accumulation. New York’s current economic health, in
this sense, is as relative and precarious as the series of temporary fixes that have emerged to
address the contradictions that sprout from the contemporary shape of capital accumulation. 30
In all, the pervasiveness and duration of the trends outlined above make it unlikely that
deindustrialization in New York can be explained solely with reference to the beliefs or the
short-run interests of elites at the municipal level, no matter how powerful or determined. “If the
crisis is treated as an intermediate stage in a protracted developmental sequence,” as Streeck
argues, “it turns out that the parallels and interactions among capitalist countries far outweigh
their institutional and economic differences. The underlying dynamic, allowing for local
variations, is the same—even for countries considered as far apart from each other as Sweden
and the United States.” Similarly, in an appraisal of three significant attempts to come to terms
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with the post-1973 era of capitalist history, Moishe Postone argued that “when viewed with
reference to this general trajectory, differences in development appear as different inflections of
a common pattern rather than as fundamentally different developments. The general character of
the large-scale historical pattern that structured much of the twentieth century suggests the
existence of overarching structural imperatives and constraints that cannot adequately be
explained in local and contingent terms.” 31
The present work explores one runaway plant for each postwar decade. Each factory I
investigate represents a different industry, a different union, and a different strategy for
addressing the problem of capital mobility. This differentiated approach is designed to account
for New York’s unique manufacturing economy, where, unlike in Pittsburgh, Detroit, or other
Rust Belt cities, no one industry dominated the scene. The selections also reflect the availability
of source material. Each of these runaways came to serve as a watershed of sorts for the unions
that represented their workers. The archives of those unions thus contain a critical mass of
documentation that permit a robust narrative and a window into strategy that is harder to come
by for runaways with limited public profiles or those that had never been unionized. A fourth
case study explores the attempt to shoehorn manufacturing back into the city under the auspices
of the nascent community development movement during the 1960s and 70s. This was an
exception that proved the rule—a factory-as-political project sponsored by a large and seemingly
invulnerable corporation that collapsed when that company’s fortunes declined during the 1980s
and 90s. Runaways were not the only cause of job loss in New York City during this period—
mechanization, for example, eliminated entire categories of work and necessarily took
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precedence as a cost-cutting strategy in industries that could not easily relocate. At the same
time, runaways and mechanization derive from the same essential dynamic and often operated in
tandem, as we see in the case of the electrical and metalworking industries covered in Chapter
Two.
The chapters in this dissertation might also be read as a series of essays working through
the challenges of doing historical political economy. I use the term “political economy” instead
of “economics” to denote a series of analytical commitments that depart from what one analyst
calls the “constricted analytical method, unrealistic assumptions, poor explanatory power, and
political bias” of orthodox economics. In particular, a renewed emphasis on the classical
tradition embodied in the work of Smith, Ricardo, Marx, and their descendants offers an
alternative to the cheery nostrums of neoclassical economics, which predict quickly-arrived-at
equilibriums mainly by assuming away a number of real-world phenomena that historians are
duty-bound not to ignore. As historians and as political actors in the world, we cannot accept
accounts of that world that tread beyond justifiable abstraction into what the economist Howard
Botwinick calls “idealization” and which cook the analysis in service of the normative claim that
whatever its results, contemporary capitalism represents the best of all possible worlds. The
political instability and environmental devastation that characterize our present moment suggest
that large numbers of people are concluding that whatever this world is, it is not good enough. 32
In my view, historians, who work under a disciplinary injunction to account for the
concrete, are well-placed to help put the “political” back in political economy. The challenges
are significant. In writing this work, I have wrestled with the challenge of building explanations
that translate smoothly between the abstract and the concrete—of steering, in other words,
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between the Scylla of bloodless abstraction and the Charybdis of an endless particularism that
scorns all attempt at generalization. The good news is that as historians reconstruct the past from
archival documents, those most primary of all primary sources, economists working in what we
may broadly call the heterodox tradition are approaching the same problems from the other
direction. In particular, the concept of “real competition,” refined by Anwar Shaikh over the
course of a long career, offers an alternative to the neoclassical idea of perfect competition,
which assumes perfect information, perfect mobility of resources, and a quick convergence of
wages and profits both within and between industries. Real competition, on the other hand—“as
different from perfect competition as war is from ballet,” in Shaikh’s memorable phrase—
reaches back to the principles of the classical tradition to recast the economy as a dynamic series
of struggles waged by mostly-blind actors whose outcomes are messy, violent, and
discontinuous. The “real” in real competition signals the commitment to account for real
outcomes—chronic underemployment and its traumas, the persistence of racial and gender
discrimination in labor markets, the “geographical and temporal inertia” noted by Harvey. Its
own normative claim follows Marx and dovetails with the one that emerges from the accounts of
job loss presented here—that the deprivation of workers is not the result of something in
capitalism going “wrong,” but an outcome of its essential procedures. In all, the idea of real
competition suggests the possibility of a convergence between economic theory and the stories
of brutal struggle that emerge from the archives of actual firms and unions, characterized as they
are by stark outcomes and clear winners and losers. 33
In the end, this is a work about the proletarian condition. The stories cohere around the
themes of security and vulnerability, its twin poles. In general, the manufacturers that remained
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in New York at midcentury were concentrated in labor-intensive, highly-competitive industries
where wage suppression was a key—and sometimes the only—means of survival. For this
reason, these employers sought the socially vulnerable—those whose subordinate positions,
conditioned by race, gender, migration status, and sometimes all three, compelled them to accept
the substandard wages and conditions required to maintain profitability in these cut-throat
environments. When workers sought to reduce their vulnerability through collective action,
joining the industrial unions buttressed by the New Deal, their firms responded by fleeing the
Northeast in search of a new, low-cost workforce defined by its relative isolation and
vulnerability.
Each story I tell represents an attempt by workers, their unions, and the state to fashion
and maintain a kind of managed capitalism that could reconcile a living wage, dignified
conditions, and the universalist ethos of the industrial union movement with tolerable levels of
profitability for their employers. Each effort collapsed under the growing competitive pressures
and increased opportunities for relocation that characterized the postwar era. The solution, in
these cases, was what the geographer David Harvey calls a “spatial fix”—a fix that was at the
same time economic, social, and racial, given the way firms embraced the political economy of
Jim Crow and that of the global color line. In the end, runaways were about increasing the size of
the potential labor force, renewing vulnerability, and setting workers in competition with one
another across ever-wider geographical scales.
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Chapter One
“Believe Me, You Can Lose”: American Safety Razor and the Deindustrialization of
Brooklyn
On April 15, 1954, the Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute, the country’s second-largest
engineering school, announced the $2 million purchase of an eight-story building on Jay Street in
downtown Brooklyn. The thirty-three year-old building had previously belonged to the American
Safety Razor Corporation (ASR), a manufacturer of razor blades, shaving brushes, cigarette
lighters, and other metal products. ASR, a descendant of the Star Safety Razor Company
established by two German immigrants in 1875, had operated in New York for the past seventysix years and Brooklyn for thirty-six. Company president Sidney Weil, who had recently
assumed the post, told the Brooklyn Eagle that while the terms of sale permitted ASR to remain
in the building for up to three and a half years, the firm would begin scouting new locations
immediately, “both in the metropolitan New York area and elsewhere.” 1
The announcement set off alarm bells across the borough. ASR employed around 1,400
people and was a mainstay of the Brooklyn economy. Its leaders were prominent and influential
citizens. Former president and current board chairman Milton Dammann had thrice headed the
Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce, a self-described “united front” for borough employers. His
predecessor in the role had been Harry S. Rogers, the president of Brooklyn Polytechnic. 2
The business-friendly Eagle was unperturbed, endorsing the sale in a breezy editorial and
assuring readers that the problem of relocating ASR “is being studied.” Correspondents were not
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so sure. “Surely our borough cannot afford to lose an industry of this type,” wrote one. “Think of
the prestige we will sacrifice as an industrial center were this company to leave our borders.
Visualize the number of residents that would be affected by such a move and the resultant loss to
small shopkeepers by the exodus of a vast number of workers from our borough.” 3
Congressman Emmanuel Celler, whose 11th District covered large parts of Brooklyn,
voiced similar consternation. The razor manufacturer, he pointed out in a letter to the Eagle, was
not an isolated case. “Quite a number” of industrial firms had left or announced plans to leave
Brooklyn in recent years. In addition to putting thousands out of work, “the purchasing power of
Brooklyn is being greatly curtailed,” Celler worried. He blamed the exodus on a search for lower
labor costs and urged a boost to the federal minimum wage that could blunt the impact of the
regional disparities that drove factory relocations. Celler’s message mirrored the “fretful mood”
of organized labor, whose chiefs warned of a coming slump and sought an increase in the
minimum wage from a recalcitrant Eisenhower administration. 4
In his letter, Celler enumerated the companies that had lately abandoned Brooklyn. His
list reveals a panorama of Brooklyn’s still-mighty industrial economy at midcentury. Davis &
Geck, the world’s second-largest maker of surgical sutures, represented New York City’s
preeminent position in the manufacture of medical and surgical devices. Permutit, manufacturer
of a well-known water softening device for commercial and industrial use, was a testament to the
still-important chemical industries located in the borough. United Metal Box, which built steel
medicine cabinets and clothes hampers for apartments and hotels as well as ammunition boxes
for the US Army, exemplified the city’s myriad metalworking firms. Eastern Air Devices
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fabricated small electrical motors for military and civilian application. Arma Engineering was a
spin-off of the famous Sperry Gyroscope company, which had itself decamped Brooklyn for an
enormous, government-financed Long Island plant during the Second World War. Like Sperry,
Arma built gyrocompasses—devices that enable accurate firing from warships—using a
blueprint originally stolen from the German navy during World War I. One of its co-founders
was a veteran of the nearby Brooklyn Navy Yard—soon to be shuttered itself—and the firm was
so intimately connected with that facility that Arma’s founders considered it virtually a
department of the government. The oldest of all the runaways was Bommer Spring Hinge, which
had been manufacturing the self-closing door hinges invented by its founder in New York for
nearly a hundred years, the last fifty in its purpose-built Brooklyn factory on Classon Avenue. 5
Among the organizations most immediately threatened by the industrial exodus was the
Amalgamated Machine, Instrument, and Metal Local No. 475 of the United Electrical, Radio,
and Machine Workers of America (UE). This local union, established in 1939, had represented
around twenty-thousand workers at its peak. But the runaway plant movement was pummeling
the organization. Arma, Permutit, Eastern Air Devices, Bommer Spring Hinge, United Metal
Box, and ASR were all Local 475 shops. Local 475, like the workers it had emerged to represent,
was situated in a particular time and place. While the Communist organizing tradition from
which its officers emerged emphasized a broad, politicized vision of trade unionism that
recognized the unemployed as an important component of the working class, Local 475 was still
a trade union premised, in the end, on the existence of work.
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Local 475 officials concurred with Celler that the wave of closings threatened the
viability of the city itself. Business Manager Clifton “Cliff” Cameron warned that “the economy
of Brooklyn is being weakened. The people thrown out of work are not going to find new jobs so
easily today. That means 1,500 people are to be buying less goods. Other companies will find it
necessary to lay off hundreds of other workers, swelling the relief rolls, and adding to the effects
of the economic crisis which threatens.” Twenty years later, when New York plunged into nearbankruptcy, Cameron’s words, if anyone remembered them, would have seemed prescient. 6
One by one, the shops bolted. In December 1953, Eastern Air Devices (EAD) deserted
Brooklyn for Dover, New Hampshire, leaving four hundred out of work. The shop’s departure
was part of an industrial reshuffling whereby EAD took advantage of the wave of abandonment
that had denuded large parts of New England of its ailing textile mills. In the desperate “ghost
towns” of that region, Cameron predicted, EAD would find the drastically curtailed labor costs
that would prop up its profits in the face of an anticipated post-Korean War slump. In their shop
paper, the UE Blade, ASR workers reported that EAD’s new employees in New Hampshire
endured a starting rate of $0.75 an hour, a more than fifty-percent drop from the UE-negotiated
Brooklyn minimum of $1.60. 7
Some Local 475 shops went directly south. Bommer Spring Hinge ended its near-century
in the city “literally overnight,” in the words of the company’s present managers, trading in
Brooklyn for Landrum, South Carolina, where it lives on today. Company vice president Emil
Bommer told a mayoral aide that “this move was necessary to successfully compete with similar
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products manufactured at other locations where conditions, taxes and utility rates are more
favorable.” “Conditions” was a polite abstraction—over the course of the conversation, the aide
reported, it emerged that “labor troubles were the main factor” in prompting the move. 8
Bommer workers had indeed troubled their employer on several occasions during the
preceding decade. In 1947, they endorsed a one-day work stoppage to protest the newly-passed
Taft-Hartley Act, which they called the “Slave Labor Bill.” In 1950, managers shut down the
plant when Italian-born machinist Anthony Cattanar, with the support of the union, tried to return
to his job after being arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on suspicion of violating the
Smith Act, which outlawed advocating the overthrow of the United States government “by force
or violence.” In 1952, Bommer workers affirmed their loyalty to the unapologetically left-wing
UE when they turned back a raid by the anti-communist International Union of Electrical
Workers (IUE), a rival union set up by the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) when it
expelled the UE in 1949. UE loyalists in the shop insisted the raid was company-sponsored.
During the early 1950s, Bommer workers struck early and often—three times in two years before
a fourth threatened stoppage secured a contract that old-timers considered the “best in shop
history.” During its fourteen years in the plant, Local 475 could claim credit for a series of wage
increases, guaranteed raises, the abolition of piece rates, and an end to the color line embodied in
Bommer’s informal “white Christian” employment policy. 9
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Now, those struggles seemed to have been for naught. When the 1952 contract expired,
Bommer packed up the plant and shipped the equipment to South Carolina, where “Jim Crow
pays off in lower wages and sub-standard working conditions,” Brooklyn workers alleged. A
minor consolation came when Local 475 managed to bust the color line at Century Projector,
another local manufacturer, compelling that employer to observe the fair employment practices
clause in its contract with the union and hire Elmer Pressley, formerly the “number one tool and
die man” at Bommer. Sixty-five years later, bitterness lingers—recounting the move on its
present-day website, the company blames a “well-entrenched and uncooperative labor union” for
its departure. 10
The list went on—United Metal Box to Pottsville, Pennsylvania; Permutit to Lancaster.
One Permutit worker, laid off after eleven and a half years with the company, travelled to
Pennsylvania in an attempt to regain his job. His report for the local described a twenty-five
percent pay cut and the absence of once-standard benefits like vacations, holidays, rest periods,
and the employer-funded health insurance that existed in nearly three-quarters of Local 475
shops. The same issue of Local 475 News carried a visceral reminder of the hardships facing
older workers as unemployment spread throughout the borough. A sixty-four year old Permutit
worker, who had repeatedly shown up to the company’s Manhattan headquarters to beseech
company officials for a job in Pennsylvania, pay cut or no, had recently gone missing. His
belongings were discovered by police on the George Washington Bridge that spans the Hudson
between northern Manhattan and New Jersey. 11
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Permutit workers had had fought back hard, mounting a plant occupation to resist the
company’s efforts to discharge them with a mere $12.60 in severance pay for each year worked.
When the company reneged on its pledge to permit its workers extra overtime before the
shutdown and instead began to lay them off early, the union’s shop committee protested. The
company responded by suspending the committee and trying to have Local 475 Business Agent
Arnold Bernadini carted off by police. That evening, all one hundred Permutit workers on the
day shift refused to leave the factory. They camped out in the plant for two frigid January nights,
even as the company shut off the heat in a bid to eject them.
The Permutit sit-in, televised on NBC, became a minor event. According to the Daily
Worker, with the plant “surrounded by cops” and “a police captain and several sergeants
conferring menacingly with company officials,” workers in the plant hung signs emblazoned
with defiant slogans. “They will get us out by atom bomb only,” read one. “Remember the
Alamo—They stood until the last man—So will we,” declared a second. Night shift workers,
barred from the plant by police and private security, mounted pickets and hovered around the
factory, seizing opportunities to secret sandwiches, coffee, and medicine through the open
windows. Some, getting creative, managed to hoist an entire spaghetti dinner to their comrades.
ASR workers joined their compatriots on the picket line. After failing to secure an injunction to
force its workers out of the plant, Permutit relented, reinstating all laid-off workers, reversing the
suspension of the committee members, and agreeing to bargain over severance pay. The
company was still leaving, but a militant defense could make inroads. 12
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Now it was ASR’s turn. Eastern Air, Bommer, and Permutit had been bad enough,
depriving hundreds of their jobs and the union of resources it would need to continue organizing
and resist the tide of factory closings. ASR’s departure posed the same problems, but on another
order of magnitude. By 1954, ASR was the largest shop remaining in Local 475 and a “pacesetter” for negotiations with other Brooklyn manufacturers. Moreover, its diverse workforce—
eighty-five percent women and twenty percent African American and Puerto Rican—made it a
key site for Local 475’s campaigns to prevent local manufacturers from leveraging race and
gender distinctions to lower their wage bills. 13
Local 475’s difficulties went deeper. During the late 1940s, the local had boasted over
twenty thousand members, but the rightward shift that gripped American politics during those
years had seriously undermined an organization whose leaders maintained substantial links to the
Communist Party. During the last several years, an offensive mounted by a de facto coalition of
employers, the federal government, more conservative unions, and the Catholic Church had
borne fruit at the local level in the defection of once-flagship shops like Mergenthaler Linotype
(the world’s largest manufacturer of typesetting equipment) and American Machine and Foundry
to the United Auto Workers (UAW), whose New York City affiliates leveraged their willingness
to comply with the anti-communist provisions of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act into a series of
“raids” on UE shops that dealt a body blow to Local 475. During a catastrophic six-month period
in 1948, the local lost over half its membership, plummeting from 19,000 to 9,500 members.
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ASR workers, however, had kept the UE faith, repelling an attempted raid by the conservative
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers by a more than eight-to-one margin. 14
During the years leading up to the move, relations between the company, its workers, and
the union had increasingly assumed the character of a standoff. Contract negotiations in 1952
had collapsed into a two-month-long strike after twenty-eight “fruitless” negotiating sessions
during which the company refused to offer more than a three-cent per-hour raise—an effective
pay cut given the rising cost of living in early-1950s New York City—and insisted on inserting a
“management prerogative” clause that would greatly weaken the union’s ability to contest
firings. ASR workers believed the prerogative clause was a device to eliminate both older
workers and union militants in order to pave the way for a planned speed-up—a drive to reduce
the work force and extract more production from the remaining workers with no corresponding
increase in pay. 15
To ASR workers, especially old-timers, the company’s 1952 demands felt like a trip back
in time to the pre-union days of the 1920s and 30s. Paul Alagna, a forty-two year veteran of
ASR, told the Local 475 newspaper how in 1910 he had worked fifty-nine hour weeks at ten
cents an hour—a rate around five times below the present average at a company still known in
the 1950s for its low wages. “They want to break our union, and return to the conditions that I
worked under when we started,” Alagna claimed. Those conditions had been buttressed by the

Ellen Schrecker, Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America (New York: Little, Brown & Company, 1998),
29; “ASR Workers Crush IBEW Raid 848 to 98,” Local 475 News, May 1952, Box 1, Folder 4, Kirschner
Collection; “Special Executive Board Meeting,” March 17, 1948, Box 1, Folder 2, International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers, Local 485 Records; WAG 137; Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives,
New York University; “Minutes of Special Call Membership Meeting, Amalgamated Machine, Instrument and
Metal Local No. 475, UE,” August 12, 1948, Box 1, Folder 2, IUE Local 485 Records; “Executive Board Meeting,”
October 8, 1948, Box 1, Folder 2, IUE Local 485 Records; On the multifaceted offensive to weaken the UE in the
late 1940s, see Ronald W. Schatz, The Electrical Workers: A History of Labor at General Electric and
Westinghouse, 1923–60 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983), 167–87.
15
“Workers at American Safety Razor Company Hit Pavement in Fight For Contract Demands,” Local 475 News,
June 1952, Box 10, Folder 89, UE District 4 Records.
14

36

fear of the sack and the unfettered power of foremen—practices the company now intended to
re-establish. “Those foremen in there want to push us around, particularly the women,” said Rose
Criscolli, a fifteen-year veteran, remembering how managerial prerogative and the absence of
any organized defense had helped to cement the gendered wage differentials that formed a
central component of the competitive strategy for companies in the electrical and other so-called
“light” manufacturing industries. Before Local 475 established itself, the company had also
encouraged racial hierarchies in the plant. “When I came in here they wouldn’t let Negro
workers in the cafeteria,” remembered Andrew Poly, an ASR worker with twenty-three years at
the plant. “The union broke that down. Now they want to bust our union, and run the shop like a
dictator. We’ll never stand for that.” 16
The word “dictator” was well-chosen. “Prerogative” meant power—the unchallenged and
sometimes unlimited authority of employers to direct the lives of their workers both inside and
outside the factory. To grasp the salience of the battle against managerial prerogative, it is
important to understand the contours of early twentieth-century factory life and the sea change
wrought by the unionization of mass production industries under the banner of the CIO during
the 1930s and 40s. Late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century American factories were what
one historian has called a “foreman’s empire,” where, according to historian David Montgomery,
these first-line supervisors enjoyed “virtually absolute authority” over who worked, where, how,
and for how much. In the electrical industries soon to be organized by the UE, crisis periods like
the Great Depression had augmented the power of these petty tyrants, as desperate production
workers subject to layoff at any moment competed for whatever work they could get. Some
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foremen used their leverage to exercise near-seigniorial power, extracting personal favors like
house cleaning or sex from the companies’ increasingly female work force. Scenes of
humiliation abounded in Depression-era factories. As a General Electric employee interviewed
by historian Ronald Schatz recalled: “Why you could stand there and hear a foreman bawl a guy
out for something that didn’t amount to anything. Make him look like a damn fool. And you
couldn’t do nothing about it, see.” 17
The industrial union movement of the 30s, of which the UE was among the most
successful products, was as much about resisting this colossal affront to personal autonomy as it
was about the bare economic rationale for joining a union. Until that time, the workplaces in
which tens of millions of Americans spent virtually their entire lives bore no resemblance to the
democratic principles that supposedly shaped the country’s civic life. The effort to extend
democratic decision-making into the management of workplaces and of the US economy itself
was at the heart of the CIO unionization drives of the 1930s and 40s. At the factory level, this
wrought what historian Nelson Lichtenstein has described as a “social revolution” where workers
utilized their newfound collective power to question and resist the dictates of onceunchallengeable managers. “With the coming of the union,” a United Auto Workers shop
stewards’ guide bragged, “the foreman finds his world turned upside down. His small-time
dictatorship has been overthrown, and he must be adjusted to a democratic system of shop
governance.” Similar revolutions were accomplished under the banner of the UE. Once the union
was firmly established, one machinist told Schatz, “supervision was sort of … afraid.” This
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seizure of power in the service of autonomy and dignity was emphasized over and over again by
the activists who made the industrial union movement in the 30s. It constitutes “the achievement
which justifies its claim to stand beside abolitionism, civil rights, and women’s rights as one of
the great movements for freedom and dignity in American history,” Schatz argues. 18
When ASR management attempted to reassert its “prerogative” in 1952, its workers knew
that it meant a return to arbitrary, unaccountable power in the factory, transforming that space
back into a private domain where basic rights, like free speech and due process, had no purchase.
“It is this right to fire workers without protection of arbitration which the company wants to
make stronger in the new contract and to be able to apply any set of rules it may decide on,”
Local 475 News explained. “The company wants the right to fire workers who will not work
overtime and who do not make bonus pay. They could apply it equally to workers who chew
gum or don’t part their hair to suit the foreman.” At ASR the company’s “rights” had
customarily included the ability to discriminate on the basis of race and to fire black workers
who challenged those practices. These battles continued during the early 1950s. One issue of
Local 475 News included the story of Thelma Williams, a “militant young Negro woman” fired
from ASR for “insubordination” to foremen. According to the union newspaper, what lay
beneath this vague charge was Williams’s loud and consistent opposition to management’s
“discriminatory practices.” Through the intervention of the union, an arbitrator awarded
Williams her job back. Her experiences and others convinced ASR workers like Sam Goodman
that “minority groups would suffer a lot with that in the contract.” Sal Graziadio, a twelve-year
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ASR veteran, put it simply—with the management prerogative clause in the contract, “you might
as well not have a union.” 19
Management prerogative clauses were not unique to ASR—they were part of a broad
offensive mounted after the Second World War by American corporations determined to restore
the unilateral control over working conditions eroded by the tidal wave of unionization in mass
production industries. These corporations were organized into groups like the National
Association of Manufacturers, which served, much like the Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce at
the local level, as a kind of hive mind, a united front, and a vehicle for the expression of the
interests of business owners as a class. These executives, many of whom had never accepted the
legitimacy of the New Deal or the industrial unions it had engendered, pined for the 1920s. Their
campaign to turn back the clock found expression in the phrase “right to manage,” which they
used to argue for a sharp delineation of which features of work in America could be subject to
collective bargaining—in other words, to input by workers. It was at bottom a statement about
property rights, a signal of their intention to re-assert the privileges of ownership over and
against the claims of those whose labor made their wealth real. 20
ASR management never got its prerogative clause—in a thank-you letter to fellow unions
and Brooklyn citizens printed in the Brooklyn Eagle, Local 475 announced the end of the twomonth strike and boasted of the “complete withdrawal” of the proposed prerogative clause, as
well as a clause protecting shop stewards, a union shop (an arrangement whereby all workers in
the bargaining unit were required to join the union), retroactive wage increases, increased
vacation time, and a health and welfare plan funded entirely by the company that featured
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medical, surgical, and hospitalization benefits as well as life and accident insurance. The letter
featured a quote from Franklin Roosevelt—“there are those who would try to refuse the workers
any power to bargain collectively … These shortsighted ones—not labor—threaten this
country”—and a pledge “to maintain and improve the living standards of our members so that
they may make their contributions to a more prosperous Brooklyn.” The elements of the letter
reflected the union’s current politics—adulation of Roosevelt, a determination to sustain and
extend the principles of his New Deal in the face of growing reaction, and a kind of popular
Keynesianism that linked high wages to purchasing power as the foundation of a prosperous
Brooklyn and a prosperous United States. 21
The 1952 contract, however, would be among the last Local 475 would negotiate with
American Safety Razor. In response, the company would up the ante, exercising a more basic
prerogative by simply closing its Brooklyn factory. And despite its public proclamations of
confidence, the union had begun to hedge against the possibility of ASR joining the ranks of the
runaways. The 1953 contract, settled at the last minute without a strike, included a severance pay
provision that guaranteed twenty-five dollars for each year of service “if the plant should ever
move.” It also included a “no moving” clause through which the company pledged not to
relocate for the duration of the contract—a toothless provision, given that the contract lasted just
one year. The local, sensing its weakness if condemned to deal one-on-one with individual firms,
stepped up its efforts in the political sphere, mounting a rally on February 25, 1954 to kick off its
campaign against the “economic crisis” it warned was engulfing the city. It also launched a
campaign to organize the growing ranks of the unemployed. 22

“Thanks for Your Support,” Brooklyn Eagle, July 25, 1952.
“Iron Strength at ASR Wins Top Settlement,” Local 475 News, August 1953, Box 1, Folder 5, Kirschner
Collection; “A Job to Do!”; “4,000 at Rally Pledge Fight In Face of Economic Crisis,” Local 475 News, March

21
22

41

In April, the hammer fell with ASR’s announcement that the Brooklyn factory would
close. Workers were furious and vowed to fight back. Interviewed for the union newspaper,
workers from ASR and United Metal Box, which announced its relocation plans the same month,
expressed their outrage and fear. “I’ve been working for ASR for 42 years,” said Tony Messina.
“Now, I ask you, if you spent all of your life working for a company, how would you feel about
their moving out on you?” Nellie Harrell, an African American woman, laughed off company
claims that its workers somehow supported the decision. “Nobody—but nobody—who works for
their living in ASR,” she declared, “feels good about the company trying to move.” Older
workers disclosed their fears around an uncertain future. “I’ve spent 27 years working for ASR,”
explained Joe Guagliardo. “If they were to move, I wouldn’t be able to get another job. I’ve got
lots of experience, but it’s all on ASR blade machines. Who else would need the specialized skill
I’ve developed for this company?” “The thought of having to start all over again makes my
blood boil,” fumed Joe Alper, a twenty-year veteran of United Metal Box. “If this company has
any consideration at all for a worker like me, who has given the best years of his life to them,
they would make every effort to stay here.” All workers interviewed expressed unequivocal
support for Local 475’s pledge to stop the plant from moving by any means necessary. The stage
was set for a fight. 23
Organizing Brooklyn
For an organization that was less than twenty years old in 1954, Local 475 had a lot of
history behind it. The local, like its parent union, was a product of the “fever of organization”
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that swept working-class America during the 1930s once the administration of Franklin
Roosevelt signaled its congeniality to union organizing with the passage of the National
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), whose famous Section 7(a) asserted the right of workers to join
unions and bargain with their employers “free of interference, restraint, or coercion,” and the
National Labor Relations Act, or Wagner Act, which strengthened workers’ hand by outlawing a
series of “unfair labor practices” that employers had used to cow them. The result was what
historian Robert Zieger calls “the largest sustained surge of worker organization in American
history.” 24
New York City—and Brooklyn in particular—had been one key site in the emergence of
this industrial unionism. Today, Brooklyn’s industrial history is visible only to those who can
decode its remnants in the landscape. But during the first part of the twentieth century, the
borough was a manufacturing powerhouse with few equals. Prior to the 1898 consolidation that
united Manhattan, Brooklyn, Queens, the Bronx, and Staten Island into a single metropolis,
Brooklyn was itself the fourth-largest city in the United States, trailing only Chicago,
Philadelphia, and “New York” (i.e. Manhattan and parts of the Bronx) itself. Consolidation
helped supercharge Brooklyn’s economic development, offering the borough access to an
enlarged tax base and laying the basis for effective rapid transit between the two island cities. 25
The advantages of Brooklyn for early twentieth century manufacturers were many. The
borough offered manufacturers a site hard by the busiest port in the United States, minus the
escalating cost and congestion of Manhattan, and serving the country’s largest home market to
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boot. Foreign trade in and out of New York was concentrated on the Brooklyn docks, making the
borough a choice location for exporters, while a unique “amphibious freight system” where
railroad cars were loaded onto barges and shuttled back and forth across the Hudson
compensated for the disadvantage of geography that put Brooklyn at one remove from the
eastern terminals of the country’s major railroads arrayed along the New Jersey side of the
Hudson. On balance, for the enterprising manufacturer, Brooklyn could lay “the commerce of the
world at his front door,” as the Brooklyn League crowed in 1914. No longer “an area of homes
and churches—a sort of residence-annex of Manhattan,” this group of boosters explained,
Brooklyn by itself had come to rank fourth in United States in the value of its manufactures by
the time of the First World War. 26
Brooklyn’s manufacturing sector was large and diverse. In the early days, the borough
tended to attract larger and heavier industries than its sibling across the river. Bakers, brewers,
ironworks, coffee roasters, sugar refiners, oil, paint and chemical processors, and a host of other
noisome, capital-intensive industries parked themselves along the borough’s less-cluttered
waterfront. These were the “fires from the foundry chimneys burning high and glaringly into the
night” described so memorably by Walt Whitman as he rode the ferry between Brooklyn and
Manhattan in the days before the Brooklyn Bridge rose over the busy East River. 27
Metalworking of all kinds was a hugely important industry in Brooklyn and in the
metropolitan area at large. In the early 1920s, investigators working for the Regional Plan
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Association found that over 250,000 people throughout the metropolitan area were employed in
metalworking, even more than in the city’s more famous garment sector. In Brooklyn, the
earliest firms were the foundries and machine shops concentrated along the waterfront, of which
E. W. Bliss, the machine tool and munitions manufacturer whose massive works under the
Manhattan Bridge employed thousands, was a leading example. Over the course of the early
twentieth century, however, metal manufacturing in Brooklyn became lighter and more
consumer-oriented. Large, capital-intensive firms wedded to the waterfront found it difficult to
expand horizontally as the districts became more crowded, more expensive, and less tolerant of
waste dumping. Meanwhile, trucking liberated firms producing small goods from the waterfront,
prompting the expansion of manufacturing districts further inland. These firms, with their lighter,
more portable products, had the option of vertical expansion in the concrete, loft-style factories
that became a symbol of New York City manufacturing. American Safety Razor, whose multistory plant afforded what amounted to several acres of floor space, was but one example of this
type. 28
The transition from heavy to light manufacturing in Brooklyn was reflected in the formal
name of Local 475, which began in 1939 as the “Amalgamated Machine Shop Local No. 475”
but quickly evolved into the “Amalgamated Machine & Instrument Local” and finally the
“Amalgamated Machine, Instrument, and Metal Local No. 475.” The first third of the name
reflected Brooklyn’s prominence in the machine tool industry—factories specializing in turning
raw metal into the machines that other factories would use to fashion finished metal products.
Machinists cut, sheared, punched, ground, and pressed metal into countless custom-designed
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shapes in a process that involved immense force and little room for error. Firms like E. W. Bliss,
American Machine and Foundry, which built ninety-eight percent of the automatic cigarettemaking equipment in the country, and Mergenthaler Linotype, by far the world’s largest
manufacturer of typesetting equipment, were standouts in this sector. The second part of Local
475’s name was a nod to the borough’s preeminence in the manufacture of scientific and medical
instruments—another sphere in which skill and precision were paramount and where, in the case
of defense-oriented firms like Sperry Gyroscope and Arma Engineering, government contracts
were the lifeblood. The third category included firms like ASR or Bommer Spring Hinge, which
mass-produced metal goods for the consumer market. 29
The UE first organized ASR in 1939, but the nascent shop organization fell victim to a
common post-Wagner Act gambit, the company union. The Gem Independent Employees Union,
named after one of ASR’s leading blade brands, worked hand-in-glove with the company to
suppress wages while the company raked in defense contracts and workers weathered the
galloping inflation of the war years. For a time, the company union held off the UE through
fraud and violence, firing UE members, stuffing ballot boxes, and assaulting organizers—UE
organizer Ann Venturi, for instance, was injured when someone, likely a foreman, chucked a
“large bag of water” onto her head from a fifth-floor window as she stood on Lawrence Street
below. When ASR workers threatened a wildcat strike that would interrupt war production, the
federal government stepped in. In an election supervised by the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), Local 475 defeated the company union by a two-hundred vote margin. With this vote,
ASR became one of more than eight hundred factories in which workers voted to join the UE
during World War II, ballooning the union’s total membership past the six hundred thousand
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mark and making it the third-largest in the CIO. The company union days had proved a brief if
profitable interregnum. The war—and the federal government—had brought unionism to ASR. 30
Postwar
Joining the United Electrical Workers both provided immediate benefits to ASR workers
and laid the foundation for their collective efforts in the postwar era. During the war, however,
Local 475, like the CIO unions generally and the Communist-oriented UE in particular,
attenuated its characteristic militancy for a policy of collaboration with local employers. In July
1942, for example, the local came out unequivocally in favor of a “drive to speed up production”
as well as “union-management cooperation” to help steer war contracts to the New York City
region. At the national level, CIO leaders had accepted both a wage freeze and a “no-strike”
pledge in exchange for the government shepherding hundreds of thousands of workers into their
organizations and guaranteeing their stability through “maintenance of membership” provisions
that protected the fledgling unions while simultaneously helping to insulate their leaders from the
vagaries of a restive rank-and-file. Communist-oriented unions and leaders, driven by an
overarching commitment to the alliance between the US and the Soviet Union, were among the
most zealous defenders of wartime labor peace and increased production at all costs, even when
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the workers they represented felt they had borne a “disproportionate share” of the sacrifices on
behalf of the war effort, as historian George Lipsitz put it.31
The cooperation drive also belied 475’s awareness of the way in which the small shops
that typified New York City manufacturing were losing out relative to their larger peers, who
garnered the lion’s share of the gargantuan wartime subsidies to private business that Lipsitz
calls "one of the largest welfare projects in history." The union’s endorsement of a radio address
by Neal Dow Becker, head of the Commerce and Industry Association of New York and
President of the Intertype Corporation, in which the business leader warned of “new plants …
being constructed in certain low-wage areas in the South while plants in the New York area, able
to produce the same things, stand idle,” gestured at concessions and collaboration as one
potential approach to a looming runaway threat. The local’s accommodating stance continued
into the immediate postwar period—on September 7, 1945, just five days after V-J Day, Local
475 released a “joint statement” with several area manufacturers, including American Machine
& Foundry, International Projector, Mergenthaler Linotype, and Schrader’s. The statement
declared that “the Union has recognized that the companies must maintain competitive costs and
continue to improve production efficiency so as to maintain themselves in a strong, sound
position.” The language of the “agreement” contained little that could plausibly be identified as
socialist:
Local 475 UE-CIO recognizes the private enterprise system and the right of the employer to
operate at a profit, and that this is a necessary condition to the continued welfare of labor. The
Union’s purpose is the constructive leadership of labor and not the management of business. The
Union recognizes the inherent right of and responsibility of Management to direct the operations
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of an enterprise and particularly regards the Management of the companies mentioned above with
confidence and good will.

The companies, for their part, averred that 475 was a “responsible,” “well-managed” labor union,
endorsed its “continued stability,” and expressed “confidence in its leadership.” 32
The détente between Local 475 and the companies collapsed as quickly as did the
wartime alliance between the US and the Soviet Union. Rank-and-file anger over the unequal
sacrifices of the war, plunging real wages, and the growing sting of postwar layoffs issued in the
largest strike wave in US history during the immediate postwar years of 1945 and 1946. In New
York City a million-and-a-half workers—“a dreadful, unnamed power,” according to the New
York World-Telegram—struck their employers, paralyzing commerce and lending the city what
the newspaper called “an air of unreality.” For unions with Communist ties, militancy from
below coincided with a shift in the strategy of the party. Gone was the shift into the mainstream
of American political life and the policy of de facto class collaboration that accompanied it.
Under the direction of William Z. Foster and new general secretary Eugene Dennis, the party
deemphasized its quest to locate a distinctly American road to socialism and the coalitionbuilding efforts that had accompanied that strategy. At the same time, the political tolerance
afforded the Communists during the war began to erode under the pressure of postwar
antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union. 33
Nor did the companies long remain in a conciliatory mood. Minutes from Local 475
Executive Board meetings reveal a gathering, coordinated offensive to roll back the union’s
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strength in the city. For the local, the first big battle of the postwar era took place at
Mergenthaler, where 2,400 workers shuttered the equipment maker for five months to wring an
eighteen-and-a-half cent wage increase, imitating the pattern established by UE leaders at the
General Motors appliance division in February 1946. According to Local 475 officers,
Mergenthaler officials had “openly boasted” to fellow area employers that they would lead the
way on limiting Brooklyn workers’ demands. Mergenthaler managers employed a series of
aggressive techniques, deploying a reinvigorated red-baiting and trying to split spouses from
their striking partners by bombarding their homes with mail pillorying Local 475 leadership and
portraying strikers as dupes. ASR would mimic this strategy during subsequent postwar strikes,
lending it a menacing edge by sending foremen to confront the families of strikers at their
homes. At ASR, where foremen were mostly white males and many workers were African
American, women, or both, this strategy of intimidation also exploited racial and gender power
dynamics at work in the city. 34
The Mergenthaler strike was a dramatic episode whose achievements, the result of fierce
struggle and sacrifice, were quickly undermined by a worsening overall picture for workers
marked by skyrocketing costs for food, housing, and other basics. The squeeze was abetted by
the Truman administration’s decision to repeal most wartime price controls in June 1946, which
included a twelve-percent increase granted to Mergenthaler in January. The government helped
out the company in other ways, as well. Generous refunds of the wartime excess profits tax,
which, despite its name, had not prevented record profits, meant that the government effectively
subsidized the employers’ end of the postwar strike wave, helping the companies to weather
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lengthy shutdowns like the one at Mergenthaler—a fact with which area managers taunted Local
475 shop committees. 35
Workers and the community at large fought back with a degree of solidarity that is rare
today but which was common across the country during the postwar strikes. Local 475 members
from other shops voted a tax on their paychecks that raised fifty thousand dollars—nearly seven
hundred thousand in 2018 dollars—for the Mergenthaler strikers, over and above the support
their locals were lending to the national strikes at General Electric, Westinghouse, and General
Motors. More than a thousand other workers, including unorganized office personnel and
members of AFL craft unions, refused to cross the UE picket line to do business with
Mergenthaler. Even the police wavered—in May, the Brooklyn Eagle noted that Police
Commissioner Wallander had cancelled a planned softball game between strikers and off-duty
policemen that would raise money for the Mergenthaler strike fund, leaving the workers “angry.”
When the strike was finally settled, this resistance had convinced management at other local
shops, like Intertype, American Machine and Foundry, E. W. Bliss, and ASR, that the time was
not ripe to break Local 475. The local continued to organize new workers as well, winning all
fourteen representation elections it sought in the year following V-J Day. 36
These efforts proved a stopgap, one that could not hold off the gathering employer
offensive. The late 1940s were, according to one company president, “a period of precarious
prosperity, threatened by insecurity and torn by strife.” They were years dominated by
“pessimism and uncertainty,” by expectations of a postwar recession or even a return to
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depression. “The industrial conflicts of the late 1940s were about much more than wages-andhours issues: fundamentally, they revolved around issues of control,” writes historian Howell
John Harris. “How strong were unions to be, and how much influence should they and their
members have over working conditions via collective bargaining and direct-action tactics? These
were the questions that stirred business to take aggressive action in negotiations and everyday
labor relations in the postwar years.” 37
In 1947, the employer offensive resumed with vigor. At A. Schrader's Son, where
workers fabricated the tire valves that graced tens of millions of vehicles worldwide,
management adopted a new, severe line designed to oust the union that had organized its
workforce during the war. “At Schrader’s,” officers reported, “the Company was blunt about
proposing elimination of any union security, automatic wage cuts, a speed-up by incentive,
elimination of plant wide seniority but a 10% special seniority to those people the Co. many
deem indispensable, a 90-day trial before stewards would get top seniority and a change in
present vacation which would mean a reduction in vacation." These were proposals, officers
warned, that would effectively “illiminate [sic] the union.” The strategy at Schrader’s was
significant because Local 475 officers detected increased coordination among borough
employers to hold the line on wages, working conditions, and the rights of management.
Reflecting on the 1947 negotiations at Schrader’s, American Machine and Foundry, and
International Projector, Local 475 Business Manager Cliff Cameron told the Executive Board
that “180 employers are waiting to see what these giant corporations will do.” 38
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ASR management played a leading role in the burgeoning employer class consciousness.
In 1946, ASR president Milton Dammann was elected president of the Brooklyn Chamber of
Commerce, a body that served the collective interests of borough employers in ways both small
and large, whether providing information on shipping rates, keeping members up-to-date on the
latest anti-union strategies, or hosting public events at which speakers were invited to thunder
against the Wagner Act, Roosevelt, and the New Deal. Maine Senator Owen Brewster, for
example, told the Chamber in 1946 that business executives must “unite in a fight to defend this
country’s industrial system,” lest the US suffer the fate of Great Britain under its newly-elected
Labour government, then engaged in erecting the bulk of that country’s welfare state. Brewster’s
ally Joseph McCarthy, then a freshman senator, addressed the Chamber in May of 1947, where
he blamed the supposed pro-worker bias of the National Labor Relations Board for the series of
anti-union bills that would become the Taft-Hartley Act. Dammann, whose interests
encompassed manufacturing, banking, and real estate, enjoyed an anti-union pedigree that
reached back to his work on the famous Danbury Hatters case, which one historian calls “one of
the most notorious anti-union judicial decisions in history.” “It is a question now as to whether
the manufacturers or the union will run the factories,” Dammann had remarked back in 1909.
After World War II, he confronted this question anew. 39
Dammann’s goal was to build the chamber into a kind of collective brain to coordinate
and strengthen the borough’s small manufacturers, who tended to be underdogs relative to the
giant corporations that dominated the American economy and its politics. ASR was typical. It
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was emphatically the number-two razor blade manufacturer in the country, compelled always to
define itself in relation to market-leading behemoth Gillette. Like the borough’s other small
manufacturers, ASR fell into what George Lipsitz, following the sociologist James O’Connor,
describes as the “competitive” sector of American manufacturing. Competitive sector firms, in
contrast to their “monopoly” sector counterparts, were characterized by “competitive product
markets,” “small profit margins,” and limited opportunities to improve productivity—constraints
that issued in a corresponding emphasis on holding down wage costs. “In the face of an alreadyprecarious economic situation,” as Lipsitz explains, “labor militancy in the postwar years
presented a particularly grave threat to competitive enterprise. Monopolistic firms might be able
to trade wage increases for the stability of long contracts, but smaller businesses could not. In
fact, they sometimes wound up paying the price for concessions granted to workers in the
monopoly sector.” 40
For the same reason, there was a racial and gender component to the competitive versus
monopoly sector distinction. Workers from proscribed social groups—women, African
Americans, and in 1950s New York City, an emerging Puerto Rican working class—often found
themselves shut out of better-paid and more stable employment in the monopoly sector and
compelled to accept lower wages and harsher conditions at competitive sector employers like
ASR. Those employers, in turn, frequently sought to leverage the vulnerability of these workers
to achieve the low-wage regime urged on them by their competitive position. Resisting
unionization and the improved conditions it brought workers was a key survival strategy for
these firms.
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“We Will Not Go Back to the Old Days,” read signs brandished by workers in Stamford,
Connecticut during that city’s 1946 general strike. The conflict had been provoked by the efforts
of the Yale & Towne lock manufacturing company to “turn back the clock” following the
establishment of legitimate unionism in the plant, an outcome midwifed, as at ASR, by the
federal government. A similar effort to return to the open shop provoked a general strike in
Lancaster, Pennsylvania the same year. Stamford was a virtual company town, but in Brooklyn,
where innumerable small manufacturers faced similar pressures but had heretofore responded in
scattered isolation, Dammann sought to develop the Chamber of Commerce’s role as a “united
front” for the employing class. “Genuine collective bargaining depends largely on the ability of
employers to work together on an area-wide basis—comparable to the closely knit effort of
organized labor,” he told the Chamber upon his ascension to the presidency in 1946. Citing the
imperative to “produce without interruptions,” Dammann established an anti-union
clearinghouse under the Chamber’s auspices, known by the euphemism “Labor Peace Bureau.”
“The special bureau, staffed by experts,” reported the business-friendly Brooklyn Eagle, “has
conducted local research and surveys on wages and working conditions and maintains a
consultation service for employers which covers ‘the whole range of employee relations policies
and practices.’” 41
Dammann’s class war extended beyond the workplace. In one speech to the Chamber, he
outlined a conservative, business-friendly program for the city government that included raising
the subway fare, severely limiting public expenditures, and revamping the City Planning
Commission to make it more responsive to the demands of small manufacturers. Dammann’s
vision of low wages, low taxes, and low public spending put him, politically speaking, in the
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company of the southern Democrats into whose states firms like ASR would soon flee. In 1939,
the Chamber had hosted Missouri Senator Bennett Champ Clark, who railed against taxation and
government expenditure under the New Deal. In 1947, Dammann and the Chamber hosted New
York governor Thomas Dewey, a Republican who scored government borrowing and advocated
a program of limited spending that mirrored the “pay-as-you-go” philosophy for which Southern
Democrats like Virginia governor Harry Byrd became famous. 42
The fruits of Dammann’s efforts revealed themselves in the 1947 negotiations at ASR, in
which the company “has made no substantial offer despite the fact that we have had seven or
eight lengthy conferences with them,” as Cameron reported to the Local 475 Executive Board in
April. The company’s offer of an 8 ½ cents an hour raise and a two-year contract with the
prospect of a wage renegotiation in six months—a hedge against continuing inflation—was not
enough for Local 475, which considered the negotiations the “most important” currently facing
the union. Discussions among the Executive Board indicate that the union felt itself to be on the
defensive. “Our main fight so far has been to retain what we have including union security ...
The company is following the same pattern as Schrader and American Machine & Foundry.” A
near-unanimous strike vote indicated ASR workers’ willingness to go out, as would remain the
case during every contract negotiation for the remainder of the company’s tenure in Brooklyn.
By June, ASR and the union had settled—a ten cents an hour general increase, increased
vacation time, and holding the line on the rest of the contract, including union security provisions
the company had sought to weaken. Local 475 officers considered the settlement a defensive
victory, lent “special significance” by Dammann’s position as the symbolic leader of borough
employers. “The activities of these employers are no accident since they have been meeting with
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the B'klyn Chamber of Commerce and are making our local a target in an effort to break our
union,” Assistant Business Manager Sidney Mason told the Executive Board in June. 43
“Our American Way of Life”
The ability of left-wing unions like the UE to defend their members came under severe
pressures in the postwar years. As Ronald Schatz indicated in his groundbreaking history of
electrical workers at industry giants General Electric and Westinghouse, “from 1946 onward the
left-wing trade unionists who captained the UE were continuously on the defensive.” This was
just as true at Local 475, perhaps the reddest of all UE locals, where, as Schatz points out,
“Communist unionists had functioned openly since the early 1930s.” Several organizers
associated with Local 475 and District 4, the UE district covering New York and northern New
Jersey, were indeed open Communists, having run on the party ticket for local offices in New
York, but others, like 475 President Charles Fay and Business Agent Clifton Cameron, were
more circumspect. The youthful Cameron was a rising star in the UE. Born on a North Carolina
peach farm, his hopes of becoming an engineer dashed by the Depression, Cameron became one
of the nearly three million white Southerners who left the region during the 1940s when he took
a job at the Babcock and Wilcox boiler plant in Bayonne, New Jersey, where he joined the UE.
Rising quickly through the ranks to become president of a large amalgamated local, Cameron
crossed the Hudson in 1946 to replace Albert Stonkus as Business Agent of Local 475. At some
point, Cameron must have joined the Party—subjected to extraordinarily hostile questioning
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before a congressional committee in 1948, Cameron asserted his Fifth Amendment right,
refusing to say whether or not he was a member. 44
During the late 1940s, Local 475, like the UE and left-led unions more generally, was
made the object of a multifaceted attack by employers, the local press, anti-communist union
members, the Catholic Church, and a hostile faction of Congress. The Taft-Hartley Act, which
went into effect on June 23, 1947, was one important component of this offensive. Among other
provisions, the act banned many of the tactics that had proven effective in the 1945–46 strike
wave. In a measure aimed squarely at the UE and other Communist-influenced unions, the law
required that each union official sign an affidavit affirming “he is not a member of the
Communist Party nor affiliated with such party, and that he does not believe in, and is not a
member of or supports any organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the United
States government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional means.” Any union whose
officers refused to sign the affidavit would be denied the services of the National Labor
Relations Board—meaning it could not have the Board supervise representation elections, certify
the union as a bargaining agent, or intervene in cases of unfair labor practices committed by
employers. The hand of the federal government, which had proved crucial in helping the UE
become established in the manufacturing shops of New York City, was now withdrawn. 45
Other CIO unions smelled blood. They began to prepare “raids”—trade-union jargon for
a strategy of poaching members and their dues from other unions. The most successful
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practitioners of this strategy were Walter Reuther’s United Auto Workers and the International
Association of Machinists, the AFL union from which many area metalworkers had seceded to
join the fledgling UE. Between 1947 and 1949, when UE leaders instructed officers to sign the
Taft-Hartley anti-communist affidavits, rival unions conducted over five hundred raids on UE
locals, depriving the union of large chunks of its membership and forcing it to divert resources
from organizing and representation towards frantic self-defense. Brooklyn, home to the largest
and reddest UE local, had the distinction of being the site of the first big wave of United Auto
Workers raids. UAW chief Walter Reuther, a figure who combined idealism and cynical
ruthlessness in equal measure, had come to despise the Communists in the CIO. The heads of the
UE, who referred privately to Reuther as the “little red-headed bastard,” despised him back. In
March 1948, Charles Kerrigan, the UAW regional director for the New York area, gave the
signal for the raids to begin when he announced that the UAW would accept locals that seceded
from the UE. UAW leaders set up a special “paper local”—one that as yet had no members—
into which members from the raided UE shops were to be deposited. CIO president Philip
Murray warned the UAW that CIO leaders frowned on cannibalization as an organizing strategy,
but his opposition was lukewarm—at the same moment, CIO leaders were moving to suspend
the Communist-led New York City CIO Council for its opposition to the Marshall Plan and
support for Henry Wallace’s third-party candidacy for president. That same month, UE leaders
resigned from the CIO Political Action Committee, which they accused of forfeiting its political
independence to become “an appendage of the Democratic Party.” 46
Raiding was most common in smaller shops like those that dominated New York City.
The anatomy of a raid grew out of the CIO unions’ reliance on the federal government as arbiter
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and protector, and raiding unions often collaborated with employers to dislodge the UE. A
typical strategy was to wait until a contract expired and an employer, aware of the weakness of
the UE, sought to press its advantage by demanding concessions on wages or working
conditions. Organizers for the rival union would then circulate among the workers in a given
shop, stressing the weakness of the UE under the Taft-Hartley law and goading them into signing
cards authorizing the rival union to represent them. If thirty percent of workers signed cards, the
challenger could petition the NLRB for an election in which the UE, denied the services of the
Board unless it signed the affidavits, would not appear on the ballot, no matter how much
support it had in the plant. This put UE backers in the bizarre position of asking workers to mark
“no union” on their ballots if they wished to remain in the UE, which had become a non-person
in the eyes of the government. 47
The first Brooklyn raid came at Schrader, where members of right-wing UE factions,
which included members of the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists, handed out UAW signup cards and asked workers if they really wished to strike merely for the right to bargain—an
effective return to the pre-Wagner Act days. UAW officials also intervened directly in
negotiations between Local 475 and the company, offering to avert the impending strike if the
company would recognize their organization instead of the UE. The company tried to leverage
the UAW threat into concessions, but backed down when presented with evidence that the
majority of its workers continued to support the UE and were determined to strike if necessary.
Schrader management also took advantage of the anti-communist climate to fire militant activists
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on the basis of a shop rule that mimicked the Smith Act, prohibiting employees from advocating
“the overthrow of the Government by violence.” 48
The dam broke in March 1948, when employees of the Metropolitan Device Corporation,
makers of switches and other electrical equipment, bolted Local 475 for the UAW. The hammer
blow came a week later, when workers at Mergenthaler and Intertype accepted the advice of their
shop leaders and defected. At one stroke, nearly 4,500 workers had left Local 475. At the Parker
Kalon machine shop in Manhattan, company officials endorsed the UAW in a mailing to
employees and granted surprise raises in the days preceding the election. By October, when
workers at American Machine and Foundry departed the UE, the exodus had become a
stampede. In less than a year, the membership of Local 475, once the UE’s largest, had been
halved. 49
ASR, which still paid the lowest wages of any large 475 shop, followed suit and hardened
its demands. During the 1948 negotiations, the company offered a two-and-a-half cents an hour
increase against the union’s demand for a fourteen-cent raise. ASR also flirted with UAW
organizers, hoping to recycle the strategy that had succeeded at other area employers. But ASR
shop leadership remained loyal to Local 475 and its members were militant and engaged,
mounting an eight hundred-person picket in front of the plant in anticipation of a threatened
strike—an action 475 editors jokingly referred to as a “cold war” against the firm and one that
indicated there was little chance these workers would accept a UAW raid. The rank-and-file at
ASR seems to have been like other workers throughout the electrical and machine industries,
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who for the most part followed the advice of their shop leaders on the secession question. Shop
leaders who emerged as anti-communist—some out of principle, others from resignation, and
still others because of a desire to obtain status and position—were generally able to bring their
members with them out of the UE. ASR, on the other hand, would remain a stalwart until the
fall. 50
Overall, the experience of workers in the New York and New Jersey shops is consistent
with Ellen Schrecker’s observation that anti-communism in the 1940s and 50s was mainly a
“top-down” phenomenon. It rhymes with George Lipsitz’s account of another threatened UE
local in Evansville, Indiana, where the Bucyrus-Erie construction equipment firm, another
competitive-sector business unionized during the war, was compelled to utilize power “beyond
the reach of local popular pressure” because the grassroots anti-communism it sought simply was
not there. Oftentimes, rank-and-file members of left-led unions remained apathetic about the
issue until it was made untenable for them from a basic trade union perspective. Prominent anticommunists in the CIO were aware of this disposition—Harry Block, one of the UE’s foremost
anti-communists and later a prominent official in the International Union of Electrical Workers
(IUE), a rival union set up to replace the UE after it left the CIO in 1949, admitted to an
interviewer late in his career that anti-communism never really seized the imagination of the
average rank-and-file worker. 51
Still, the cumulative effects of this assault provoked a crisis within Local 475. The
besieged leadership began to turn inward. Because the Communists’ control of the UE, including
Local 475, was concentrated among officeholders, they increasingly resorted to procedural
maneuvers and leveraged their control of the union’s resources, such as 475, its monthly
50
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magazine, to press their case. The local constitution was changed in order to permit Cameron to
cement himself as permanent business manager and staff organizers would now be appointed
instead of elected. These were the days in which, as Vivian Gornick put it in her collection of
oral histories from American Communists, “the American CP became an Orwellian caricature of
itself, disintegrating from within even as it was being destroyed from without.” 52
By the turn of the decade, Local 475 was an organization in disarray. The hemorrhage of
members and the organizational expenses associated with combatting the raids had drained the
local’s coffers. In a sign of the retrenchment at hand, the Executive Board canceled publication
of 475, the local’s monthly magazine. At the same time, the organization had become more
insular and less democratic. Executive Board meeting minutes read like an echo chamber, replete
with half-truths and rhetorical evasions. Taft-Hartley was taking its toll. In October 1948, in a
case involving the UE, NLRB trial examiner Irving Rogosin, citing the Taft-Hartley law,
outlawed even non-violent mass picketing of shops. “There is ample authority for the proposition
that force of numbers alone, even where picketing is conducted peacefully, has an intimidatory
and coercive effect on employees otherwise willing to cross a picket line,” Rogosin wrote. The
decision was nakedly favorable to employers. Tactics like the one that Local 475 had used at
ASR that year were now illegal. Moreover, the law had encouraged the splits now emerging in
the labor movement by dangling incentives for raiding in front of those unions willing to play
ball. “When the act was passed … every trade union leader condemned it,” Cameron complained
to the 475 Executive Board that month. “But now some unions are using it to try and build their
own unions at the expense of others who still refuse to work with the Taft-Hartley Act.” It was
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working—in November 1949, UE leaders capitulated and ordered all local officers to sign the
affidavits. 53
Runaway
An “Officers Report” prepared for the membership on the occasion of Local 475’s 1951
convention painted a grim picture of the circumstances of working people in New York City.
Their lives constituted, said the local’s officers, “an unremitting struggle for merest survival.”
The purchasing power of a dollar had plummeted, making a mockery of any raises won in the
postwar strike wave. In New York City, the officers reported, a dollar in 1951 was worth only
forty-four cents in prewar terms. The situation was likely worse, given the Bureau of Labor
Statistics’ reputation among unionists for underreporting hardship. “Our wage increases are
swallowed up almost as soon as we negotiate them,” said William Dash, an African American
worker at Sanitary Dash, the plumbing supply manufacturer. “I can’t make ends meet now,
particularly with the rent I have to pay.” When the United States invaded Korea, wages had again
been frozen by the government—with the collaboration of its allies in the CIO leadership,
stressed the now-independent UE—while prices and profits continued to surge. UE researchers
estimated that in 1950, average hourly wages in manufacturing rose eight percent while
manufacturing profits went up by eighty percent. Not all manufacturers were affected equally,
however. Like the Second World War, the conflict had unleashed a process of concentration that
left small manufacturers, like the ones that dominated the city’s industrial landscape, out in the
cold. 54
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The problems didn’t stop there. Then as now in New York, “the largest single item in the
budget of a working family is rent,” the report stressed. But wartime rent controls had been
removed from six million units nationwide by 1951. In New York State, what historian Joel
Schwartz calls “the gradual, but determined, campaign for the restoration of market rents” had
opened the door to average annual rent increases of fifteen percent. Landlords quickly moved to
take advantage—the State Rent Commission reported that it had granted over half a million
applications for rent boosts in the preceding six months. The postwar years brought another
victory for local elites when they managed to bust the city’s longstanding five-cent subway fare,
doubling it to ten cents in 1948 and hiking it again to fifteen in 1953, when a new public
authority was created to manage the subways free of interference from politicians whose
vulnerability to democratic pressure might tempt them to them resist this regressive funding
technique. In the face of these and other rising costs, families cut back where they could, often
on food—eliminating meat and milk from the family diet was a common strategy, the National
Social Welfare Assembly reported. Several Local 475 members reported being turned away from
the local blood bank when supervisors explained they were too malnourished to donate. In all, if
there was a postwar “boom,” the men and women of American Safety Razor and plants like it
would have had to strain to see it. 55
The obstacles were more severe for the African Americans and Puerto Ricans who made
up an increasing portion of Local 475’s membership. “In New York City, Negro and Puerto
Rican workers are special victims of this rent gouging,” explained Local 475 officers. African
American and Puerto Rican workers, many of them new to the city, faced a double problem—
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confined to the lowest paying jobs, their family incomes lagged those of whites by about half,
but their housing costs generally exceeded those of whites because of the artificially-engineered
housing scarcity induced by segregation. The local pledged in particular to attend to its growing
Puerto Rican membership, many of whom lived in “rat infested,” “one-bedroom apartments
without adequate health or sanitary facilities,” for which they paid outrageous portions of their
meager incomes. The dangers were real—at midcentury, over two hundred thousand apartments
in New York City still lacked running water, and tuberculosis and rat bites remained harrowing
realities for impoverished renters. “In addition to all the problems of discrimination,” the officers
explained, Puerto Rican migrants “have a special language problem which, in many instances,
employers are quick to take advantage of. In our own Local, employers are constantly attempting
to take advantage of this by offering jobs to Puerto Rican workers and other minorities at lower
rates of pay, knowing that because of sheer desperation, in order to be able to eat, that in many
instances they will be forced to accept those jobs.” For these reasons, the UE position was
clear—“discrimination hurts all workers.” 56
The problems of rent gouging, workplace discrimination, and police brutality often
coalesced seamlessly in the lives of Puerto Rican workers. In 1954, the Daily Worker told the
story of a man on strike from the truck lamp manufacturer Signal-Stat, whose heavily Puerto
Rican workforce made just a dollar an hour and lacked basic provisions like maternity leave or a
seniority system. The firm’s owners, Local 475 spokesmen explained, maintained a tacit alliance
with local landlords, whose exorbitant rent demands, buttressed by segregation, would cause
workers to buckle. A third point of this oppressive triad was the police department, the de facto
face of the government in the ghetto neighborhoods to which the migrants were often confined.
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Open hostility was the order of the day. In this case, the Signal-Stat striker visited the local
precinct to file a complaint about his landlord. When the desk sergeant learned he was on strike,
he told the man “you don’t have to worry about your room. Pretty soon you’ll be living down
here”—in the jail. 57
For the UE, Jim Crow was not just a local but a national problem. In the North, pay
discrimination “threatens the rates and conditions of all workers,” while in the South, the poll tax
robbed blacks and poorer whites of the vote, guaranteeing “the continuation of a Taft-Hartley,
McCarran, wage freeze Congress” dominated by a plutocratic alliance of Republicans and
conservative Southern Democrats. The laws they passed, the union insisted, were ultimately
devices to cement the rule of the rich in both the North and the South, where low wages, weak
unions, and the obstacles to organization embedded in the Taft-Hartley Act combined to make
the latter region a “haven for those employers who would like to run away from the union and
the wages and working conditions which have been established for the workers through years of
struggle.” Local 475, already reeling from the anti-communist offensive, would soon face this
reality in a concrete way. 58
With the defection of the local’s once-biggest shops, American Safety Razor became the
fulcrum of a now-reduced Local 475. ASR still maintained among the lowest wages of any UE
shop. The company had still managed to do well, UE officials insisted, increasing its reserves
past $10 million and marking a 600 percent jump in profits between 1949 and 1950.
Nonetheless, the company sought to take advantage of the federal government’s new wage
controls to limit any wage increase after granting a paltry two-and-a-half cents in 1950, which
the company augmented with a “voluntary” five-cent increase later that year. By 1951, the
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lowest-paid employees at ASR made $1.03 an hour, or around $10 an hour in 2018 dollars. In
negotiations that year, Local 475 demanded twenty cents an hour more for each employee, while
the company countered with a mere eight cents. On May 1, 1,100 ASR workers, wielding signs
that read “We Can’t Eat Razors—We Need Raises!” struck the plant for three weeks to force the
company to budge. Local 475 officials also asked other UE locals to encourage a consumer
boycott of the company’s main brands—Gem, Silver Star, Blue Star, Treet, and Ever-Ready
shaving brushes, as well as ASR’s popular line of cigarette lighters. Photos of the strike reveal a
mostly female workforce with significant numbers of African American women walking the
picket line. 59
When the strike ended with an eleven-cent settlement—UE District 4 organizer James
Lustig perhaps exaggerated in calling it “a complete and decisive victory”—Local 475 officials
threw a party for 2,000 members at the Livingston banquet hall downtown, indicating the
prestige attached to the ASR struggle. In response to the massive defections and scant coffers of
recent years, the local had abandoned the self-defeating authoritarianism of the late 40s, when
power was concentrated among a handful of politically reliable staffers. New leaders were
cultivated, powers were devolved from the Executive Board, and officers began to rely more on
rank-and-file leaders and direct-action techniques. The rank-and-file oriented approach that
would impress a new generation of labor radicals during the 1960s and 70s may thus have been
partly a response to the profound weakening the UE suffered at the hands of conservative forces
in the late 40s and early 50s. The reorganization paid off—during its final years, Local 475
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became a smaller but scrappier organization on whose behalf members would put their bodies
and their livelihoods on the line. 60
The early 1950s were a time of change for ASR as well. While the company had done
well in the immediate postwar era, by 1952 increasing costs associated with the “highly
competitive” nature of the shaving business were eating into profits. Fierce competition meant
big promotional budgets, and while ASR directors made it a point never to mention Gillette in
their public communications, they strained to keep up with their rival’s colossal advertising
efforts. The firm also cited “‘substantial increases’ in labor, material, and other costs, with no
corresponding increase in selling prices,” as the Wall Street Journal reported in April 1953. The
Journal also noted that the eight-week strike of 1952 had eaten into the company’s sales. In a
full-page appeal published in the Brooklyn Eagle during the 1952 strike, the company
complained that UE wage demands would increase its direct labor costs by $1.3 million a year,
even before factoring in the cost of the cost of UE health and welfare benefits and a proposed
pension plan. “The business and financial picture of American Safety Razor Corporation is in
stark contrast with that of our principal competitors,” the company’s directors warned. Since the
end of the war, the company had granted wage increases in line with those achieved by the major
UE contracts at GE and Westinghouse. Those firms, however, had “increased their prices many
times since the war” while ASR remained mired in a competitive business that kept prices
stubbornly low. “As a result,” the officials wrote, “management has found it increasingly
difficult to operate its Brooklyn plant on a profitable basis.” Investors were punishing the
company—its shares sold for two-thirds less on the New York Stock Exchange in 1951 than they
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had in 1946. The ad, which brought the company’s financial situation to the attention of the
newspaper-reading public, was to serve as a line in the sand. 61
ASR made further moves in 1953. First, it bought out a competitor, expanding its list of
brands to include the well-known Pal and Personna razors. The same year, the company hired a
new industrial relations director who hailed from the Dan River Mills in Danville, Virginia, once
the largest textile mill in the world. And with the retirement of company president J. B.
deMesquita, a new chief executive named Sidney Weil took the helm. It would be Weil who
would execute the company’s move to Virginia. 62
After the 1952 strike, ASR workers and their union could sense the runaway coming. To
prepare, they negotiated a severance pay provision and a “no moving” clause in their 1953
agreement. When news came down of the ASR plant sale in April 1954, the union kicked itself
into as high a gear as it could muster to pressure ASR to stay. John Monaghan of UE Local 107
in Philadelphia told five hundred assembled ASR workers how his local had stopped
Westinghouse from relocating 2,500 jobs to Kansas by “raising havoc” in the shop and
mobilizing the surrounding community. Delegations met with Congressman John Rooney, New
York State Industrial Commissioner Edward Corsi, the city’s Director of Industrial
Development, and Mayor Wagner’s Executive Secretary William Peer. Most of these officials
promised to “contact” ASR, but offered little else. Mayor Wagner would later disavow his
assistant’s sympathies when a local unit of the anti-communist IUE wrote his office to protest
perfunctory messages of support issued to the “discredited and dying” Local 475, which it called
“an arm of Soviet policy.” The mayor’s obsequious reply illustrated the extent to which the UE
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had become radioactive for anyone hoping to remain in the political mainstream. At the national
level, the local vowed to step up its efforts to secure passage of the Murray-Metcalf minimum
wage bill, which would raise the federal minimum to $1.25. If passed, the bill would partially
flatten out the low end of the labor market, lessening the regional wage differentials that made
relocation so attractive for factory owners. 63
In July 1954, when the Local 475 negotiating committee entered the room for the first
bargaining session on the new contract, ASR President Weil preempted the discussion with an
announcement. He began with a lengthy preamble focused on the claim that ASR officials would
maintain for the public during the relocation battle—that the company had been “forced” to
move by the impending redevelopment of the Brooklyn Civic Center. “Forced” may have been a
term of art, given that ASR’s board chairman Milton Dammann was a three-time president of the
Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce, as plugged in as any individual could be to the financial
muscle behind the redevelopment efforts. Brooklyn Borough President John Cashmore,
interviewed by the Brooklyn Eagle, rejected ASR’s claims. “The city has done nothing to prevent
the razor company from continuing in this location,” he told the paper. Beyond this, factories
were deserting the Northeast in droves, very few of them impelled by anything like the
redevelopment of the Brooklyn Civic Center. American Federation of Labor President George
Meany, addressing a group of Connecticut hatmakers that January in a speech that was carried
nationwide, outlined the more basic reasons for the runaway trend—“the offer of cheap,
nonunion labor, backed by state laws which make it exceedingly difficult for workers to organize
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into effective unions.” The goal, in other words, was “to make more money.” The hatmakers’
marathon strike ended after ten months without an agreement to prevent the plant from
relocating. 64
Continuing his speech, Weil revealed that three years prior, the firm had engaged Walter
Kidde, a leading industrial engineering firm, to conduct a study of possible plant locations—at
least 150 of them, it would later emerge, including sites in Alabama and Indiana. When the sale
to Brooklyn Polytechnic went through in April, “every major industrial real estate firm in the
country” contacted ASR, hoping to facilitate its move. Weil complained about the cost of land
and taxes in New York and the relative unavailability of one-story plants that would permit new,
automated work processes. He explained that ASR, “not a tremendous organization,” after all,
was in trouble. Sales and profits were down, and the company was at a severe competitive
disadvantage relative to Gillette, that company “whose name I don’t have to mention” and whose
1953 profits alone outstripped ASR’s total annual sales. 65
Weil then arrived at the climax—ASR would be moving to Staunton, a small town in
Virginia’s Shenandoah Valley, in the summer of 1955. In May, following the announcement of
the sale to Brooklyn Polytechnic, officials at the Staunton Chamber of Commerce had contacted
ASR to inform them that the Celanese Corporation, a textile manufacturer, was looking to sell its
fourteen-year-old plant in Verona, a tiny community just outside the Staunton city limits. ASR
bargained Celanese down to just over a million dollars, less than half the original asking price,
and closed the sale on July 9, three days before the first bargaining meeting. The plant itself was
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a one-story, 223,000 square-foot “modern” facility with air conditioning, sprinklers, railroad
sidings, and truck loading docks. Weil gave the committee a sales pitch for the town,
emphasizing its proximity to Richmond and Washington DC, its schools, parks, and religious
facilities, its “excellent social and cultural opportunities,” and the natural beauty of the
surrounding area. Any employees who wished to uproot themselves, he promised, would have a
job in Staunton. Weil didn’t mention it, but in Virginia ASR would be joining runaway shops
from industry giants General Electric, which sliced its militant Schenectady workforce in half to
send the work to Waynesboro, twelve miles southeast of Staunton, and Westinghouse, whose air
conditioner plant would open in Verona that October. Nor did he acknowledge to his
workforce—composed mainly of first-generation Italians and Jews, with significant
concentrations of African Americans and Puerto Ricans—that Staunton was a Jim Crow town. 66
For those non-managerial employees who declined to abandon New York City for the
Jim Crow South—which would turn out to be all of them—Weil proposed a plan. Employees
over sixty-five would be enrolled in a company-financed pension plan with a baseline of $125 a
month for anyone with twenty-five years of service. The pension would not be paid in full by the
company—instead, ASR would top off a retiree’s Social Security benefits in a scheme that
mimicked those negotiated in auto, steel, and rubber, but fell well short of the gold standard, a
no-strings-attached $100 a month pension secured by the militant United Mine Workers.
Workers under sixty would be offered one week of severance pay for each year of service to the
company, while those between sixty and sixty-five were offered one-and-a-half week’s pay for
each year of service. Weil portrayed the offer as a gift borne of his commitment to the “human
values” and “principles of equity” he declared were “the foundation of our country’s system of
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individual enterprise.” Playing the good cop, he stressed that not all ASR board members were
feeling so generous, but that his commitment to fairness and decency had won the day. 67
But there was a catch, one that became clearer over the coming weeks as more
information emerged from the company about its plans. The pensions and severance proposals
were contingent on “being able to operate efficiently until we are ready to move,” the company
stressed in a “Questions and Answers” document distributed to employees. The company would
go on to demand that a “cooperation clause” be included in any agreement with the union. The
clause was a gag order that would forbid the union not only from attempting to prevent the move
but even from criticizing the firm’s decision. The pensions and severance, in other words,
depended on ASR workers accepting the relocation as a foregone conclusion and working
quietly and diligently until their jobs were liquidated. The stakes were high—in a business as
competitive as razors, any interruption in production beyond that exacted by the move itself
could prove deadly if ASR’s products were to vanish from shelves. 68
The agreement was never consummated. Instead, the break-up with Brooklyn and Local
475 was acrimonious and at times violent. Over the coming weeks, the contours of life with ASR
in Staunton would become clearer. On wages, the company was cagey—rates for the Virginia
plant had not been established yet, managers told workers, but they admitted that in general,
wages were “about 15 to 20% lower” than in Brooklyn. The UE disputed this figure, insisting the
average hourly wage in Staunton was $0.75 an hour—half the Brooklyn figure. In internal
communications, the union estimated the company would achieve a $2 million annual savings in
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its wage bill, slashing its annual payroll from five to three million. On these terms, the new plant
would pay for itself in just one year. Moreover, the new factory in Staunton would employ fewer
people. One of the motivations for seeking a one-story plant was to permit the installation of
equipment to mechanize the production of razor blades. The company admitted as much to
employees, but explained it would not matter since they already knew few would agree to come
to Virginia, leaving “more than enough jobs to go around.” 69
In his book The Limits to Capital, the geographer David Harvey writes that “the search
for excess profits through technological change is not independent of the search for excess
profits through re-location.” Over the course of the 1950s, it became clear that automation and
the runaway threat were not discrete phenomena, but two aspects of the same cost-cutting
strategy. In this, too, ASR would follow in the footsteps of giants. In 1954, for example, General
Electric vowed to double production without increasing its labor force. Westinghouse, whose
directors told the Wall Street Journal that the mid-1950s were “no time to pull your punches,”
boasted to the press that its Verona air conditioner plant was the most highly automated of its
kind. The recent battles over managerial prerogative and control over the work process had been
fought for a reason—“as a result of sticking to our guns, we have complete freedom to automate
and make our plants more efficient,” Westinghouse managers told the Journal. By doing so, the
firm was able to increase profits in a recession by laying off 18,000 workers. In private
communications to stockholders, ASR boasted that its new plant would unleash “major
economies in operation.” 70
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Runaways and automation often worked in tandem. “In its newer plants in low wage
areas,” UE researchers complained, “GE speeds up production tremendously. The company
admits with pride that at its runaway plant in Rome, Georgia, it has cut the ‘shop work cycle time
43% as compared with the Pittsfield [Massachusetts] plant.” The workforce at a new runaway
plant was often a “green” one, sometimes drawn straight from the farm, unschooled in collective
resistance, and lacking any memory of work before the speed-up. At the same time, the threat of
relocation could serve as a cudgel to force more effort out of workers in existing plants. As one
weary union bureaucrat in K. B. Gilden’s Between the Hills and the Sea, the great (and probably
only) novel to dramatize the struggles in the US electrical industry during the 1950s, put it—
“Come on, come on. Any more of this yakking, you know where Switch’ll be? Way down south
in Dixie. With a brand-new facility built with the help of government money. And all the
improved methods they wouldn’t put up with here put through on a greenhorn crew.” 71
In Gilden’s novel, the company—a thinly fictionalized version of GE—capitalizes on the
“insecurity,” “mistrust,” and “doubt” fostered by the fear of relocation to install new machinery,
combine multiple jobs into one, halve the section’s workforce through layoffs and exasperated
quitting, and extract a “tripling” of effort from the women who remained. At the factory’s reallife analogue in Bridgeport, Connecticut, GE bosses managed to increase the plant’s total output
even as employment was halved between 1947 and 1955. 72 The trump card of potential or actual
relocation presented unions with an unpalatable choice. Like Local 475, they could fight it and
risk losing everything. Or they could pursue a strategy of concession, hoping to salvage jobs that
were becoming increasingly unendurable. Speaking to an interviewer in the 1960s, UE captain
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James Matles described the calculus imposed on his rivals in the IUE as they stared down a
runaway threat at General Electric:
The campaign lasted for about three months, in the newspapers, every organization starting with
the Chamber of Commerce, was enlisted by the company. The union was being hit over the head
by newspaper ads by all these outside organizations saying you'd better cave in and take what G.E.
is offering, or we're going to lose 5,000 jobs. Tremendous fear and terror throughout the
community—families, wives, children. The picture of a ghost town was painted for them. There
was tremendous fear among the people, but no mobilization for effective opposition to the
Company. The leadership of the union, early in the game, caved in and proceeded on the basis that
something has to be done or we are going to lose the jobs. 73

In this way, GE was able to jettison its longstanding incentive pay system in favor of a new
scheme called “measured daywork,” which enabled even tighter control over the output
demanded of workers and paved the way for further job losses in the 1960s and 70s due to
mechanization. 74
Staunton
Though it is 500 miles from Rome, Georgia, Staunton too sits in the valley formed by the
Appalachian mountains, the great chain that reaches down eastern North America from
Newfoundland to Alabama. While the Shenandoah Valley was known during the Civil War as
the “granary of the Confederacy,” by the 1950s the 20,000-person town of Staunton—
pronounced “STAN-ton,” without the “u”—was probably best known, if it was known at all, as
the birthplace of President Woodrow Wilson. The small farms that had dotted Augusta County
for centuries specialized in wheat, corn, rye, apples, and livestock. By the 1950s, however, this
farm economy co-existed with an equally robust manufacturing sector, which by midcentury
employed 31.6% of Augusta County residents as opposed to the 27% who worked in agriculture.
The transformation of the Shenandoah Valley mirrored that of the South at large, where
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manufacturing came to outstrip agriculture as a source of income during the latter years of the
Second World War. 75
While industry emerged in the Valley as early as the 1920s, the 1940s were a key decade
in the transformation of Staunton and neighboring Waynesboro. Millions of acres of wheat and
corn across the state were retired under the guidance of the federal Soil Conservation Service, the
land either converted to pasture or turned to raising hay to support the growing livestock
industry. The old farm economy began to erode in other ways, too. The local apple industry
contracted by fifty percent in the postwar decade, culminating in what a local historian describes
as an “abrupt removal of apple trees throughout the state in 1949–51.” The emergence of a
national market for fruit, spurred by the growth of west coast producers and the increasing
facility of refrigerated transport, put pressure on local apple growers whose low yields and
vulnerability to frost and disease left them at a disadvantage. Worse for the growers, during the
war, manufacturing plants had soaked up the once-cheap harvest time labor that worked for as
little as thirty cents an hour during the 1940s. For Augusta County residents, “a regular job in a
factory was obviously preferable to seasonal work at a low wage,” explains a local historian. As
a stopgap, the growers resorted to forced labor, using German prisoners of war with whom they
occasionally formed lasting friendships. Postwar retrenchment, however, had taken its toll on the
manufacturing economy—the local DuPont plant had cut its workforce from 7,000 to 2,700 and
several plants closed entirely, prompting some to migrate to places like Baltimore in search of
work. By 1954, the Virginia State Unemployment Commission was reporting what it called a
labor surplus in Augusta County. 76
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In 1954, then, Staunton was in a state of transition. The tension between old and new was
reflected in a spatial and generational split in Shenandoah Valley elites. The power of the older
farming families was in decline, but they enjoyed residual control over key institutions like the
town’s newspaper, which worried aloud about the influx of manufacturing denting the supply of
inexpensive farm labor and insisted that “it would be a mistake ever to forget that the basic
strength of the Valley of Virginia is agriculture; and nothing must be done to handicap the farmer
in producing the essential products that sustain man and sustain industry.” These older families
were challenged by an up-and-coming class of “go-getter” businessmen, based in the towns, who
mounted the drive to attract northern industries to the Valley. The political vehicle of this
coalition of lawyers, merchants, real estate promoters, and radio station owners was the Staunton
Chamber of Commerce, whose Industrial Committee solicited interest from the representatives
of northern industries, wining and dining prospective runaways and helping them to navigate the
transition. The Chamber of Commerce served as the spearhead of a new elite whose power was
rooted in a feedback loop between industrialization, a growing population and tax base,
urbanization via the annexation of erstwhile farmland, and a mushrooming infrastructure that
was both physical—roads, water, power, sewers—and social, leading to the growth of the cities’
schools, churches, and other civic institutions. 77
In executing the move, ASR officials joined this new elite and marshalled its power to
defend the conditions that had made the runaway feasible. While in some ways, Staunton was
coming to resemble the northern cities from which it poached companies like ASR, these
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changes did not include tolerance for unionization or the erosion of the social arrangements that
helped cement the low wages and resistance to unions that attracted northern companies. Almost
immediately upon removal of equipment from Brooklyn to Virginia, the UE sent representatives
to survey the terrain. Staffer George Goldstein’s report described a town “pretty completely
controlled by businessmen” who were “extremely conservative and anti-union.” Goldstein
interviewed a number of the town’s prominent figures, who were moved neither by his
explanation of the “dirty deal” ASR had given its workers nor his Keynesian plea that the
company, by lowering its wage bill from five to three million dollars, was taking advantage of
backward conditions in Staunton to rob the community of two million dollars in alleged
“purchasing power.” These elites, who stood to benefit personally from the arrival of a large new
manufacturing concern, explained to Goldstein that three million was better than nothing.
Goldstein found little enthusiasm for higher wages or an empowered working class. “There was
generally a fear on the part of these people,” Goldstein explained to his superiors, “that unions
following the new companies and industries into town would disrupt the stability and equanimity
of their community patterns.” In this respect, they were confident that ASR would follow
“prevailing practices” and respect the “pattern of the community.” 78
The “pattern of the community” in Augusta County was maintained by state power
exercised on behalf of the interlocking political and economic interests that manned the levers of
government. In an example of the seamlessness of political and economic power in Staunton,
ASR’s new lawyer, Richard Smith, was also a member of the city council. Behind this power lay
the threat of force. In November, as ASR began to install its machinery in the Staunton plant,
Local 475 sent several laid-off ASR workers to Virginia to appeal directly to newly-hired
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employees. Before they reached the plant, however, they were intercepted on the highway by
Augusta County sheriffs. “The sheriff eventually let us go,” Local 475 member Burt Caplan
wrote, “but not until he had briefed us on Virginia’s ‘right-to-work’ laws, the size of their jail
and the size of the police force.” Undaunted, Caplan returned to Staunton the following week
with other ASR workers in tow, only to face stepped-up harassment. After visiting a worker’s
house but finding only his wife at home, Caplan was arrested in his room at the YMCA and
hauled down to the police station. “The police chief told me I had to get out of town
immediately; that I was an agitator, a trouble maker and a union man,” Caplan recalled. “He told
me the people in the South didn’t want to be bothered by unions, they were content with life as it
has been for years. He told me he had called up the all the hotels and the YMCA and told them
not to rent me rooms.” The police chief suggested he might charge Caplan with forcing his way
into the woman’s home and surmised that the man he had meant to visit would probably be fired
from ASR. While the chief sat at his desk, he flipped through a copy of the seniority list from
ASR’s Brooklyn plant—a document he could only have gotten from the company. As if to
emphasize the point, the chief ostentatiously lit a cigarette with a new ASR-brand lighter. That
night, Caplan was tossed from the YMCA. 79
On the issue of Jim Crow, ASR officials played dumb. “We know that there are laws and
customs in Virginia which, to some extent, segregate Negros and Whites socially,” the company
told employees upon announcing its move. “To what extent they will affect working conditions,
we honestly don’t know.” UE representatives who visited Staunton found little ambiguity. There
were “no Negroes in any production jobs in any of the manufacturing plants,” George Goldstein
reported. African Americans held “only the most menial jobs.” According to ASR veteran Nancy
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Anderson, an African American native of nearby Lynchburg, Staunton was a “cracker town”
where the only work available for people like her was as a porter or domestic. ASR managers
were undisturbed—“from now on we’re strictly Confederate,” joked one to the Saturday Evening
Post, which lent the company a fawning profile upon its move to Virginia. 80
Unlike ASR management, bigwigs on the city’s Real Estate Board were frank with UE
investigator Goldstein, warning him that any African Americans who dared settle there would be
“most unhappy.” The city’s power brokers were a solid bloc—Chamber of Commerce chairman
Charles Blackley, who doubled as the owner of the town’s only radio station and served on the
Board of Education, was “completely vicious on the question of Negro workers,” in addition to
refusing to sell the UE airtime. A local minister whispered to Goldstein that Blackley was a
“rabid, grafting reactionary” who was at the center of the drive to attract Northern industry to
Staunton. The minister, who confessed he had little influence in town because of his anti-Jim
Crow views, “emphasized business domination of the community, particularly with respect to
most of the ministers, and the newspapers as well,” which adhered to an “extremely conservative
Democratic policy, in support of the Byrd machine and generally anti-labor.” Not everyone was
hostile to Goldstein. Father McConnell, a Brooklyn-born priest who tended to the town’s four
hundred Catholics, “threw up his hands” when Goldstein asked him whether Puerto Rican ASR
workers would be accepted in Staunton. Not if they were “dark-skinned,” the cleric predicted.
His advice for African American New Yorkers was stark—“do not come.” The director of the
Staunton office of the Virginia State Employment Service, a Pennsylvania native, confirmed
without relish that there “would be serious difficulties if any of our Negro and Puerto Rican
members came with the company.” The only local figure to embrace Goldstein’s UE philosophy
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was Dr. C. J. Waller, president of the Staunton chapter of the NAACP, who predicted “our
program would meet the complete support and approval of the Negro community.” 81
Historians have uncovered further evidence of the sturdiness of Jim Crow in the
Shenandoah Valley in the 1950s. “Staunton was clearly a racially segregated community in the
1950s and 1960s,” writes Josie Dull in her investigation of the struggle for civil rights in Augusta
County. Locals interviewed for the article recalled an active Ku Klux Klan whose most vocal
proponent worked in an insurance agency downtown. African Americans in Staunton could not
eat at white restaurants, try on clothing in white stores, or visit white doctors, prompting the
growth of a parallel African American commercial sphere that produced influential black leaders
like Dr. Waller. As late as the early 1960s, the white owner of the Brooks Restaurant outside
Staunton was fined $450—nearly $4,000 in 2018 dollars—for serving a black customer in a
deliberate challenge to segregation. 82
1954, of course, was a particularly important year in the history of white supremacy in
Virginia. That year, in the Brown v. Board of Education case, which consolidated several
challenges to school desegregation, including one in nearby Prince Edward County, the US
Supreme Court outlawed segregation in public schools. The next year, the Court instructed the
southern states to integrate their schools “with all deliberate speed.” The Byrd Organization, the
legendary Democratic political machine that dominated state politics, quickly designed a plan for
“massive resistance” to desegregation. State officials conspired to cut off funding to any public
school facing a desegregation order and sought to redirect state funds to white families who
would send their children to new, private “segregation academies.” In 1954, schools in Staunton
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were separate and patently unequal—Booker T. Washington High School, which served the
city’s African American students, had no cafeteria and used textbooks discarded from white
schools, which were built and improved with regularity. Local school officials frequently refused
to spend tax money on black schools, telling African American parents that if they wanted
laboratory equipment, for instance, they could buy it themselves. The Augusta County Training
School, which educated black students from grades eight through nine, was built only after
parents agreed to dig its foundations with their own hands. When the order to desegregate came
down, school officials in Staunton dragged their feet and followed the lead of the Byrd forces at
the state level. The city, which lay west of the Blue Ridge Mountains and had fewer black
residents than the state’s Piedmont and coastal regions, never closed its schools completely and
avoided the spectacular rancor that accompanied desegregation in Charlottesville, its neighbor
over the ridge. Nonetheless, city officials managed to delay integration of public schools until
1966. The mayor of Staunton said he could not see what the fuss was about, as the school board
had never, in his opinion, treated black students unfairly. 83
Though no blacks worked in production jobs in Staunton, the UE believed they were very
much a part of the political economy of the Jim Crow South—that “business climate” of which
Southern governments often boasted when wooing cost-conscious northern industrialists. “Jim
Crow Is an Invitation for Runaway Shops,” Local 475 stressed in the literature that accompanied
its boycott campaign following ASR’s departure. Three elements—Jim Crow, anti-union laws
like Virginia’s “right-to-work” statute, and the “terror tactics” of Southern police—combined to
keep the South a low-wage haven for runaways like ASR. White supremacy in the South was
part of a class war, the union insisted. African Americans were confined to menial, low-wage
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work and barred from production jobs—except when they could be used as a threat to keep the
wage demands of white employees in check. General Electric had recently employed this
strategy in Louisville, Kentucky when it threatened to hire black workers, who made up fifteen
percent of the population but eighty-five percent of the unemployed, at eighty cents an hour, five
cents below the existing rate. In this way, the low wages paid to blacks, cemented by the regime
of state-sanctioned violence and discrimination known as Jim Crow, acted like “gravity” on the
wages of white workers in the South—and indeed, on the wages of workers across the country,
insofar as the runaway threat now put them in competition with one another.
According to the UE, the fates of white workers in the North and black workers in the
South were linked. “As long as bosses are allowed to maintain Jim Crow hiring as a threat,
workers in the South will be unable to organize properly for higher wages—and they will
provide cheap labor areas for our shops up here to runaway to,” Local 475 told anyone who
would listen. Worse, the effective disenfranchisement of huge portions of the Southern electorate
ensured the dominance of “poll tax Dixiecrats” who would use their influence in Congress to
defeat the $1.25 an hour minimum wage bills currently pending—measures that would erode the
economic incentive for northern shops to run away. Unionists in Staunton agreed—the president
of an Amalgamated Clothing Workers local whose members made ninety to ninety-five cents an
hour in a local textile mill “emphasized the general lowering effect of jim-crow” to UE
organizers. “Unions like the UE, if established throughout the South, would play a major part in
ending the Ku Klux Klan psychology which keeps Southern workers divided, produces low

85

wages, and keeps poll-taxers in key positions in Congress,” Local 475 Business Manager Cliff
Cameron, a native North Carolinian, stressed to members. 84
The workers at ASR never considered moving to Virginia with the company. This left a
choice—accept ASR’s deal and work quietly until the layoffs came or try and exact a price for
its betrayal. Their union chose the latter. No record survives of Local 475’s internal deliberations
on how to navigate the crisis, but their persistent trumpeting of successful examples of militant
resistance—the sit-in at Permutit that softened the impact of its departure and the struggle at the
Westinghouse South Philadelphia plant that for the moment had preserved 2,500 jobs—suggests
they considered confrontation the least bad approach, even if it would not in the end prevent
ASR’s departure. “We have taken the position that there is no way of saving a plant in a given
community by a reduction in pay,” explained Matles several years later. 85
Moreover, in creating a spectacle of resistance, Local 475 sought to turn runaways into a
political issue—to enlist the support of politicians and ordinary Brooklynites by stressing the
brutal unfairness of the company and the threats to the city’s overall well-being posed by the
ongoing industrial stampede. Given recent history, this was not a wholly implausible strategy.
While the New Deal and World War II had lent the industrial unions greater security in their
struggle simply to exist, the basic rules of capitalism—reverence for private property and the
unrelenting pressure of the profit motive—meant that employers still held the bulk of the cards in
any contest with their workers. Their hand had just been strengthened by the Taft-Hartley Act,
made possible by the undemocratic “poll tax-Dixiecrat” Congress the UE bemoaned. In their
short lifetimes, the CIO unions had always enjoyed their greatest success when they were able to
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embrace their role as vehicles of democratization, not simply for their members, but for the
American working class as a whole. The postwar strikes, to which so many unionists now looked
as halcyon days, were an example. In city after city, solidarity among workers across industries
and from the community at large had transformed individual contests over working conditions
into collective political struggles that threatened the basis of managerial control and the political
arrangements that underpinned it. Teamsters president Dave Beck, a conservative unionist, put it
best when observing the 1946 Oakland general strike, which he actively tried to break—“I say
this damn general strike is nothing but a revolution. It isn’t labor tactics. It’s revolutionary
tactics.” As longshoreman and labor radical Stan Weir, a participant in the strike, put it—“never
before or since had Oakland been so alive and happy for the majority of the population.” It was
this atmosphere, this world, that manufacturers like ASR were fleeing and which Local 475 now
sought to re-conjure in New York City. 86
In its attempt to encourage a social movement against the runaways, the UE stepped up
its fundraising and began churning out literature. Matles instructed UE districts across the
country to distribute leaflets and to flood ASR and the Brooklyn Eagle with letters protesting the
move. They were also to continue advocating for a $1.25 minimum wage and legislation to
combat runaway shops and to protest the tax write-offs and other subsidies that states and
localities frequently granted manufacturers to entice them to move. These actions, while logical
enough, remained at the level of moral persuasion and did little to reverse the fact that the UE
was at the nadir of its influence. “This Factory Is Running Away!” proclaimed a flyer distributed
nationwide, urging unionists to protest ASR’s “return to the past.” “What Happens to the People
When the Factory Runs Away?” asked another, which featured quotes from ASR workers and
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local politicians. “My whole working life was in that plant,” said Joseph Cangialosi, a fortyseven year veteran of ASR. “This is the third plant I’ve worked for that wants to move,”
lamented Max Quagliariello, another ASR employee. The majority of ASR workers were over
forty years old, Cameron observed to the press. “Obviously these people, mostly unskilled, are
not going to fare too well in a fight for jobs in which they will be competing with nearly 400,000
others already unemployed in the New York City area. What are they going to do?” A scattered
group of Congresspersons and state representatives expressed their “hope” and “wish” that ASR
would “reconsider,” but showed no sign of a desire to play hardball. 87
The hardball, if any, appears to have come in the only way an isolated group like Local
475 could muster—at the shop level. As the mid-August contract expiration date neared, the
company accused workers of mounting “planned, systematic, organized slowdowns ordered by
the union.” Weil went to the newspapers, alleging that production was down forty percent
because workers in the tool room were destroying “expensive motors” and the dies needed to
shape steel into blades. He also claimed that the UE had threatened violence against anyone who
dared to work overtime in preparation for the move. Two days later, company lawyers withdrew
the charges, only to have Weil reassert them the next day, when he publicly threatened to lay off
440 employees and begin preparations for an immediate move. News coverage of Weil’s
remarks unfailingly emphasized that the UE was “Communist tainted” and had been thrown out
of the CIO. “With Reds, It’s Rule or Ruin,” editorialized the New York Daily News, repeating
Weil’s charges. A bizarre episode occurred on August 4 when company officials insisted that a
woman had called in a bomb threat to the plant. Police found no bomb and company officials
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declined to explain why, if they believed the threat was serious, they hadn’t evacuated the plant.
Meanwhile, the company’s public relations offensive was bearing fruit in the business-friendly
press. The New York Herald Tribune and Newsweek, both conservative publications, praised
ASR for its generosity, “good labor relations,” and overall “industrial statesmanship.” 88
On August 10, with three working days left before contract expiration, ASR President
Sidney Weil delivered an angry speech over the plant’s public address system. Over and over, he
sought to impress upon his employees what he called the “facts of life.” He accused them of
sabotaging production and threatened again to lay off hundreds. He explained, with
condescension, that workers had fallen under the spell of the “showman” Cameron, who “will
not let you do what you want to do.” ASR would not sign any contract governing the plant’s
final year of operation without an expanded “cooperation clause” by which employees, on pain
of discharge and therefore of losing their pensions or severance, pledged to work diligently,
including overtime if necessary, to build up an inventory that would cushion ASR during the
move and then to help in dismantling the plant. He urged a revolt against Cameron at that night’s
union meeting. If not, the plant would shut down early, everyone would lose their jobs, and no
one would receive a pension or severance pay. “Believe me,” he warned—“you can lose.” 89
On August 16, 600 out of 850 remaining production employees at ASR submitted to the
“facts of life” and voted unanimously to accept the company’s offer. But the agreement, it
turned out, did not settle the issue. On the union’s interpretation of the draft contract, it was free
to continue its public campaign to oppose the move. On the company’s reading, “cooperation”
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meant self-censorship. On September 8, board chairman Dammann wrote Cameron to complain
that workers continued to lambast ASR in the shop paper, the UE Blade, and Local 475
continued to publicize its opposition to the move. “Fortunately no contract has been signed, nor
will we sign one which you consider gives you the privilege to act against the very essence and
spirit of our settlement and to malign and boycott us not only in the plant but publicly.” The
company then submitted an additional clause that enjoined ASR workers to “not do or perform
any act or take any step of whatever nature which has as its purpose or aim, directly or indirectly,
to interfere with or hinder the Employer’s plant removal to Staunton, Va.” This broadly-worded
measure would give the company extraordinary latitude to fire anyone who “interfered” with its
plans, no matter how indirectly, raising the prospect of large numbers of workers being denied
the severance pay they had just negotiated. Moreover, under the Taft-Hartley Act, the company
could sue the already-reeling union for damages if it breached the lopsided agreement. Finally,
the clause offended many workers’ sense of their basic right to have an opinion about what was
being done to them. Seven hundred ASR workers signed a letter demanding the company sign
the contract as originally agreed. 90
On September 28, with no agreement signed, Executive Vice President Wesley Songer
took to the loudspeakers for a final attempt to ram through the company’s terms. Cameron was
Ahab, a mad villain who “so hates his fellow man that he is willing to sink the ship with all
hands aboard rather than continue on a course to which he is opposed.” Workers had been duped
by a “hardcore of die-hards”—“comparative newcomers to ASR” who “blindly follow Mr.
Cameron’s orders” and had “little to lose” when everyone’s pension and severance went down
the drain. The implication was that the local had planted Communists among the workforce who
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used their Svengali-like powers to convince ordinary ASR employees to sacrifice their severance
and pensions on the altar of their mad schemes. 91
Negotiations were deadlocked. “GEM RAZOR RENEGES,” shouted an ad in the
Brooklyn Eagle taken out by the union. With few alternatives, the local bet the farm and turned
to direct action. On September 30, six hundred employees sat down at their jobs, ending all
production of razors at the plant. Two hundred fifty remained inside the building after work,
vowing to stay the night. They ended up staying for fourteen days, at the end of which ASR
effected an immediate removal to Virginia. 92
The protest, which the local bragged was “most dramatic sit-in strike in New York labor
history,” was an event. ASR’s claim that resistance to its proposals was the product of a small,
isolated group was belied by widespread participation, considerable logistical acumen, and
willingness to put bodies on the line as police assaulted picketers to clear the way for the
removal of equipment from the plant. Privately, ASR admitted as much—in a December report
to stockholders, after the dust had cleared, company officials conceded that the union “could
count on very strong support from their membership.” Judges of the state Supreme Court
agreed—“it may be inferred from the allegations of the complaint,” they wrote in refusing to
dismiss an injunction against further sit-ins, “that the sit-in strike was participated in by all
members of the union.” Strikers enjoyed support from the community, as well. The first food
items smuggled into the plant traveled window-to-window from the fourth-floor apartment of an
elderly Puerto Rican woman in an adjoining building. Cigarettes arrived via donation from local
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Parent-Teacher Associations. Amenities gradually increased—after the first few days strikers
were sleeping on donated cots that “appeared” in the plant. 93
The protest was well-organized. Workers seized and held the third, fifth, and eighth
floors of the plant, including the cafeteria, which was renamed “Sloppy Joe’s” and repurposed to
turn out three meals a day for strikers. Several strikers were ex-military—a former Army cook
manned the kitchen and another explained to the newspapers that surviving the Bataan Death
March made sleeping on a cardboard box at ASR seem easy. Strikers formed committees for
entertainment—concerts, ping-pong tournaments—and security, a key issue given that private
guards hired by the company stalked the grounds looking for opportunities to seal off increasing
portions of the building. A publicity committee turned out signs to hang from windows, a daily
newspaper, and mimeographed leaflets that strikers and sympathizers passed out to drivers on
busy Jay Street. Workers washed their own clothes and set up a barbershop stocked with ASR
blades. A picket was maintained around the idled plant by other Local 475 members, militants
from other unions, and the families of strikers, who navigated hostile police lines to visit with
their relatives through barred plant windows. 94
The strikers were a diverse group. Newspapers noted that about half were “middle-aged
women.” Local 475 News bragged that “men and women, Negro, white, Puerto Rican, and other
nationality groups lived in mutual harmony and came out knowing that they could only win as
long as the harmony prevailed.” One striker, the pastor of an African Methodist Episcopal church
in upstate New York, told reporters he expected to miss Sunday services. “I’m going to let my
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conscience be my guide,” the Right Reverend Richard Dix explained. In a jibe at the company’s
willingness to secure a modus vivendi with Jim Crow, the union explained that “if any of the
segregationists in the South want to know how it’s done, they should have been able to observe
the ASR sit-in.” 95
On October 4, five days into the plant occupation, Weil wrote all ASR employees to
inform them the company would seek a court injunction to end the sit-in. He also told them that
without a cooperation clause “there will be no contract, and without a contract, neither we nor
you want to continue to operate in Brooklyn.” The next day, the company took out an ad in the
Brooklyn Eagle asking readers whether the union was determined to seek “strife at any price.”
The day after, the company was in court asking the help of a judge to clear the plant. ASR
lawyers complained that occupiers conducted themselves in a “boisterous and disorderly
manner” and were using the company’s gas and electricity “for their own purposes.” They also
grumbled that the police department had as yet been “unwilling or unable” to storm the plant and
eject the strikers. The case had come before Judge George Arkwright, a stalwart of the Brooklyn
Republican Party. Judge Arkwright set the matter down for a hearing but remarked in advance
that sit-down strikes constituted an “illegal seizure of property” and remained so even if it were
found the company had reneged on a contract. Certain that the judge would rule against them, the
eighty or so remaining strikers began plans to evacuate the plant. On October 13, they ended
their occupation, exiting the plant to a crowd of demonstrators and a bevy of television
cameras. 96

95
“200 Sit-Ins ‘Hold Fort’ In Strike,” New York Post, October 1, 1954; “What It Was Like Inside ‘Hotel Gem’”;
“200 Sit-Downers Hoist Food Into Razor Plant,” New York World Telegram, October 1, 1954.
96
“To All ASR Employees,” October 4, 1954, Box 1, Folder 2, Kirschner Collection; American Safety Razor Corp.
v. Amalgamated Machine, Instrument, & Metal, Local 475, 132 NYLJ, October 13, 1954, 11; “Justice George
Arkwright, 83, Of State Supreme Court Dead,” New York Times, August 27, 1972.

93

After seventy-six years, ASR had fashioned its last razor blade in New York. Company
officials began plans to accomplish the move immediately and informed workers that the pension
and severance scheme, which had been meant to guarantee continued production, was off the
table. On November 3, coincidentally or not the day after Election Day, 150 police officers,
many on horseback, attacked the picket line around the now-empty plant, scattering the forces of
Local 475 and opening the way for moving trucks to cart off the equipment. Demonstrators did
not go down without a fight. They parked three cars across busy Jay Street, halting traffic during
the afternoon rush hour until police smashed the windows and dragged them off. Nine strikers
chained themselves to the plant fence until police destroyed their padlocks and hauled them in.
Dornalea Spears, a thirty-seven year-old African American ASR worker, Harlem resident, and
mother of four, was charged with assaulting a police officer. Protests lodged with the mayor, the
borough president, and the police commissioner drew no response. In the days that followed,
demonstrations continued, drawing up to a thousand people to protest the continuing removal of
equipment under police guard. 97
In the aftermath of the plant battle, both sides claimed victory. “We Gave the Alarm!”
boasted the local in the Brooklyn Eagle in the days following the sit-in. ASR adopted a tone of
fatherly consternation, regretting that it had been “forced” to abandon pension and severance
payments to its employees and asking Eagle readers to ignore the UE’s calls for a nationwide
boycott. The boycott campaign was pursued with vigor, but the UE’s much-diminished clout
gave it little staying power. One local union that responded positively to the campaign was UAW
Local 600, representing workers at Ford’s gargantuan River Rouge complex outside Detroit.
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Local 600, which had a strong left-wing tradition, had engaged in its own anti-runaway
campaign three years prior, when Ford began gutting its militant Rouge workforce as part of a
nationwide “decentralization” policy. Working with the National Negro Labor Congress, a CPaffiliated organization tied to the left-wing unions, Local 600 mounted an ultimately
unsuccessful political and legal campaign centered around the “inalienable right to a job.” Like
Local 475, Rouge leaders challenged the notion that property rights trumped all, including the
physical, social, and economic well-being of concrete places like Detroit or New York City. Like
Local 475, they stressed the nationwide consequences of Southern white supremacy and its links
to the runaway shop plague. And like Local 475, they were marginalized by the anti-communist
mainstream, whose avatars, like UAW chief Walter Reuther, were moving in the direction of
accommodation with the chieftains of American capitalism. In 1952, UAW officers executed a
coup at Local 600, taking the organization into “trusteeship” and ousting the leaders who had
mounted the anti-runaway campaign. As historian Thomas Sugrue comments, “the reluctance of
the UAW International (and most other unions) to challenge sacrosanct business practices
limited the possibilities of resistance to deindustrialization.” 98
As the runaway movement and its consequences began to receive more attention from
press and politicians, Local 475 and ASR workers could credibly claim to have “raised the
alarm,” as they put it. But raising the alarm was different than taking concrete steps to stem the
tide of runaways or address their consequences. Like the postwar strikes, the runaway
phenomenon raised basic questions around ownership and control—in a word, about private
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property and its relative moral weight against the claims of workers who toiled day in, day out,
sometimes for decades, only to find themselves and their families suffering and insecure.
The consequences of ASR’s departure for the well-being of its former workers were
illustrated starkly in the results of a survey conducted by Local 475 six months after the plant
shut its doors. The survey was among the first of its kind, depicting the circumstances of
runaway victims with statistical precision and in their own words. Seventy-four percent of ASR
workers remained unemployed as of March 1955, a date by which they would have exhausted
their state unemployment benefits. Four-fifths of the small group who had found other
employment now made less than they had at ASR, which had itself been among the worst-paying
of Local 475 shops. One of the thirteen who reported higher wages had been one of the lucky
ones to secure a job with the city, where municipal employment would serve as a de facto safety
net until the cuts that accompanied the fiscal crisis two decades later. The results were worst for
women, racial minorities, and the old. Only eight percent of the women surveyed had found
other jobs, while black and Puerto Rican men and women fared worse in terms of employment
and wages than their white counterparts. The results of the survey revealed the ways in which
runways became a victory for employers as a class by leaving their victims desperate to take any
remaining job, no matter how low the wage. And they revealed a double penalty exacted by the
racial discrimination that structured the market for blue-collar work. It wasn’t only that African
Americans, lacking seniority due to past discrimination, ended up “last hired and first fired”
when layoffs came. It was that the very employers most likely to hire African Americans or
members of other ostracized groups, taking advantage of their position in the labor market to
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impose lower wages, were precisely those most vulnerable to the competitive pressures that
drove them to run away, leaving their minority workforces in the lurch. 99
The stories of laid-off ASR workers were most poignant when told by the workers
themselves. Copies of the survey responses survive in the UE Archives, written in the
employees’ own hands. In response to the question “If you are not employed, how do you plan to
support yourself when your unemployment insurance runs out,” fifty-five year-old Cyrus Dery
wrote “by taking a job at whatever salary I can get.” Dery had moved in with relatives after
losing his job at ASR. “I work 6 day a week for $40.00,” wrote Max Diaz, age twenty-four.
“What do you gone to do [sic]—I have to eat. I have to work.” Joseph Sotomayor, who reported
seven dependents, answered with one word—“welfare.” “When unemployment insurance runs
out there is nothing I can do but go on relief,” wrote Antonio Martino, age sixty, with five
dependents.
The UE asked former ASR workers how they were getting by in the wake of job loss.
Cutting down on food and clothing? Selling a car or other possessions? Doubling up with
relatives? Depleting savings and borrowing money? Some respondents checked all these boxes.
Some had turned to private employment agencies—rackets that guarded access to jobs and made
them available only to those who could pay. One had found work at United Metal Box, another
475 shop that within a year would flee New York. Several described their experiences with the
state unemployment insurance office. “Unemployed at the present time, jobs scarce for a person
my age, insurance office getting strict pressing me to look for work, telling me the’ll stop my
cheks [sic],” wrote one forty-three year-old woman. For Eleanor Moore, forty-five years old, the
unemployment office was an accomplice to employers who offered rock-bottom wages and
“74% of ASR Workers Remain Unemployed,” Local 475 News, March 1955, Box 1, Folder 7, Kirschner
Collection.
99

97

conditions. After quitting a $.90 an hour job with “very unsanitary conditions,” the state had cut
her off and she had received no income for five weeks. A few mentioned their suspicion that
having fought back against ASR had put them on an informal blacklist.
The prevailing theme was insecurity. “I don’t know, I’m not working & my husband isn’t
working so I don’t know what we’re going to do. I’m expecting a baby & I don’t know how we
are going to pay the doctor bills,” wrote a twenty-nine year-old woman. “I don’t know what is
going to happen to my family,” said Manuel Perez, age forty-seven. “Our savings are almost
gone. The job situation is bad. The future looks very bleak. My present job ends soon—it was
only temporary,” explained a thirty-five year-old man. Workers who were too old to find new
jobs but too young to collect Social Security expressed particular pain. “I don’t know what to do.
I am told I am to [sic] old to work at 42. What are we to do but try to apply for City Welfare. I
worked for A.S.R. 22 yrs,” lamented one forty-two year-old woman. “I have found out over 40
yrs old you have to drop dead,” another wrote angrily. Some expressed despair. “Thinking on
this I feel depress, nervous, disconsolate, sick of living. After my whole life of loyal service with
the A.S.R.,” wrote Joaquin Buenahora. “What I struggled for will go to the four winds,” mused
seventy-one year-old Sarah Lohman. Some workers, asked what they planned to do, wrote a
giant question mark or said “you tell me.” Others cried for help. “Go on relief or commit
suicide,” wrote one fifty-five year-old woman of her plans. In these surveys, we can grasp the
building blocks of what would come to be called the “urban crisis”—an abstraction that
concealed the thousands upon thousands of concrete struggles that emerged from the collisions
of people and capital we call “deindustrialization,” many of which are lost to historians. 100
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The fall of ASR was the end of the line for Local 475, as well. The loss of its now-largest
shop plunged the organization deeper into debt. The local had been on life support from the
national UE during the ASR fight and by March of 1955 had not bothered to forward any dues to
the central organization for five months, knowing its checks would bounce. In December of
1954, reflecting their own straitened finances, UE leadership stopped a monthly subsidy to the
local for its Staunton activities. In March of 1956, the local announced it was laying off three
longtime organizers, printing encomiums in Local 475 News that read like obituaries for the
passing era and its approach. 101
In July of 1955, Matles had written Cliff Cameron to express concern over rumors that
Cameron had sought a meeting with James Carey, president of the UE’s hated rival, the IUE. An
indignant Cameron denied the rumors, but if they weren’t already true, they soon would be. By
December, IUE officials were addressing mass meetings of Local 475 at the invitation of
Cameron and President Charles Fay, and by April officers spoke openly of “becoming a part of
the mainstream” of American labor. This latter phrase likely reflected their continuing
attachment to the Communist Party, which in 1955 instructed its cadres to liquidate the locals
and districts under their control into the IUE. Because Matles, Empsak, and UE President Albert
Fitzgerald stubbornly resisted amalgamation, Communists in the UE were “forced to choose
between their union and their party,” as historian Ronald Schatz put it. One did not have to be a
formal member to remain in the party’s orbit—those who followed the party’s advice, like
Cameron, Fay, and District 4 President James McLeish, had probably abandoned any formal
relationship several years prior, when they signed the Taft-Hartley affidavits. On May 17, 1956,
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the membership of Local 475, on the recommendation of their leaders, voted to secede from the
UE and join the IUE as Amalgamated Machine, Instrument & Metal Local 485. The defections
were wholesale, complete, and remarkable given the extraordinary vitriol that existed between
the two organizations. Local 475 simply became IUE Local 485 (AFL-CIO) with little change in
staff or policy. They were not the first leftists to defect from the UE—the leadership at GE’s
flagship Schenectady plant, for instance, had bolted in March 1954 because they concluded they
could no longer fulfill even the basic responsibilities of a trade union in an organization as
thoroughly besieged as the UE. In response to the mid-50s Communist refrain “rejoin the
mainstream of American labor,” an intransigent Matles accused his erstwhile comrades of
turning tail to preserve their careers and thundered that “the mainstream is a sewer.” 102
He was mostly right. While they may have had few other options, Cameron, Fay, and
other UE defectors rejoined a mainstream that was stagnating, organizationally and politically.
The merger of the two rival union federations in 1955 had given birth to the AFL-CIO, an
organization whose “strategy and culture were completely at odds with the industrial union
upsurge of the 1930s,” as historian Nelson Lichtenstein puts it. At the national level, union
density, or the proportion of workers organized into unions, began a long decline that has not
abated to this day. The IUE into which the leaders of Local 475 brought their remaining
members was “plagued by internal conflict,” as historian Ronald Schatz observes. “The coalition
of religiously motived Catholics, secular Socialists, and discontented ‘pork choppers’ who had
founded the new union was an inherently unstable aggregation—united in their opposition to
Communism but lacking a commitment to each other and a shared vision of labor's future.”
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These internal problems “crippled the union in its dealings with management,” culminating in
the disastrous 1960 General Electric strike helmed by an overmatched Carey. The fragmentation
within the union was magnified by fragmentation in the industry, the result of the “orgy of
interunion conflict” that had marked the early 50s. By 1963, workers at General Electric
belonged to at least twelve different labor organizations, a problem reflected in Staunton when
the IUE, the IAM, and the AFL-affiliated International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
(IBEW) competed to organize the workers at the ASR plant there, the latter offering the
company what was widely recognized as a “sweetheart” deal. The industrial union idea, by
which ASR workers had found their wages and conditions pegged to those of workers at places
like GE and Westinghouse, where their unions enjoyed the greatest bargaining power, was
mostly dead in the electrical industry. The weakening of the unions paved the way for the next
wave of decentralization and technological change, which allowed the companies to “radically
change the world of the workers and in the process undermine the conditions which had given
birth to nationwide unionism in the first place.” 103
The grey fortunes of the IUE at the national level were mirrored in Local 485, its main
New York City affiliate. In August of 1957, the local had 4,250 members—less than a quarter of
its postwar strength. Executive Board meeting minutes from 1958 reveal a sobered Cameron,
resigned to a defensive struggle to preserve New York’s dwindling manufacturing economy and,
if need be, to collaborate with the companies to do it. “Beginning with a background of the
current economic picture and, in particular, the depressed conditions of small business who
comprise the majority of the shops in our Local, Brother Cameron then outlined the aims of our
policy—the maintenance of the greatest possible degree of job security for our members without
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being at the expense of the conditions we have achieved over the years,” the meeting secretary
wrote. Outlining the local’s plan for the coming years, Cameron stressed a “common sense
approach and an understanding of the period in which we are living and the shop we are dealing
with; a flexible approach in order to meet the different situations existing in each individual
shop; Union help, where it is needed and will not be taken advantage of by the Employer, in
helping to establish more efficient plant operations which will not be at the expense of the wages
and working conditions of the membership.” Where possible, Cameron and his cohort retained
the uncompromising sense of principle that had characterized the best of the Communist labor
organizers, most notably in their fight against corruption in the labor movement, which earned
Cameron a beating at the hands of notorious gangster and labor racketeer John “Johnny Dio”
Dioguardi in 1957. Dioguardi and other mob figures preyed on those at the bottom of the labor
market, especially the growing Puerto Rican working class of New York City, cutting deals with
their employers to pose as unionists but acting in reality to quell demands and prevent strikes.
Cameron’s heroics in combating the mobsters were real, but in terms of the shifting political
economy of manufacturing in New York, they were a drop in the bucket. In a 1958 speech to the
members of Local 485, IUE President Carey acknowledged “we’re on the defensive” and
outlined gloomily the emergence of Puerto Rico, from which one-third of Local 485 members
now hailed, as a haven for runaway shops. 104
ASR, on the other hand, got what it wanted out of the move to Staunton—for as long, at
least, as it took the principals to sell the business to Philip Morris in 1959. The company got
more out of workers at lower wages than it did in Brooklyn. In choosing Virginia over the deeper
South, the company had likely tried to strike a balance between the need to find skilled labor and
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the threat of eventual unionization. Indeed, as soon as IUE officials learned of the move, they
wrote “Here’s what we’ve waited for—let’s get our guys into Staunton!” The company sought to
thread this needle by establishing a relationship with a conservative IBEW local that had
insinuated itself as the bargaining agent for workers at the newly-established Westinghouse plant
in Waynesboro. IBEW adopted a typical sweetheart strategy of organizing the company instead
of the workers, working hand-in-hand with ASR management to effectively return workers to the
1940s, when the firm had enjoyed the services of a company union. First, the company hired
IBEW organizers while denying jobs to their CIO counterparts in the IUE. It furnished the names
and addresses of all employees to its preferred union. IBEW organizers toured the plant
accompanied by management and were encouraged to pass out literature, while IUE organizers
were threatened with arrest for setting foot on company property. In their spare time, foremen
and plant security pressed workers to sign IBEW cards. In the end, Shenandoah Valley workers
were not as green as ASR had hoped—by April of 1955, the IUE had secured a representation
election at ASR from the National Labor Relations Board and by October, the IBEW was out at
Westinghouse, the victim of a rank-and-file revolt against its cozy relationship with the
employer. 105
During the run-up to the June 1955 election, the company tried the same trick with the
IAM, another AFL affiliate with a record of collaboration with employers. Meanwhile, in
addition to the Southern wage differential—an asset ASR and other runaway firms defended
with the euphemisms “area wage” or “community standards”—the company was enjoying
savings on a host of other provisions. Compared to Brooklyn, the Staunton plant had fewer
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holidays, reduced night and weekend pay, and no health and welfare plan. Both the company and
the IUE sought to play on what they considered Virginians’ sense of local pride. While the
company proffered vague nostrums about “community standards”—which included, of course,
white supremacy—the IUE sought to redeploy that outsized attachment to place and tradition
that northerners frequently assume is an inborn characteristic of their southern neighbors. “When
ASR insists on paying lower wages here than in Brooklyn the Co. is saying that we don’t deserve
good wages, that we in Virginia are not good enough to get the same wages ASR paid in
Brooklyn. Is it fair that we have to do more work and get only half pay?” goaded IUE organizers
seeking to wrest the plant’s workforce from the company and its pet IBEW local. 106
The biggest issue, however was speed-ups, which went by the polite name “production
standards.” Already, in its first months of operation, ASR had laid off some employees, raised
quotas for those who remained, and fired those who could not meet the new demands. When
workers complained the quotas did not even leave them time to use the bathroom during their
shifts, at least one foreman suggested they keep buckets near their machines if they didn’t want
to be fired. Workers found themselves shut out of promotions, too, finding that the company
preferred green hands. “Seniority doesn’t mean a thing around here,” taunted one ASR foreman
in the weeks leading up to the election. 107
ASR managers, along with the town’s newspapers and radio stations, intervened loudly to
stave off the CIO. As soon as the IUE made its presence known in Staunton, Weil was on the
town’s only radio station lamenting the introduction of “class hatred and demagoguery of the
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worst type” to Staunton. “Is this the attitude we want in our community?” asked the industrialist
who had lived there for fewer than six months. Weil warned Virginians that the CIO meant
“strife, disharmony, discord, and strikes.” “That,” he reminded them pointedly, “is how the U.E.
operated in Brooklyn, and that is what brought disaster to its membership there.” Joining a carrot
to the stick, the company quickly introduced insurance and pension plans and a new procedure
for employees to lodge grievances. Weil ended by repurposing a quote from Virginian
independence hero Patrick Henry—“If this be anti-unionism, then make the most of it.” 108
In general, ASR and its allies among the town’s elites sought to link the IUE to the
“communistic” UE and the CIO to violence, “terrorism,” and “social reform,” a euphemism for
desegregation. On four consecutive days leading up to the election, ASR took out full-page
newspaper advertisements excoriating the IUE and praising its AFL rival. “We have every right
to call the attention of the community at large, and our workers in particular, to the disaster that
can strike, and I use the word strike advisedly, when a strike-happy, hate-mongering organization
takes over. We as a company remember only too well the disastrous consequences to the workers
of the UE, and we fear IUE, an offspring so to speak of UE, represents the same brand [of]
unionism,” the company told readers on June 5. Staunton could be “choked to death” “at the very
birth of its expansion and prosperity,” ASR warned. For this reason, “it behooves everyone in
this valley to make it his personal business” to make sure that ASR workers rejected the CIO.
Another broadside defended Virginians’ low wages, protesting that ASR “did not create
conditions in the Staunton area. It found these conditions when it moved into the area.” The
company also, in sub rosa fashion, linked higher wages to desegregation. Low wages, low taxes,
and penny-pinching state government were not the only things that would change with the
Sidney Weil, “How Silly Can You Get?” (WTON, March 30, 1955), Box 31, Folder 36, IUE SecretaryTreasurer's Office.
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introduction of “distant and untried hands who are so obviously unacquainted with the quality of
our Valley living and thinking,” as the Waynesboro News-Virginian put it in an editorial
supporting the company. Did ASR workers really “wish to become the guinea pigs of social
reform?” the company asked in another of its bulletins. In the hothouse atmosphere of 1955 in
Virginia, everyone knew what “social reform” meant. Other runaway employers had made their
pitches even more explicit. In the summer of 1957, for instance, the Chicago-born owners of the
Northern Electronic Products Corporation, which now operated a plant in Bay Springs,
Mississippi, had herded their employees into the plant lobby and harangued them, calling the
IUE a “nigger-loving” organization and Carey himself a “nigger-lover.” To aid them, the nearby
Jackson Daily News had printed a photo of Carey dancing with a young black woman. The photo
had been taken in Switzerland and the woman was a Nigerian delegate to the anti-communist
International Labor Organization, facts the newspaper declined to include. The damage was
done—Northern Electronic workers rejected the IUE by a 291 to 86 margin. In Staunton, though,
the anti-CIO propaganda was not enough. In the election that took place on June 8, 1955, ASR
workers selected the IUE by ninety-nine votes. 109
Back in New York, horizons were darkening for manufacturing workers. In 1954, as
Mayor Robert Wagner took office, the city lost 41,000 manufacturing jobs. Meanwhile, the
sobering effect of plant relocation and the concessionary strategies some unions pursued to stem
it began to eat at wages. By 1957, hourly wages in manufacturing in New York City had fallen to
meet the national average, while average weekly earnings actually fell below the national
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average. City and state political leaders were distinguished mainly by their near-total lack of
interest. “There is no serious menace to the present business activity in New York City,” insisted
a mayoral aide in a memo to Wagner in 1955. Agencies like the Department of City Planning
observed that the number of manufacturing workers in New York was sharply declining, but
expressed no special concern and proposed no strategies to address it. Brooklyn Borough
President Abe Stark did hold a press conference at City Hall in 1954 to denounce efforts of other
localities to lure industry away from New York as “highly unethical” and “economically
dangerous.” The response of the city’s Department of Commerce, however, was to commission a
report titled “Why Industry Is Not Leaving the City” that sought to calm civic leaders and
suggested the city step up its promotional efforts—as if mere advertising trickery had convinced
manufacturers to uproot their operations of decades and depart for climes unknown. 110
While the slide in manufacturing jobs abated for two brief years in the 1950s, the
recession at decade’s end resumed the plunge. In 1958, the mayor observed to a congressional
committee that “the proportionate rise in unemployment in this recession has already exceeded
the worst months of the two previous post-war recessions,” and that “it is our manufacturing
industries that have been hardest hit.” Wagner cited in particular “the increase in idleness among
our older workers and minority groups”—the two groups hardest hit by the ASR closing. He also
noted with alarm that “the largest number of unemployed persons … come from our most
important manufacturing industry, the apparel industry.” Like ASR workers and their union, the
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UE, workers in the city’s garment industry and their unions would have to confront the runaway
shop problem as the 1960s drew near. 111
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Chapter Two
On the Auction Block: Judy Bond and the Collapse of the Northeastern Garment Industry
On September 8, 1968, the New York Times ran a story accompanied by a photo of two
women, both members of the International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union (ILG), mounting a
lonely picket on a Manhattan sidewalk. “Time erases all, it seems,” wrote the paper’s business
reporter, “except the Judy Bond labor dispute.” In the photo, the women, one middle-aged, the
other older, gesture casually to one another as a third woman strides past, paying them little
mind. The sandwich boards they wear read “JUDY BOND INC—ON STRIKE—DON’T BUY
JUDY BOND BLOUSES.” 1
These pickets were a fixture at American department stores in the 1960s. In the first two
years of the campaign alone, ILG cadre from coast to coast distributed ten million leaflets and
three million custom-designed shopping bags in a bid to convince American women to shun the
products of one of the world’s largest blouse makers, whose factories turned out millions of
garments a year in a dizzying variety of sizes, styles, and prices. In an industry characterized by
small firms, Judy Bond, with anywhere between twenty and thirty million dollars in sales each
year, was a relative giant. Still, the firm operated in an exceedingly competitive market, its
output accounting for just a fraction of the 200 million blouses sewn in the United States each
year, all destined for domestic shoulders. 2
By 1964, the Judy Bond boycott was “the widest campaign of its kind ever conducted,”
boasted ILG vice-president Shelley Appleton, who managed Local 23-25, the Blouse, Shirt and
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Sportswear Workers Union. “For a while this year, a casual observer had the illusion that New
York City was sinking beneath a flood of ‘Don’t Buy Judy Bond’ shopping bags,” wrote a
bemused Business Week reporter. Appleton was the son-in-law of ILG president David
Dubinsky, the so-called “labor Goliath” who hobnobbed with presidents from Roosevelt to
Johnson and whom some journalists insisted “runs the Manhattan garment district,” a roughly
twenty-five square-block territory on the city’s west side whose thousands of firms were
responsible for seventy percent of all women’s clothing produced in the United States. 3
Ideally, the souvenirs would turn shoppers into walking ILG pickets. Like the signs, they
read “JUDY BOND INC—ON STRIKE—DON’T BUY JUDY BOND BLOUSES.” By 1968,
though, the slogan was wishful thinking. In late 1961, the firm, in the midst of negotiating a new
contract, had abruptly announced its resignation from the New York-based employers’
association, locked employees out of its state-of-the art warehouse on West 61st Street, and
shifted the majority of its blouse production to two newly-purchased plants in southern Alabama,
distributing the remainder among a series of contract shops scattered across Alabama and the
Carolinas. The firm had become, in the parlance of the union movement, a “runaway.” In
response, the ILG had shut down Judy Bond’s remaining Northeastern affiliates and pulled
skilled garment cutters out of the firm’s headquarters at 1375 Broadway, but it was too late. Judy
Bond told the union it intended to move all operations—cutting, sewing, and shipping—to its
new Southern abode. Worse, the company had already signed a contract with another union, the
United Garment Workers, whom the ILG believed had offered Judy Bond a “sweetheart” deal
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that sold short its new Southern workforce and ratified the low wages and inferior working
conditions that had attracted the New York firm in the first place. 4
The reaction at ILG headquarters was shock. Judy Bond had been an “outstanding
employer”—“the largest union firm in New York,” lamented Dubinsky. But now, the firm had
“abruptly ended almost three decades of mutually valuable relations,” howled the union in a fullpage ad in Women’s Wear Daily, the must-read paper of the women’s clothing trade. “Judy
Bond’s present position in the trade and past ties with the ILGWU make this reversal by the firm
more than a blow to the workers whose jobs were destroyed,” the union warned. “Judy Bond’s
new procedure threatens both the labor standards and the industrial peace that prevail in the
garment industry.” Dubinsky’s sense of injury was personal, political, and probably genuine—
despite its size, the garment industry could be tight-knit at the top. The quarrel quickly took on
the color of a family dispute, spiked with the bitterness borne of dashed expectations. “As in the
Catholic Church, we consider a heretic worse than an apostate, and Judy Bond falls into the
category of a heretic,” explained one ILG official to Women’s Wear Daily. 5
The consequences were immediate. Out of the thousand or so workers who had toiled
over Judy Bond garments, the firm would retain only a group of five sample makers housed at its
Garment District headquarters. It is unlikely that many of these workers, nearly all women and
many the chief earners in their families, felt the quake coming. Though it was their hands that
stitched every garment sold under the name “Judy Bond”—“Judy” for Judy Garland, and “Bond”
for “our word is our bond”—legally speaking, they didn’t even work for the company whose
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blouses bore that label. Judy Bond, like most “jobbers”—garment industry jargon for firms at the
top of the food chain who handled design, fabric cutting, and wholesaling to retailers—sat at the
center of a chaotic web of contracting that stretched across four Northeastern states and had
recently grown to include shops as far away as Maryland and Virginia, which served as stepping
stones on the firm’s journey to the deep South and beyond. The fragmented, ultra-competitive
political economy of clothing manufacture—the closest thing in American capitalism to a freemarket utopia, as journalists never tired of pointing out—kept the women who sewed Judy Bond
blouses at arm’s length, physically, socially, and legally, from the firm’s owners. 6
The union, the company, and the press all recognized the symbolic import of this clash.
Virtually overnight, a household name had abandoned its Northeastern origins and gone from
union darling to “stubborn” non-union “holdout.” For the ILG, the Judy Bond debacle was a kind
of Waterloo. “To let such ‘betrayal’ succeed … would be to invite wholesale desertion by an
industry already in flight from the unionized Northeast,” noted a Business Week reporter. The
story went international—despite the ILG’s intense anti-communism, a sympathetic
correspondent for Trud, the newspaper of the Soviet All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions,
informed readers in that country of the company’s “traitorous blow in the back.” 7
For the boycott campaign, the ILG pulled out all its guns. By the end of the 1960s, union
officials admitted they could no longer estimate its cost. Nonetheless, through a massive effort to
provoke public opprobrium, spiked with mountains of litigation, the union hoped to make an
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example of Judy Bond, to prove that “running away is no bargain.” In the end, though, it was—
in 1966, company officials noted with satisfaction that while they had lost money during their
final years in the Northeast, they were now back in the black with “no regrets.” 8
The Judy Bond runaway marked the end not only of a relationship between a firm, its
workers, and their union, but of a settlement in the women’s clothing industry that was at once
economic, political, and geographic—a settlement rooted ultimately in the New Deal, a project
the ILG had helped to invent and which had delivered the organization from a state of collapse
during the first half of the 1930s. This settlement, at bottom an attempt to contain and limit the
consequences of competition, came under attack from several directions almost immediately
upon its inception. For this reason, the Judy Bond story is a kind of long runaway that
encompasses two phases—the first from New York City to the distressed former coal towns of
northeastern Pennsylvania, and then, once the ILG caught up with employers there, to small
towns dotted across the South with “conditions you would have to see to believe,” as one
southern ILG organizer explained to her superiors in Atlanta. With this in mind, the reason the
ILG-Judy Bond dispute felt like a break-up is because politically speaking, it was. 9
The New Deal settlement at Judy Bond, Dubinsky’s example of an “outstanding”
employer, lasted from 1933 to 1961, when the company succumbed to the whip of competition
and joined its rivals in abandoning its trade agreements, the ILG, and the Northeast itself, a
gambit the firm’s owners insisted was “economically necessary” to confront a growing crop of
non-union blousemakers. It did so largely by abandoning contracting and opting instead to
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operate its own factories, effecting a return to what industry hands called the “inside shop,” or
large, integrated plants under the direction of a single employer. But this was a new kind of
inside shop, situated in a region that had remained in important ways outside the reach of the
New Deal, enabling the company to realize the economies of scale made possible by the inside
shop, an increase in the size of the potential labor force that had been achieved in an earlier era
by a combination of runaways and contracting, and the cost savings made available by a
political-economic regime much harsher for ordinary workers. 10
In 1949, when the ILG was arguably at the peak of its influence, Time magazine asked
David Dubinsky about shops that sought to “escape and take to the hinterland in quest of cheaper
labor.” “There are some in hiding,” admitted Dubinsky. With typical verve, though, he added—
“but not for long.” While Dubinsky was, understandably, eager to project confidence, his words
required a grain of salt. It was common at midcentury for journalists, academics, and popular
observers to exaggerate the power of the labor movement. In truth, neither Dubinsky, the ILG,
nor the garment manufacturers “ran” Seventh Avenue like the journalists claimed. Instead, it was
the market, reasserting itself in a series of guises after the Second World War, that ran them all.
The heyday of the ILG and of garment work in the Northeast—and one should use the word
“heyday” judiciously, given that garment work never stopped being poorly-paid, stressful, and
unpredictable—depended on the political settlement achieved in 1933, whose gradual
disintegration culminated in the Judy Bond runaway. 11
“We’ll never give up on Judy Bond,” ILG President Louis Stulberg told Women’s Wear
Daily in 1968. By then, though, the union had little choice, since Judy Bond was not long even

“Award in the Matter of the Arbitration between Charles Kreindler, as Financial Secretary of Blouse and
Waistmakers' Union, Local 25, ILGWU and Judy Bond, Inc.,” Box 12, Folder 22, ILGWU Legal Department
Records, Collection 5780/081.
11
“Little David, the Giant.”
10

114

for Alabama. Back in New York, the survival of garment work would be predicated on a
convergence with Alabama conditions—what State Senator Franz Leichter identified in 1979 as
the “return of the sweatshop.” It must have been disheartening, since it was this very institution
that it had been the ILG’s raison d’etre to abolish. Soon, even the union itself would be no more.
In 1995, the ILG lost its unique identity, merging with the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile
Workers of America in a tacit recognition that the US garment industry was no longer big
enough to justify two labor organizations. If one knows where to look, monuments to the ILG’s
former preeminence abound in New York, where the organization once enjoyed “sacred” status.
But the days when the garment district swelled with raw, immediate commerce are gone. 12
The Auction Block
The entire history of the garment industry consists in a series of struggles to limit—or, on
the other hand, to exploit—the effects of the anarchic competition that has made clothing
manufacture a byword for exploitation since the dawn of mass-produced, “ready-to-wear”
clothing in the late nineteenth century. The “bitterly competitive and determinedly rapacious”
nature of the industry formed the starting point of every contemporary analysis of the garment
trade. “If Eve walked down Seventh Avenue wearing the first fig leaf,” Time magazine joked in
1949, “two manufacturers would be making fig leaves with ermine trim within three days, three
would be promoting oak leaves instead, and nine would be offering Eve's ‘same identical
garment’—but cheaper.” No industry embodied the hungry, amoral ethos of competitive
capitalism in purer form. 13
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The basic traits of the industry evoked the competitive ideal. Firms were small and
owner-operated. Judy Bond, for all its heft, remained a family business, run by its founder,
Russian-born Jacob “Jack” Rothenberg and his son, Yale-educated Millard. They were laborintensive, as the nature of the product and the market made garment work notoriously difficult to
mechanize. Basic technology had changed little since the introduction of the sewing machine in
1846, and engineers found it difficult to devise machines that could handle “soft” goods like
fabric without human guidance. Moreover, as all successful garment manufacturers knew,
clothing is inseparable from fashion. Styles could shift abruptly and offering the wrong one
could spell doom. Standardization is a prerequisite for mechanization. Large, mechanized plants
were feasible in lines like underwear, where designs were consistent and demand relatively
predictable. But for a blouse maker like Judy Bond, whose products were among the most
fashion-sensitive of all, large capital investments seemed a poor risk. 14
Low capital costs made it notoriously easy to start a garment firm. “The process by which
garments are manufactured offers easy access to almost anyone with an entrepreneurial spirit and
a few bucks,” wrote ILG educational director Gus Tyler in his history of the union. “A contractor
with six sewing machines, operating out of a basement … can enter the industry. He rents the
machines; he employs women in the neighborhood; he gets a few ‘bundles’ of work from the
biggies in the industry who use him as a contractor; and he is in business.” But if it was easy to
get started, it was also easy to fail. Tyler recalled the experience of his father, a Lithuanian-born
children’s dress contractor who “went bankrupt twenty times,” remaining throughout his life “a
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worker for one season and a boss for one season.” The father, who joked that “I cannot read or
write in four languages,” was a “Buntsche Shweig”—a passive man who “lacked the killer
instinct,” his son explained. Many others lacked this instinct, or were simply unlucky, caught out
by poor timing, an unforeseen style change, or other kinds of bad luck. In the 1950s, only
thirteen percent of women’s outerwear firms had been in business for more than twenty-five
years, and one out of every five garment firms folded each year. In this chaotic environment,
Judy Bond’s longevity was remarkable. In 1952, Women’s Wear Daily ran a feature on the
company that sought to explain how any firm could survive thirty years in the blouse business. 15
Contracting was a way to hedge these risks. The practice permitted manufacturers to
reduce overhead costs by passing them on to others, to achieve “flexibility” by quickly
expanding or contracting production, to disassociate themselves from legal and moral
responsibility for the conditions of the workers who made their garments, and to increase the size
of the potential labor force, permitting them to set workers in competition against one another,
resulting in downward pressure on wages and conditions. The jargon of the trade reflected the
salience of contracting, which fluctuated with shifting political, economic and industrial
conditions. “Inside” shops were integrated factories where all facets of garment assembly were
carried out under one roof by employees whose relationship to their employer was clear and
direct. “Outside” manufacturing referred to contracting, where assembly was disaggregated in
time, space, and legal identity.
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A typical arrangement would see a “jobber” like Judy Bond employ executives, a sales
force, designers, and highly skilled garment cutters and sample makers, while the actual sewing
was performed elsewhere by a rotating cast of contractors, some steady and others fly-by-night.
Truckers were the glue that held the system together. Relationships between a jobber and
contractor—in other words, between a firm and the workers who did the bulk of the work on the
garments it sold—could seem strangely ephemeral. “Sometimes the jobber himself will not know
where his dresses are sewn,” commented Fortune magazine in 1952. According to the ILG’s
Northeast Department, one of a series of detachments established to police the increasingly farflung contracting networks, “many Northeast contractors were like foundlings who did not know
their own parents; jobbers were like parents who did not know their own children.” And in the
garment industry, where the limited scope of technology and easy pirating of styles made it
difficult to distinguish oneself on those scores, it was the wages paid to these “children” that
provided the focal point of competition. Wage suppression was practically the “only weapon” of
the garment manufacturer, as US Senator, former governor of New York, and longtime ILG ally
Herbert Lehman put it in 1959. 16
To succeed in the garment business, jobbers did not need to know who was working for
them—what they cared about was numbers. In a 1937 pamphlet, ILG Research Director Lazare
Teper fashioned an imaginary dialogue between jobber and contractor, undoubtedly drawn from
experience, to illustrate the dynamics of contracting:
Contractor: Do you have any work? I will give you a bargain.
Jobber: My work is done by N. and M. They are making this style up for me now. (Shows the
garment.) I am paying $1.37 for the work. If I get a better price, I might consider a change.
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Contractor: (Examining the garment) I think I could make it for $1.30.
Jobber: (After brief reflection) Get in touch with me tomorrow, I’ll see what I can do.
(After the contractor leaves, the jobber telephones his regular contractor.)
Jobber: Listen, you are charging me $1.37 for my garments, but here is a man who is offering to
do it for $1.30. (His voice goes up) What? You don’t believe me? Go and ask him. His name
is P. Of course, I am not trying to take work away from you. But listen, I am not in business
for my health and I got to meet the competition. So if you make them for $1.30 you can finish
the lot. 17

This was the famous “auction block system,” the root of all evils in the garment trade,
according to the union. In the face of this pressure, the only way for contractors to preserve their
margins, or sometimes to stay in business at all, was to get more for less by lowering wages,
increasing the duration and intensity of work, or both. Owners were often able to badger workers
into colluding in these arrangements by stressing that the alternative was the demise of the shop.
Jobbers often engaged in several rounds of this chiseling, playing as many contractors as
possible off of one another to arrive at a punishing equilibrium. At bottom, contracting was a
machine to shift risk downward, a transmission belt for big fish to exert leverage on smaller ones
until ultimately, the uncertainties of a fiercely competitive and unpredictable industry were
loaded onto the backs of those least equipped to bear them.
A basic purpose of the ILG was to amend the remorseless political economy of the
garment business—“to bring some semblance of reason and peace to an industry characterized
by a jobber-contractor system of production, rapid style changes, piece work, cutthroat
competition, low capitalization, simple technology, extreme mobility and a readily expandable
labor force,” as the union’s General Executive Board put it in 1959. This struggle to tame
competition and its brutal effects on garment workers was embodied in a series of agreements
that began with the 1910 Protocols of Peace, continued with a 1925 Advisory Commission set up
Lazare Teper, The Women’s Garment Industry (New York: International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union, 1937),
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by Governor Al Smith to help police the industry, came to fruition in the National Recovery
Administration (NRA) established as part of the New Deal in 1933, and continued in a kind of
private NRA maintained by the union and the more reputable garment manufacturers for the next
quarter of a century. 18
At the heart of this system was a series of restrictions on contracting meant to curtail the
hated auction block system. But in an industry with a notoriously low cost of entry, these
agreements, meant to fix relationships between jobbers, contractors, and workers at an
equilibrium that didn’t drive manufacturers out of business and workers into penury, never
covered all employers and weathered attacks from all directions by the partisans of a return to
cut-throat competition. At one time or another during the life of the agreements, these included
regulators who wielded anti-trust laws as a club to beat the union, importers whose wares marked
the beginning of a tide that would destroy the domestic apparel industry, retailers demanding
ever larger portions of the garment profit pie, and “chiseling” employers, sometimes linked to
organized crime, who sought tirelessly to evade union oversight in search of the “edge” that
would put them over.
Hunting the Fugitives
From its earliest days, contracting had been a way to secure, organize, and exploit large
new pools of labor. The first to be absorbed into this system were the Eastern European Jews
who amassed in New York City during the 1880s. Their experiences are sometimes
romanticized, but contemporaries were more likely to emphasize what Irving Howe called the
“traumas of proletarianization,” whereby the struggle to survive was at first “more severe” than it
had been in Europe, where it had at least been a collective endeavor. The earliest immigrants
18
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were people who were “stranded—stranded socially, morally, psychologically,” wrote Howe,
whose own parents had been immigrant garment workers. They made easy pickings for the
German Jewish manufacturers who dominated the clothing trade in New York—co-religionists
who were at the same time “class enemies.” Their immigrant district, the Lower East Side of
Manhattan, was a place of “fierce congestion, a place in which the bodily pressures of other
people, their motions and smells and noises, seemed always to be assaulting one.” Hester Street
was the “Pig Market,” lined with pushcarts where one could purchase small, damaged quantities
of “everything but pig,” as an ILG ally joked. The wares on sale included jobless men who
crowded the street corners, hoping to be snatched up and groomed by an enterprising
contractor. 19
Contractors—often landsleit, or immigrants hailing from the same region as their
workers—played a special role in the evolving political economy of the garment trade. They
were specialists in organizing immigrant vulnerability, pounding it into a shape suitable for
exploitation, and fashioning it into a shield to protect jobbers and retailers from responsibility.
They helped extend working hours, drive down wages, ward off unions, and undermine
conditions in the inside shops. The result was a “vicious competition”—“contractor against
contractor and worker against worker”—that “demoralized the entire industry and dragged the
living standards of its workers to new depths, toward the abyss of poverty,” as Teper put it.
“Among employers the manufacturer who is merciless in reducing wages and in stretching out
the hours of labor, the manufacturer who disregards in dealing with his employees all laws
human and divine is most likely to succeed,” wrote Meyer London, the ILG counsel and future
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Socialist congressman. The name for this system—“sweatshop”—became a permanent addition
to the English lexicon. 20
The first stirrings of garment unionism took aim at this contracting system. As early as
1886, cloak makers in both inside and outside shops struck unsuccessfully to abolish contracting,
which had fostered what the New York State Bureau of Labor Statistics called “the shocking
conditions under which work is done in a Christian community.” Manufacturers, on the other
hand, insisted they “could not carry on business without it.” The ILG, founded in 1900, existed
in large part to combat the system. The union established itself in a series of epic battles that
culminated in the Uprising of the Twenty Thousand, a massive 1909 strike of mostly women
shirtwaist makers, and the Great Revolt of sixty thousand cloak makers who mounted a general
strike the following year. The latter concluded with the Protocol of Peace, a settlement brokered
by Boston attorney and future Supreme Court justice Louis Brandeis, which sought to curtail the
industrial warfare that regularly paralyzed the trade. A chief goal of the Protocol, according to
Brandeis, was to overturn the principle that London had called “survival of the meanest.” By
contrast, the Protocol would “raise the industry as whole … to the standard which it is said was
already observed by those shops in the industry which were most advanced.” In theory, fixing
wages, working conditions, and union influence by political agreement would reset the
competitive equilibrium in the industry and eliminate the race-to-the-bottom ethos that wrought
such persistent chaos. 21
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The persistence of contracting rendered enforcement of the Protocol nearly impossible.
“No sooner … than the Union succeeded in becoming an effective agency in the enforcement of
standards in the industry, some manufacturers, who were unwilling to assume responsibility for
work conditions in their factories, and in order to block the Union’s efforts to enforce these
standards, devised a new method for evading their obligations under the collective agreement,”
explained Isidore Nagler, a prominent ILG official. Manufacturers evaded the Protocol’s
minimum-wage and other provisions by sending work to contractors whose identities were kept
secret from the union, renewing the competitive scramble that depressed wages, fostered
unhealthy and humiliating conditions, and drove large numbers of firms out of business, further
destabilizing employment. Competitive pressures and capital mobility made a mockery of
Brandeis’s imagined virtuous circle. 22
In response, the ILG sought a series of reforms. The first was transparency, which took
concrete shape in a system of “registration” and “limitation” of contractors. Manufacturers
should be compelled to identify their contractors and to desist from playing them off one another
by only farming out work to a second contractor once the first had reached capacity. The second
was equalization of wages and conditions between inside shops and contractors, with the idea of
removing these factors from the realm of competition. All this would be overseen by the
ostensibly impartial arbitration machinery established by the Protocol. These proposals would
come to serve as the chief instruments by which the union would attempt to mitigate the effects
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of the contracting system, but it would take two decades before the ILG could achieve even their
partial implementation. 23
In the meantime, the effect of unionization was to kill the inside shop. The ability of the
ILG to locate, surveil, and hold accountable inside manufacturers put those who played by the
rules at an irrecoverable disadvantage to their rivals who persisted in contract work. Between
1916 and 1924, the number of workers employed in inside shops dropped by two-thirds. The
decade belonged instead to the “jobber”—a lean firm that slashed overhead to a minimum and,
insofar as it was possible, revived the hated auction block system. Observers often complained
that the garment industry operated according to a kind of Gresham’s Law by which “bad money
drives out good”—a metaphor for the competitive cost-cutting that relentlessly eroded wages and
conditions. In this case, the law obtained, as the jobbers dragged the inside manufacturers back to
the days of the sweatshop. “This kind of competition often drove inside manufacturers out of
business,” Local 25 manager Charles Kreindler recalled in 1962. “If they returned to the industry
at all, they returned to it as jobbers.” 24
The emergence of the jobber, Kreindler made clear, constituted a change of “form and
not of substance.” Jobbers were engaged in the same basic procedure that had defined the
industry from the beginning—a relentless drive to cut costs and to shove the risks of the trade
downward:
Often, yesterday’s foreman was today’s contractor. … The only difference … was that the outside
foreman or contractor shielded the true principal from all responsibility to the workers.
[…]
The jobber encouraged the development of numerous contractors—many more than were
needed—to insure themselves a surplus of bidders for their work. Under the Union’s collective
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agreements with inside manufacturers, the workers were secure from arbitrary layoffs or discharge
so long as they performed their jobs properly. But the jobber had no such obligation to the workers
in contracting shops. He could withdraw his work from any contractor at will and thus throw a
whole shop of workers out of employment.”

Contracting, then as now, was a legal device that permitted owners to achieve what today’s
purveyors of euphemism call “flexibility.” For Kreindler, the contractor was “simply the
instrument by which the jobber depressed labor standards.” 25
Disaggregation in the eyes of the law was accompanied by disaggregation in
geographical space. By contracting less-skilled work, manufacturers could evade their
responsibilities through a legal metamorphosis. This fragmentation of ownership eased the
emergence of the runaway, or the physical relocation of production to bolster one’s chances of
eluding the ILG. Some of the earliest runaways lay within the boundaries of New York City
itself—as early as 1920, for instance, several raincoat makers had established “fugitive shops” on
still-bucolic Staten Island. That year, the union established an “Eastern Out-of-Town”
department to undertake the organization of the manifold contract shops sprouting in upstate
New York, eastern New Jersey, in Connecticut, and on Long Island. The moniker reflected the
New York parochialism of ILG officialdom. “Out-of-town” was whatever was not in New York
City—wherever that was. 26
Organizing these “fugitive shops” was rough going—“as a rule,” organizers wrote, “the
employer who opens a shop in such a small locality gets in advance the assurance of the local
powers that he will be protected against strikes and labor disturbances as a reward for his
benevolent boosting of the industrial ambitions of the town and the supplying of jobs to some of
its residents.” The “solid wall of opposition” ILG organizers encountered in these small,

Ibid.
“Report of the General Executive Board to the Sixteenth Biennial Convention,” May 1, 1922, ILGWU
Convention Reports and Proceedings, DigitalCommons@ILR, https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu.
25
26

125

oligarchical towns could be severe—in 1919, three members of Local 20, the raincoat makers,
were accused of assault on the picket line and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment by a Staten
Island judge relying on the services of a “prejudiced and hand-picked jury.” These alliances
between runaway employers and undemocratic political regimes marked a pattern that would
repeat at a series of geographical scales, culminating at the global. 27
By 1924, jobbers had succeeded so magnificently in re-establishing the sweatshop by
other means that the ILG was prepared to call a general strike, shutting down the entire industry
in order to re-attach responsibility for wages and working conditions to those who actually set
them. A perturbed New York Governor Al Smith intervened, convincing the parties to work with
a special Advisory Commission whose members included future governor Herbert Lehman, New
York State Industrial Commissioner Bernard Shientag, and prominent jurist George Gordon
Battle, among others. After investigating for two years, the Commission affirmed the union’s
claims that jobbers encouraged the establishment of as many contract shops as possible in order
to play them off one another, driving down wages and conditions, stymieing unionization, and
rendering the idea of stable employment a bitter fantasy. 28
The Commission’s report, in the eyes of the ILG, was “an indictment of the jobbingcontracting system.” “While … the jobbers are the real capitalists in this large branch of the
manufacturing process,” the commissioners wrote, “they do not directly employ labor, and
consider themselves free from responsibility for labor standards.” The contracting system was
“fraught with waste to all concerned,” but the worst burdens fell on garment workers, for whom
“the competition … in the securing of orders throws upon them cruel pressure out of all
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proportions to their powers of resistance.” “By whatever name he may call himself,” the
Commission wrote, “the jobber controls working conditions; he controls employment, and that
element of control imposes upon him the responsibility that he shall so conduct his business that
proper working standards shall be upheld instead of undermined, and that employment may be
stabilized instead of demoralized.” 29
The Commission endorsed the union’s argument for curbs on contracting. Manufacturers
should identify their contractors and use the same ones as steadily as possible. If observed, this
principle would establish a de facto inside shop, albeit one that was fragmented in space. It
would render the landscape of contracting legible, exposing the contract shops to ILG oversight.
Ultimately it would re-knit a jobber’s legal responsibilities to its moral ones. “In the absence of
such a limitation of contractors, the garment industry was eternally doomed to sweatshop
conditions,” the ILG believed. 30
Manufacturers fought these proposals bitterly—“far more vigorously” than any other
question, according to Lehman. Nor were unionists unanimous—the ILG’s robust left wing
trusted neither elite oversight nor the conservative officials, like ILG President Morris Sigman
and rising star David Dubinsky, who put their faith in the Commission. Neither the Commission
nor the ILG brass was able to prevent a grueling six-month strike in 1926, one that Sigman
admitted was “inevitable”:
The jobbers who control most of the trade … have made it unavoidable. The misery of the cloak
workers, their inability to make a living … their intolerably long periods of unemployment, their
meagre earnings, and the general demoralization in the industry fostered by the jobber system of
production have left for the cloakmakers no other avenue of relief but to quit the shops and strike
for their demands. 31
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The strike left the union in tatters just in time for the onset of the Depression, which
shattered employment in the garment trades and intensified competition for what little remained
of the market, mostly in the cheaper lines. The ILG was on life support, kept afloat by loans from
sympathetic millionaires like Lehman and Sears chairman Julius Rosenwald. By 1932, the nadir
of the Depression, the ILG was, in Dubinsky’s words, “bankrupt in every respect, financially,
morally, organizationally,” unable to cover even the electric bill on its Sixteenth Street
headquarters. When Dubinsky assumed the presidency in 1932, several cloakmakers wryly
congratulated him on his ascension to “undertaker.” 32
“Back in the USA”
For the ILG, the New Deal was everything. At the beginning of 1933 the organization
was “in ruins,” wrote historian Irving Bernstein. Membership had plummeted to 40,000, many of
whom couldn’t pay their dues, and the industry was essentially “a huge sweatshop.” Just one
year later, however, the ILG had 200,000 members and had established itself as “one of the most
powerful arms of the labor movement.” Dubinsky and the ILG were aware of the shortcomings
of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), whose famous Section 7(a) endorsed the right
to organize and bargain, but established few avenues for enforcement, and whose industry code
hearings served as a government-sponsored exercise in collective bargaining, albeit one that was
dominated by the strongest manufacturers. Still, few organizations took advantage of the
openings provided by NIRA as assiduously as the ILG. As soon as the act was passed, the union
went on the offensive, deploying squadrons of volunteer organizers to help shut down the
Philadelphia and New York dress industries and force employers to recognize the union. The
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ILG used its newfound leverage to influence the code-making process, entrenching the twin
principles of contractor limitation and “jobbers’ responsibility” for wages and conditions in their
contract shops. “The old fiction that the jobber was only a ‘merchant,’ not an employer of labor,
had finally been given the coup de grace,” wrote Max Danish, the editor of the ILG newspaper. 33
The Great Depression also helped bring blouses back into style. Two dresses were just
that—two dresses—while blouse and skirt combinations permitted the appearance of greater
variety with less strain on the pocketbook. Straitened budgets dovetailed with a long-term trend
towards casual dress to double the volume of the blouse industry between 1929 and 1933. In
response, the defunct ILG Local 25 was revived to receive the growing corps of blousemakers.
These were the “NRA babies,” in the parlance of ILG old-timers. They became the figurative
descendants of the storied waistmakers who had mounted the Uprising of the Twenty Thousand
and perished in the 1911 Triangle Fire. 34
As in other sections of the garment trade, the union negotiated a government-sponsored
production code with the bigger, more stable blouse manufacturers, who gathered in a trade
association. This code, like the others, provided for minimum wages, limitation of contracting,
and the attachment of responsibility to jobbers to maintain standards in their contract shops.
Writing the codes was a victory—enforcing them was another matter. In the absence of some
kind of policing power, the codes remained, like all garment industry agreements, “pious
expressions of good intentions typed on fine rag-content paper,” as one ILG veteran colorfully
put it. As soon as the codes were minted, smaller, slicker operators—the “chiselers,” in industry

33
Irving Bernstein, The Turbulent Years: A History of the American Worker, 1933–1940 (New York: Houghton
Mifflin, 1969), 84–89; Crone, 35 Northeast, 8; Max Danish, The World of David Dubinsky (Cleveland: World
Publishing Company, 1957), 76.
34
Ten Years of Progress: The Story of the Blouse and Waistmakers’ Union, Box 1, Folder 36, ILGWU Local
Publications, Collection 5780/169, Kheel Center for Labor-Management Documentation, Catherwood Library,
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 5–10.

129

parlance—began stretching the geographical frontiers of production within a circle described by
the limits of overnight trucking to and from the Garment District. Their incentive for this flight
to the hinterland was baked into the codes in the form of a twenty-five percent wage differential
between New York City and outlying areas—a difference that in practice often widened because
of the union’s inability to surveil far-flung, fly-by-night shops. By 1935, “the single most
important problem confronting the organization,” wrote the leaders of Local 25, “was the
movement of factories to small towns in outlying areas.” 35
The chief destinations for runaways in the 1930s were the denuded anthracite coal towns
of northeastern Pennsylvania and the suffering former textile hubs of New England. Anthracite,
or “hard” coal, is a mineral borne of the detritus of prehistoric trees, buried and reburied as
ancient seas washed back and forth over eastern North America and hammered into purity by the
collisions of continents. Anthracite was “the fuel that powered American industrialization,”
feeding iron-smelting furnaces and heating homes across the burgeoning industrial North.
Northeastern Pennsylvania, which harbored huge deposits of this carbon-rich, clean-burning fuel
in close proximity to the huge markets of the eastern cities, became for a century or more a “total
mineral economy,” stresses the region’s preeminent geographer. The anthracite companies were
fewer and more powerful than their cousins in the bituminous, or “soft” coal industry, and
conditions for the mostly immigrant workers in the anthracite fields were even more dangerous
and repressive. Naked domination was a way of life in the northeastern coal fields. This was the
land of the Molly Maguires, the alleged miners’ terrorist organization whose adherents were
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hanged en masse in the late 1870s, following trials in which their bosses managed to double as
prosecutors. 36
Northeastern Pennsylvania was also one of the first regions in the United States to
deindustrialize. Anthracite production peaked during World War I, when nearly 180,000 miners
worked to hack the valuable mineral out of the ground. During the 1920s, employment began a
precipitous decline, as fuel oil and natural gas replaced anthracite for home heating. The
Depression cut demand even further, even as the populations of the coal towns peaked. In
stepped the New York garment manufacturers, for whom the northeastern coal country presented
an irresistible opportunity. Here were amassed great concentrations of desperate women—
urbanized, proletarian, and jobless. Such were the ingredients on which the “chiseler” hoped to
grow rich. “In coal-poor northeastern Pennsylvania, the ‘runaways’ from New York found their
edge … and prospered—far from the Seventh Avenue core of union enforcement power,” wrote
two New York journalists investigating the runaways form the vantage point of the 1950s. “The
wives of chronically unemployed anthracite miners flocked to work at minimum wages [and]
were slow to organize under the ILGWU.” 37
Towns like Pittston, Hazelton, Pottsville, Scranton, Wilkes-Barre, and Shamokin now
played host to the sweatshops whose existence in New York was imperiled by the growing
strength of the ILG. They became part of what economists called the “New York Production
Area,” a four or five-state regional settlement of the industry. For local elites, courting footloose
garment manufacturers promised a quick fix to the towns’ economic crises. “Moving into long
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vacant buildings, even into churches … aided by concessions and spurred on by promises of
‘protection’ against union activities by local chambers of commerce, these bosses put women
and girls to work,” explained David Gingold, who became director of the ILG’s Northeast
Department, established in 1935 to try and contain the increasingly out-of-control dispersion of
garment work. 38
The Northeast Department began life as the “Cotton Garment and Miscellaneous Trades
Department,” reflecting the fact that the out-of-town shops specialized in the cheap cotton
dresses known as “house” or “wash” dresses—unadorned garments meant for the daily drudgery
of housework. This name, knowingly or not, pointed to important features of the political
economy of runaways. The shops that could most easily set up out of town were those that
produced unsophisticated, easily standardized garments for which demand was relatively
predictable. Standardization permitted a more intense division of labor, known in the industry as
“section work.” Section work was the alternative to the “whole garment” system that prevailed in
New York City, where one operator used his or her skills to assemble an entire piece. Cheap
rents, long production runs, and disaggregation of the work process meant larger factories and
mechanization to the degree that it was possible in what remained a labor-intensive industry. The
overall result was that labor in the out-of-town shops was cheaper in both the absolute and
relative senses. “Business has been gravitating to Pennsylvania from New York City because the
high capital investment in Pennsylvania plants permits volume production and increased
efficiency through the use of the section work system, the use of the most modern machinery,
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and therefore lower relative labor costs,” explained the Slate Belt Contractors Association, an
employers’ group established to serve the Pennsylvania contractors. 39
Along with Gingold, the ILG sent Min Lurye Matheson to wrangle the Pennsylvania
runaways into the ILG fold. Matheson’s background suited her for the task. Born in Chicago in
1909 to a family of warlike unionists, her childhood memories included police ransacking the
family home during the 1919 Red Scare and her cigarmaker father barely surviving a machine
gun attack from assassins linked to underworld kingpin Al Capone. “I was an extremist,”
Matheson recalled later in life. “I came out of Chicago. The Haymarket case was very fresh in
everybody’s minds. We hated the courts. We hated the police … We would not sit down and
break bread with an employer. We would not participate with elected officials who were not prounion.” Over time, Matheson would moderate her politics to correspond to the ILG’s go-alongto-get-along approach, but the militancy persisted. Over several decades, Matheson became
famous for her frontal challenges to the organized crime figures that controlled both significant
chunks of the garment trade as well as the politics of the one-time coal towns. Her zeal ran in the
family—in 1949, Matheson’s brother William Lurye, also an ILG organizer, was murdered with
an ice pick in the lobby of a Garment District loft building by associates of mobster and
racketeer Albert Anastasia, who owned a non-union garment factory in Hazelton,
Pennsylvania. 40
As the case of the Molly Maguires suggests, the anthracite towns had never been
democracies. This remained true in the 1930s. “Everything was controlled,” recalled Matheson.
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“There were laws in the land but they weren't carrying out any of the laws.” Elections were
easily rigged. The neophyte women sewers of the Wyoming Valley told Matheson “we register
but we can’t cast our vote.” “Our man”—either a husband or boss—“has to cast our vote for us.”
When Matheson asked how this could be the case, she was told “that’s the system.” Pittston, in
particular, had a reputation for congeniality to organized crime, whose influence predated the
arrival of the garment factories. Cooperation between local politicians, the police force, and
garment racketeers was a not-so well-kept secret in the town. Shortly after arriving, Matheson
booked time on the local radio station to lay down a gauntlet. “We’re going to put Pittston back
in the USA,” she told listeners. 41
In the wilds of northeastern Pennsylvania, chiselers had been free to perfect their craft.
Relocation had freed employers from the dense, urban industrial neighborhoods of Manhattan,
where news about wages and working conditions traveled fast and proximity facilitated
solidarity. Whereas the Garment District, one ILG official joked, was like “a goldfish bowl
equipped with loudspeakers,” the Pennsylvania shops suffered from a “tyranny of distance”
whereby workers in one town lacked easy and obvious communication with compatriots “over
the next mountain range or across an unbridged river.” Jobbers worked to foster opacity about
their contracting arrangements—“prolonged investigations and abstruse detective work … were
often necessary to trace and uncover the subterranean connections between New York firms and
their non-union production sources in the Northeast areas,” complained officers of the Northeast
Department. 42
Even when the ILG tracked down a contractor, there were a hundred-and-one ways to
cheat. There was the apprentice scam, where owners exploited the area’s labor surplus by hiring
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new women at a depressed “learners’” rate and laying them off before they graduated to the
standard wage scale. There was the double-book scam, which sought to evade the ILG’s hardwon ability to examine employers’ books to ensure they honored the contract. Many contractors
simply kept two sets of books—a forged one to show the ILG and a real one that reflected actual
piece rates and hours worked. Another favorite was the bait-and-switch, where contractors
signed an agreement stipulating they would produce blouses or neckwear—items whose lower
price meant a lower wage rate—then quietly switched to a higher-priced line, such as dresses,
while keeping their workers at blousemaker wages. 43
Truckers, who played a key role in bridging the emergent spatial gap between jobber and
contractor, had rapidly emerged as the life’s blood of the “New York Production Area.” In a
business premised on speed, these paladins of logistics manned a choke point that was irresistible
to the mobsters, like Louis “Lepke” Buchalter, who perpetually sought to muscle in on the trade.
One should be careful about drawing too bright a line between racketeers and so-called
legitimate manufacturers. The gangsters too obeyed the rationality of competitive capitalism and
played a legible economic role. Their objective was to regulate competition by cartelizing the
trucking business, parceling out work to firms who played ball and punishing those who did not.
In principle, it was not much different than the efforts of the business-dominated NRA code
authorities who sponsored cartels in order to maintain prices, stem “ruinous” competition, and
eliminate the “chiseler.” The garment racketeers worked as a kind of ad-hoc, street version of the
NRA, although their enforcement mechanisms tended to be surer and swifter. 44
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Another service the truckers offered was matchmaking. According to historian David
Witwer, “for a jobber, the arrangement apparently worked like this: he contracted with a mobconnected trucking company that, in return for a set commission on each dress, undertook to
have the garments made at below the union rate without the jobber suffering any repercussions.
Within the industry this was known as purchasing ‘an edge.’” The ILG tried to combat the
practice by organizing the truckers, but the administration of its truckers’ Local 102, headed by
Sam Berger, retained embarrassingly open ties to Garment District gangsters. “This new nonunion production, organized and backed by gangsterism, put us under tremendous pressure ,”
explained Julius Hochman, manager of the ILG’s Dress Joint Board. “We have a double
competition going on,” Hochman complained. In addition to the ordinary competition between
unionized jobbers, a volatile tier of mob-connected firms constantly threatened to upset the
equilibrium the ILG and the above-board manufacturers worked so hard to maintain. 45
The “legitimate” manufacturers resisted this intensification of competition. Since 1933,
they had sought, as much as possible, to reduce its scope by taking wages and prices out of the
equation, a task they pursued in tacit alliance with the ILG. Both the National Association of
Blouse Makers (NABM), the trade association for the reputable New York jobbers, and ILG
Local 25, the Blouse and Waistmakers’ Union, traced their present incarnations to that annus
mirabilis. For two years, they operated according to the Code of Fair Competition hammered out
in the return to collective bargaining that had taken place under the auspices of the NRA. When
the US Supreme Court struck down NIRA in 1935, the codes became legally unenforceable. In
an attempt to forestall a return to the desperate price and cost-cutting of the 1920s, the NABM
and the ILG attempted to reincarnate the NRA through collective bargaining—to establish, in
David Witwer, “The Dress Strike at Three Finger Brown's: The Complex Realities of Antiracketeering from the
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effect, a private NRA. These jobbers, who accepted unionization as an established fact, worked
together with the ILG to establish parameters by which member firms could maintain
profitability while tolerating unionization and avoiding resort to the sweatshop. The only way
this could work was by discouraging price competition. This required policing the pricing
policies of member firms and encouraging the unionization of any non-union blousemakers,
thereby eliminating their competitive advantage. Competition would take place, if at all, on style
and workmanship—stressful enough given consumers’ fickle tastes. This approach to curbing
competition built on longstanding practices in the blouse industry by which labor rates were set
according to established “price classes” with which manufacturers, the union, and retailers were
all familiar. Manufacturers tended to specialize in one or another price class, meaning that the
blouse industry, like the garment industry as a whole, was less a common market than a
collection of tiered competitive environments. Only the largest manufacturers, like Judy Bond,
produced both low and high-priced garments. One role of the NABM and other trade
associations was to establish floors for each price class below which members would not be
permitted to sell. Only through this collective effort could manufacturers maintain the margins
required to pay contractors and workers according to a minimum standard—and garment wages
were never high, even in this respectable sector—while maintaining even modest profitability for
jobbers themselves. 46
“The Garb of Management”
In the garment industry, there was an obvious connection between the prices at which
garments were sold and the conditions under which they were produced. To defend the latter, the
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ILG’s bargaining agenda included attempts, conducted jointly with the New Deal blousemakers
gathered in the NABM and other trade associations, to police those market conditions. But this
exposed the organization to attacks from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the anti-trust
division of the Justice Department, the two agencies tasked with bolstering competition in
American industry. In 1943, for example, the FTC filed a complaint against Local 25, the
NABM, and the Greater Blouse Association, the trade association for blouse contractors in New
York City. Lawyers for the FTC charged that members of the NABM effectively controlled
blouse production in New York and, with the help of the union and the contractors’ association,
coerced manufacturers into joining the NABM and abiding by its pricing policies. Their goal, the
FTC charged, was to “hinder competition,” “enhance prices,” and “create … a monopoly” by
these “unfair and deceptive acts.” FTC attorneys also alleged that the New York blousemakers
and the ILG were conspiring to curtail the geographical spread of the industry in order to have
“New York maintained in its present state of supremacy.” The FTC cast the ILG as a titan that
dictated terms to hapless manufacturers and bilked consumers in order to feather the nests of
garment workers and union officials. “There is no magic in the words ‘Labor Union,’” scoffed
George Williams, a government attorney. Unions were, on this argument, no longer the scrappy
organizations that had charmed so many in the heady days of the 1930s. “Like the butterfly the
labor unions have come forth from their chrysalis and assumed the garb of management,”
Williams added, with a touch of poetry. 47
The ILG and the NABM teamed up to defend their joint efforts to regulate the blouse
industry. NABM director B. H. Lerner asked the FTC to recall the pre-New Deal era, when there
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was a “great deal of home work, there were no standards of sanitation observed, there were no
limitations as to hours, there were no … floors as to prices, working conditions were very poor.”
Manufacturers had been squeezed from both sides—on the one hand by intense competition with
other producers, on the other by the rise of discount stores and retail syndicates—“powerful
buying organizations” that “bring pressure on a small manufacturer of limited capital to sell
goods on consignment, they make returns, they make unfair cancellations, and they demand
excessive discounts.” Without a counter-organization on the part of garment manufacturers and
the union, the fragile dyad of already-thin profit margins and tolerable working conditions would
collapse. 48
For their part, ILG officials contended their chief goal was to maintain minimum
standards of wages and working conditions. They were telling the truth. The natural equilibrium
of the garment industry, after all, was the sweatshop. Regulation had partly eliminated this
widely-acknowledged social evil. Dismantling that regulation would invite its return. On the
issue of runaways, the ILG did not oppose decentralization of the industry because they disliked
Pennsylvanians, southerners, or anyone else—they opposed it unless and until relocation could
be made into something other than a wage suppression device. Their efforts were only halfsuccessful—manufacturers stubbornly resisted ILG efforts to erode the wage differentials
between New York and “out-of-town” shops. Incremental progress made on this count was cold
comfort as production steadily slipped out of New York, where the union could best influence its
terms. The earliest agreements between the ILG and the NABM included a New York City
“preference” clause whereby employers were meant to “make fair and reasonable effort” to keep
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work in the city, but as ILG counsel Elias Lieberman pointed out to the FTC, there was no
provision for enforcement and the clause remained a “dead letter.” 49
After ten tedious years, the FTC dropped its complaints against the ILG and the
blousemakers. As anti-trust scholar Ellis Hawley argued in his classic book The New Deal and
the Problem of Monopoly, the legal system was a poor instrument to effect a return to unfettered
competition. Before long, the economic dynamics of the industry itself would realize this goal in
a much more thorough way. In the end, short-sighted anti-trust fervor mainly served the interests
of the chiseling employers, who learned they could marshal the government to harass and
distract the ILG as well as their commercial rivals—a process that would be repeated during the
late 1950s and early 60s, when the Pennsylvania contractors wielded the Justice Department as a
club to batter the union and their New York rivals. 50
The ILG was powerless to stop the work from leaving New York. The union consistently
advocated for an increased federal minimum wage that could help iron out the regional
differentials that made running away so attractive, a task that proved difficult given the political
power of Southern legislators dedicated to that region’s synthesis of low wages and white
supremacy. In the short run, there were two solutions, which the ILG pursued in tandem. The
first was to ease wage demands in New York shops in an effort to reduce the incentive for
manufacturers to leave. During the 1960s, ILG officials even fought to kill city and state
minimum wage hikes for fear that they would reinforce the differentials that drove garment
manufacturers out of New York. The second was to organize the runaways. For two-and-a-half
grueling decades, organizers fought their way into the Pennsylvania plants in a series of
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campaigns that culminated in general strikes that shut down the entire dress and blouse industries
during the late 1950s. They made significant progress in improving wages and benefits and
establishing a union infrastructure, but never fully eradicated the gap between the New York and
Pennsylvania shops. Their success was enough, however, to provoke what Northeast Department
organizers called a “grim irony”—“the Northeast areas in Pennsylvania and New England,
originally considered the Out-of-Town hideouts for New York City and Philadelphia only two
decades earlier, were now confronted with their own out-of-town competition.” 51
Dollar Blouse
The first blow came from abroad. In December 1954, NABM chief Lerner told the Senate
Finance Committee that American blousemakers were visiting Japan to arrange for “large-scale
importation” of “popular-price” blouses, the industry term for the low end of the market. By that
time, the industry was in the midst of a sudden assault from low-cost, low-price Japanese
manufacturers, who hiked exports to the US from a mere thirty-eight dozen in 1952 to four
million dozen in 1955. This was the notorious “dollar blouse,” which became an early symbol of
the public controversies over the growing tide of imported Japanese manufactures. The Japanese
blouses boasted identical workmanship to those produced in the United States but sold for less
than half the price, a feat achieved by paying the women who sewed them one-sixth of what their
American counterparts made. “Our labor cost alone … exceeds the complete cost of a blouse
manufactured in Japan,” wrote Judy Bond founder Jack Rothenberg in a letter to Dubinsky,
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where he proposed that the manufacturers and the union collaborate on a campaign to address the
crisis. 52
Retailers, on the other hand, loved the dollar blouses, whose rock-bottom wholesale
prices allowed them to undersell less-savvy competitors and still achieve a higher mark-up than
was possible with American made blouses, all the while wielding the threat of an intensified turn
to imports to batter domestic manufacturers into concessions. In an industry with chronically low
profit margins and little prospect of technological rationalization, those concessions could
ultimately only be wrung out of workers. “Stores which profit from the American standard of
living should not undermine it by seeking goods made by workers earning 11 cents an hour,”
complained Lerner. These moral arguments made little impact. The ILG realized that the
conditions under which foreign blouses were produced augured a return to the sweatshop, but on
an expanded, indeed, a global scale. “In the international competition that now exists in this
product,” wrote the editors of Justice, “work is shifting to those who employ labor to the ultimate
limits of human endurance. This is the kind of competitive exploitation our union fought and
drove out of the garment industry in its great campaigns to wipe out the auction block and to set
a limit on the number of contractors a jobber might employ.” 53
It was not foreordained that East Asian manufacturers would challenge domestic clothes
makers so quickly or so direly. Ten years before, Japan had lain in ruins, its industrial output at
one-tenth the pre-war level. The victorious US military possessed virtually unfettered control
over the country’s politics and its economy. For the first two years of the occupation, the
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authorities pursued a course of “New Deal-style reformism and trust-busting fervor,” seeking to
rein in Japan’s reindustrialization by purging pre-war business leaders from public life,
dissolving the zaibatsu conglomerates, and strengthening Japan’s trade unions, which had been
cowed by the militarist regime of recent decades. Beginning in 1947, however, occupation
authorities embarked on what became known in Japan as the “reverse course,” or what one
scholar has dubbed the “Kennan Restoration,” after its intellectual architect. The reverse course
was an austerity program designed to prepare the ground for renewed capitalist development in
Japan. Its measures, embodied in the famous “Dodge Line” enforced by the Detroit banker who
became the Occupation’s new “economic czar,” aimed to jump-start industrial production
through what Kennan called “financial and social discipline.” 54
Concretely, this meant imposing privation—suppressing wages, curbing government
spending, and breaking workers’ power. Today, Dodge’s name invokes “memories of hard times,
dismissals, wage cuts, and political turmoil,” remarks the leading Japanese-language historian of
the Occupation. This was the point. Dodge’s argument that “the standard of living has probably
been permitted to go too high” might have struck an odd note in war-ravaged Japan. But
crackdowns on the standard of living combined with the Korean War procurement boom—a
“gift from the gods,” crowed conservative prime minister Shigeru Yoshida—to prepare Japanese
capitalism for its breakneck growth of the 1950s and 60s. 55
The reverse course and its suppression of democracy was a key precondition for the
Japanese economic miracle. “Japanese foreign economic policy has been carried out in a context
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in which the political exclusion of the Japanese Left and organized labor has allowed the
Japanese government to avoid the redistribution of social benefits that has taken place, at least to
some extent, in societies with a higher degree of corporatist inclusion of the labor sector,” notes
political scientist T. J. Pempel. ILG officials, including Local 25 manager Charles Kreindler,
were active participants in the Occupation through the Free Trade Union Committee, the foreign
policy vehicle of the American Federation of Labor. In general, AFL officials found themselves
caught between the wishes of Japanese workers, the US government’s business-dominated
economic policies, and their own reflexive anti-communism. “By accepting and working within
the broad contours of American policy in Japan,” writes historian Howard Schonberger,
“American labor contributed to the weakness and fragmentation of the Japanese labor movement
as the post-Occupation era began.” 56
When the procurement boom wound down, Japan turned to exports as the surest road to
growth. Now in a position to realize the promise of the trade liberalization embodied in the 1948
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Japanese firms, in close collaboration with the
government, began their export drives in earnest. While other developed countries hedged their
GATT obligations by invoking escape clauses and other non-tariff barriers, the United States was
“the one industrial nation willing to absorb higher levels of Japanese exports,” observes historian
Michael Schaller. American textile and clothing producers, hit with this avalanche, cried that
they did not wish to become a “sacrificial goat” on the altar of anti-communist grand strategy. In
the blouse industry, Charles Kreindler worked with Jack Rothenberg, founder of Judy Bond and
a key member of the NABM, to apply for relief to the US Tariff Commission. The Japanese
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labor cost advantage was so lopsided, they argued, that no conceivable tariff could offset it.
Something stronger was needed—a quota to sharply limit imports. Many, especially in Congress,
agreed—sixty-three senators supported one or another bill mandating a quota on Japanese cotton
goods, and the state legislatures of Alabama and South Carolina passed laws requiring merchants
to post signs informing customers that their wares had come from Japan. After fielding formal
protests from the Japanese government, the Eisenhower administration, hoping to avoid such
harsh measures, brokered what they called a Voluntary Export Restraint whose nominal goal was
to steady the flow of exports at a moderate level, ironing out back-breaking surges like the dollar
blouse. 57
It was not enough. Japanese negotiators could accept restraints on textile and apparel
exports because they did not intend to limit the country’s exports to these low-tech, low-margin
goods. Cotton blouses, a product that harkened back to an earlier stage of Japanese
industrialization, were just the beginning. In the coming years, Japanese firms, responding to the
escalating wage costs associated with a boom now in full flower as well as signals from the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the country’s planning agency, would ascend the
technological ladder by exporting ships, chemicals, steel, automobiles, electronics, and more.
Meanwhile, the country began to shed low-value, labor-intensive industries like garment
manufacture. First, garment factories left cities like Nagoya for the hinterland in a movement that
mimicked the flight of American garment factories to places like northeastern Pennsylvania.
Before long, however, the center of gravity shifted to newer contestants in the East Asian
industrial scramble, like Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea, where the preconditions for
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success in low-wage, highly competitive industries now lay. The evolving regional division of
labor took the shape of the “flying geese” pattern first theorized by the Japanese economist
Kaname Akamatsu in the 1930s, now a staple of development economics. As in postwar Japan,
northeastern Pennsylvania, and any other place garment manufacture thrived, these low wages
were guaranteed by authoritarian politics. In South Korea, the Park regime not only blocked
imports and limited competition, but guaranteed cheap labor by “the exclusion of labor, the
exploitation of women, and … low state expenditures on social welfare.” In Taiwan, the
Kuomintang ruled under a decades-long state of martial law that helped leaders curtail
unionization and forbid strikes. Both dictatorships were supported by massive quantities of US
aid. The pattern continued—eventually, new flying geese would join the flock from the countries
of Southeast Asia. 58
In 1956, imports amounted to between three and four percent of domestic production.
Complacency was not in order, however. Not only were imports rising precipitously, helped
along by the relentless entry of new producers into the market, but as ILG Research Director
Lazare Teper emphasized, “a relatively small volume of imports can be disruptive.” In addition
to the increased leverage they afforded retailers, the economic pressure of imports rippled across
different sections of the industry, intensifying competition even in lines not immediately
affected. The plight of the neckwear manufacturers was instructive. “Lady Fashion” had “all too
often frowned on the work opportunities of neckwear members,” lamented ILG Neckwear
Workers’ Local 142 manager Joseph Tuvim in 1962, three years before this group collapsed. For
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decades, neckwear manufacturers had weathered downturns in their volatile business by flooding
into other lines, especially blouses, where they could temporarily undercut existing blouse
producers by quietly paying their workers the cheaper scarf makers’ wage. Judy Bond itself had
begun life as a neckwear firm before migrating into the more lucrative blouse industry. As early
as 1938, the NABM was begging Charles Kreindler to ferret out and organize these crossover
manufacturers. Kreindler had warned Dubinsky that “we are skating on thin ice” in the blouse
industry. 59
The 1950s brought disaster to the neckwear business—by mid-decade, Japanese
competition had “virtually wiped out” the domestic industry. Neckwear manufacturers responded
by flooding into blousemaking, exacerbating the problem of overcapacity and the resultant
competitive pressures just in time for imports to further aggravate the problem. Some neckwear
manufacturers became blouse importers, drawing fines from the industry’s impartial arbitrator
for violating their ILG contracts, which stipulated that their work be done in unionized shops.
They may have been among the manufacturers visited by agents of F. Kanematsu & Co. of
Tokyo, who in 1955 made the rounds of New York blousemakers promising “to make to our
specifications any garments our members submit … at far below American production costs.” 60
The Pennsylvania shops servicing the cheaper, “popular” end of the blouse and dress
markets were the hardest hit by imports. During the 1950s, Judy Bond employed contractors
throughout the region, including in Manhattan and New Jersey, but a plurality lay in the former
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anthracite country. Few areas of the United States had been convulsed so thoroughly by the
squalls of the market economy, and locals now prepared for another trial. “It does not take a
genius to find what will happen to the blouse industry,” warned the director of the Slate Belt
Apparel Contractors Association in a 1955 letter to David Dubinsky. “It will be too late when the
inroad of foreign manufactured articles has laid waste our industry, taken away the homes of our
people, and caused an exodus to other climes in order to make a living. This we saw happen
under our very eyes in the anthracite coal region when … that industry practically disappeared.”
Even with the garment industry in place, unemployment in Pennsylvania was “staggering,” wrote
Congressman Francis “Tad” Walter in a letter to Grace Birkel, head of the ILG local in his
hometown of Easton. But the swell of imported clothing had helped set off a new frenzy of price
competition, thinning margins to the very edge of profitability and further undermining the
fragile New Deal settlement. At its 1962 convention, ILG officers warned that the industry was
entering a new era—the “global runaway shop.” With the ascent of the United States to
undisputed capitalist hegemon, the sphere of competition had gone global, thrusting the miners’
widows of Pennsylvania coal country into an intimate but alienated relationship with war
widows in Gifu Prefecture and beyond. The gathering collapse of the garment economy in the
Northeast would soon send firms like Judy Bond in search of a new internal hinterland. 61
Bursting the Production Area
One response of the garment makers to these new threats was to try and turn back the
clock and restore the competitive advantages of a previous round of decentralization. The
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method was to attack the collective bargaining agreements that were gradually ironing out the
unevenness in wages and conditions between New York and elsewhere and which were the
embodiment of the New Deal settlement in the industry. The vehicle was the Eisenhower
administration, whose prosecutors mounted a renewed government attack on the ILG and the
trade associations. The twist came when it was revealed that some manufacturers welcomed the
prosecution of their own trade associations, hoping it would free them from an increasingly
untenable relationship with the ILG.
On March 11, 1959, a federal grand jury accused four organizations—ILG Local 25, the
National Association of Blouse Makers, the Greater Blouse Association, and the Slate Belt
Contractors Association—of engaging in a conspiracy to fix prices between jobber and
contractor, restrict the entry of new contractors into the market, and force all jobbers and
contractors to become members of their respective trade associations. “Competition among
contractors … has been eliminated,” charged the grand jury. Included in the indictment were two
known racketeers—Harry “Little Lefty Strauss” Strasser, a drug dealer turned garment racketeer
with interests in Pennsylvania dress factories and the truckers that supplied them, and James
“Jimmy Brown” Clemenza, who was head of the Greater Blouse Association, the trade group
representing the New York contractors. The evidence linking Strasser to the ILG was vague at
best, but prosecutors achieved what was likely the desired result when newspapers splashed his
photo next to that of Local 25 manager Kreindler. 62
Dubinsky identified the anti-trust case as an attack on the New Deal settlement. The
criminal complaint was, he thundered, an attempt to “smear” and “discredit” a “New Deal union
on behalf of the Republican administration.” The indictment “represents a return to the days of
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the 1890s when the Sherman Act was used not to bust trusts but to cripple unions.” As if to
emphasize the point, the ILG turned to Judge Simon Rifkind to represent Local 25 in the
proceedings. Rifkind, a former legislative secretary to Senator Robert Wagner and later the
senator’s law partner, was a living embodiment of the New Deal. In a hard-nosed speech
delivered to the 1959 ILG convention, Rifkind outlined the approach he would take in the
courtroom. The ILG was indeed a “conspiracy,” he argued—“a conspiracy against chaos in
industry, a conspiracy against peonage in industry, a conspiracy against starvation and
unemployment in industry.” The ILG adopted the same defense it had used in the earlier FTC
battles—that its goal was to protect workers, any measures it adopted were directed toward that
goal, and that the fruits of those efforts, outlined in the collective bargaining agreements
governing the blouse industry, had been public knowledge for decades. 63
The case dragged on for five interminable years. In 1962, the ILG applauded the decision
of the Kennedy Justice Department to soften the approach by pursuing a civil anti-trust suit. “The
test can now be made in an atmosphere free of the politically-motivated sensationalism
stimulated three years ago when intimations of racket-busting were gratuitously associated with
the case for the sole purpose of besmirching a legitimate labor organization,” Dubinsky
announced. A civil suit, decided by a judge instead of a jury, was preferable for an organization
long accustomed to fostering close relationships with elite decision-makers, a practice embodied
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in the role of the “impartial chairman” established during the days of the Protocol. By 1964,
Justice Department attorneys had decided to drop the case altogether. 64
But when the day came for government attorneys to formally end the case, a “bizarre,
stranger-than-fiction” twist emerged. J. W. Castles, a lawyer representing the Pennsylvania
contractors, pleaded with the judge to compel the government to continue the prosecution.
Castles’s maneuver was a bombshell, at least in the dreary precincts of anti-trust litigation. “You
want the government to prosecute your client?” asked the puzzled judge. “Old hands in the
courtroom were astonished,” wrote an incredulous reporter. “How could an attorney, associated
with a highly respectable Wall Street firm, stand before a judge and demand that his client—
indicted in an alleged antitrust conspiracy—stand trial after the Government moved to drop (nolpros) the case?” Castles’s gambit laid bare for the public the real issues at stake in the byzantine
case. His boss was Herbert Brownell, a former Eisenhower Attorney General and current
President of the New York City Bar Association who now served as counsel to the Pennsylvania
blousemakers. If the prosecution succeeded, the Pennsylvania shops could escape the
gravitational pull of ILG contracts that increasingly tethered their costs and their fate to their
New York brethren, leaving them free to pursue renewed wage differentials. The goal was to redifferentiate the New York Production Area, rescuing it from the flattening effect of ILG
organizing efforts, which threatened to take down the entire region. To support this counterintuitive request, Brownell’s firm sought to undermine the current prosecutors, introducing
affidavits from former Justice Department attorneys urging that the judge order their successors
to continue the offensive. Brownell’s conduct, which raised what Judge Edward Weinfeld called
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“a serious and substantial question of propriety,” split the Bar Association, whose ethics chief, a
partner in the law firm of ex-Franklin Roosevelt aide Samuel Rosenman, angrily quit the post. In
the end, Brownell’s ploy did not succeed—the Justice Department dropped the case as planned. 65
The blouse anti-trust case was a battle over the New Deal in more ways than one.
Rosenman, who would succeed Brownell as president of the Bar Association, had literally
coined the term during his days as a speechwriter for Franklin Roosevelt. At bottom, the
prosecution was an attack on the New Deal settlement—an attempt to break up the New York
Production Area, to restore interregional differences in wages and conditions, and to pave the
way for a return to the auction block system of dog-eat-dog comparative advantage. “The case is
a harbinger of change,” wrote the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin—a “revolt against the
ILGWU’s designation and registration system of control of wages,” which had existed in one
form or another for half a century. In the face of multiple new sources of competition, the
Pennsylvania blousemakers sought to assert their independence from their New York brethren,
with whom they had been locked in uneasy embrace as wages and conditions gradually
converged. The anti-trust harassment had partially done the trick, weakening enforcement and
buoying the fortunes of the Slate Belt contractors while sparking a host of copycat suits designed
to distract and weaken the ILG. With the dismissal of the suit, however, the Pennsylvania shops
would enjoy diminishing returns on this tactic. In court, their lawyers begged for the government
to help them dismantle the collective bargaining practices in the industry. The failure of this
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initiative, they predicted, would have the “severest consequences” for the Pennsylvania blouse
industry. 66
“In Their Desperation They Are Fishing Around”
At the conclusion of the 1958 dress strike that shut down the Pennsylvania industry,
bringing a significant chunk of the rogue and mob-connected contractors into line, David
Dubinsky had warned that “in their desperation they are fishing around for other production
sources throughout the country, especially in the South.” “Let not your sacrifices be in vain!” he
urged the troops. His warning was apt. The last-ditch effort by contractors to re-differentiate the
New York Production Area augured a new strategy—enlarge the labor market by looking south
to impoverished communities where “the minimum wage is like a gold mine,” as Alice York, an
Alabama ILG organizer, put it. Some firms mixed importing and southern contract work. Murray
Epstein and his nephew Herbert Rutt ran New Fashion Blouse Inc. out of 1370 Broadway, down
the block from Judy Bond’s offices. Epstein had gotten into the blouse business in 1937, likely
using Northeastern contractors. In 1944, he established the Iva Manufacturing Company in a
South Carolina mill town. In 1955, Epstein established a third firm, Sunny Shores Inc., to import
Japanese dollar blouses. By 1962, Iva Manufacturing, with Murray’s son William at the helm,
was sewing blouses for Judy Bond, then in the first flush of its runaway effort. 67
Another firm that migrated south by way of a detour into imports was Marlene Industries.
“At one time Marlene was a firm under contract to Local 25, ILGWU,” Shelley Appleton
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reported in June 1965. During the mid-1950s, Marlene succumbed to the dollar blouse craze,
importing the Japanese garments in violation of its union contract, eventually paying “a
tremendous fine” that temporarily forced the firm out of business. Before long, though, Marlene
was back, with “eight plants in Tennessee, South Carolina and Alabama, employing over 3,000
people making blouses under sub-standard conditions; working 40 hours per week at $1.25 per
hour. The 20 organizers assigned to strike this firm have been beaten, arrested, threatened with
death.” 68
Judy Bond thought of itself as nobler than the New Fashions and Marlenes of the world.
In 1955, Jack Rothenberg had pointedly told Dubinsky that Judy Bond would not participate in
the import craze. Like other manufacturers, Rothenberg had been approached by representatives
of the Japanese trading companies but had turned them down because “such a course of action
would wreck our domestic industry.” Rothenberg and his son Millard thought of themselves as
friends of the ILG—sometimes adversaries, sometimes collaborators, but ultimately partners. 69
The relationships between the small groups of men who headed the family firms of the
Garment District and the small groups of men who wielded effective power in the garment
unions were lubricated by shared, seemingly interchangeable social and ethnic backgrounds. It is
not an exaggeration to say that Jack Rothenberg might have been David Dubinsky and vice
versa. Like Dubinsky, Rothenberg was a Jewish immigrant from the Russian Empire who had
entered garment work in his teens, starting as an errand boy at a neckwear firm. He came up
under the tutelage of Louis and Elliott Levy, neckwear manufacturers whose union sympathies
got them “howled” by peers in the Ladies Neckwear Association, who urged the brothers to
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“visit Bellevue”—the city’s mental hospital. Eventually Rothenberg became a cutter—the same
position Dubinsky held during his factory days—and worked his way to production manager. In
1922, with the Levys’ blessing, Jack Rothenberg struck out on his own with nine thousand
dollars in capital, most of it borrowed. The Bond Novelty Company started out in lofts on
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Streets and moved uptown to the Garment District in 1933, eventually
renting ten thousand square feet of space at 48 West Thirty-Eighth Street. The spacious quarters
suggest that garments were still assembled in Manhattan at this time. By the early 1940s, the firm
was producing blouses, and by 1952, all its contractors, save one, were in Pennsylvania. 70
Jack and Millard Rothenberg could fairly be called “New Deal blousemakers.” Jack was
several times head of the National Association of Blouse Makers, the employers’ group
descended from the New Deal Era code authority. In this capacity, he routinely served as chief
negotiator for collective agreements with the ILG. The Rothenbergs were on a first-name basis
with the ILG officials with whom they dealt, professionally and socially, sharing the stage, for
example, with outgoing Local 25 manager Charles Kreindler at his retirement dinner. Along with
other manufacturers, Jack Rothenberg had been a weekend guest at Unity House, the ILG-owned
resort in the Pocono Mountains of eastern Pennsylvania. At Yale, Millard had penned a
sympathetic account of the ILG for his senior thesis. The Rothenbergs were jet-setters and
philanthropists who enjoyed globe-spanning vacations and donated their time and money to Beth
Israel Hospital, the Albert Einstein College of Medicine, and a host of other causes. Their story
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was a remarkable one—from the shtetl to Yale in one generation. Still, Judy Bond remained a
family-run business in a legendarily unstable industry suffering a series of novel shocks. 71
Runaway
On September 27, 1961, Charles Kreindler wrote the employers’ associations noting that
the present contract would expire on December 31 of that year and inviting the contractors to
begin negotiations at their convenience. The letters have a pro forma feel. “We trust that the
harmonious relations that have existed between our organizations for many years will continue,”
Kriendler wrote. The October 13 reply from the National Association of Blouse Manufacturers,
the trade association that represented the large New York jobbers, was not encouraging. The
contractors agreed to negotiate, but cited “widely felt economic disaffection” and expressed
“grave concern” for the future of the industry. 72
On December 4, the union received a more disturbing missive. Jacob Brodsky, the owner
of Judy Bond’s main contractor in South River, New Jersey, wrote an ILG vice president to warn
him that
Reliable information has reached me that Judy Bond for the past year has been giving out their
contract work to many Southern contractors, who are in the main completely non-union. Needless
to say, this deplorable situation has curtailed the amount of contract work I have received from
Judy Bond, and I have had to resort to looking for other sources of supply—those sources of
supply being mainly non-union manufacturers.

Brodsky, whose shop had been almost wholly dependent on Judy Bond work, stressed that “my
relations with the union have always been good.” Still, he cautioned the ILG that
If such a situation continues to exist, it becomes a farce where some union jobbers continue to
negotiate and sign new union contracts guaranteeing your members better and better working
conditions … and then blithely beat the contract by giving out their work to … non-union
contractors. … Certainly it becomes very difficult for the union contractors up “North” to fulfill
71
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their obligations to your union members if their source of supply can so easily give away their …
proportion of work to cheaper shops. 73

Some in the ILG already knew of Judy Bond’s southern foray. In October, Jack
Rothenberg had met with Louis Stulberg, ILG Treasurer and Dubinsky’s heir apparent.
Rothenberg informed Stulberg that Judy Bond had purchased a plant in Ozark, a small town in
the southeastern corner of Alabama. Rothenberg invited the ILG to represent his Alabama
workforce at wages that represented a steep drop from those paid to northern workers. Stulberg
assented to these severe concessions, but the tentative pact would dissolve in the acrimony that
emerged when it became clear the Judy Bond runaway would be total. The ILG would later
claim that Rothenberg had “repudiated” an agreement to pay Ozark workers fifteen cents above
the federal minimum wage, which stood at $1.15 an hour in late 1961 and would rise to $1.25 by
1963. Rothenberg maintained he had never agreed to pay more than five cents above the
minimum, a figure he insisted would be necessary if Judy Bond were to meet the labor costs of
its competitors. 74
A week after Brodsky protested the “farce” whereby Judy Bond maintained its image as a
reputable jobber while secretly farming out work to non-union southern contractors, the
company dropped a bomb into the ongoing negotiations. A terse telegram to the ILG announced
Judy Bond’s resignation from the NABM, of which it had been a stalwart. Henceforth, the
company would negotiate its labor rates independently, joining the competitive fray. On
December 20, the union sent a letter to George Mintzer, a lawyer who served as the industry’s
“impartial chairman,” accusing the company of violating its union-shop agreement by having
work done in non-union shops, including southern ones. Mintzer, a son of the Lower East Side
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whom the manufacturers complained was too close to the garment unions, summoned the parties
to an early January hearing. 75
On December 26, Millard Rothenberg and his lawyers met with Elias Lieberman, counsel
for Local 25. Attorneys for the company were blunt—“the firm has been losing money during
the last few years and … was confronted with either a liquidation of its business or a radical
change in its method of operation,” Lieberman reported. For that reason, they explained, the firm
had purchased a new plant in Alabama in addition to the one in Ozark. Moreover, it had
established a relationship with a rival union, the AFL-affiliated United Garment Workers. From
now on, Judy Bond would manufacture all its blouses in the South. Lieberman, sensing the
firm’s transformation from partner to adversary, became irritated. If this was the case, there was
nothing to discuss, he told Millard Rothenberg. Why had they come to his office? To make the
shift “in broad daylight,” the younger Rothenberg replied. On December 28, the news broke in
Women’s Wear Daily. “Judy Bond Gets 2 Alabama Plants,” the paper reported—one in Ozark
and another in Brewton, a small town around a hundred miles to the southwest, near the Florida
border. On January 9, the union struck Judy Bond contractors in Pennsylvania as well as the
firm’s headquarters on Broadway. 76
For a time, Judy Bond and the ILG sought to salvage the intimate, casual style of
bargaining to which both parties were accustomed. On January 25, Jack Rothenberg met Joseph
Tuvim, head of the soon-to-be defunct neckwear workers’ local, for a heart-to-heart at Gross’s
Restaurant on Broadway in the Garment District. Rothenberg complained about the pickets in
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front of Judy Bond’s headquarters. “He said he was shocked and mortified at the attitude of some
of the people who have worked for him over 35 years, and with whom he grew old and others
with whom he had a good labor-management relationship and that as far as he was concerned, he
was treated very, very rudely and without conscience, by them,” Tuvim reported to David
Dubinsky. Rothenberg was referring to the cutters and sample-makers who worked out of the
firm’s headquarters, a relative elite among production workers whose social composition
resembled that of garment manufacturers and union officials more than it did the sewing women
of coal country or their increasingly African American and Latino counterparts in New York
City. In more collaborative moments, these three groups formed a sort of elite family—an inner
core distinct from the disposable contract labor of the sewing shops. Now, as competition
wobbled the industry, “conscience” retreated and class reared its head. 77
Rothenberg repeated his son’s contention that Judy Bond had to change or die. The firm
had lost $450,000 during the last two years, he told Tuvim, and his accountants had warned that
“some means must be found to salvage the business.” Rothenberg claimed he had shown Charles
Kreindler “all the books” and warned him that the firm would have to pursue southern
production. He similarly claimed to have warned Stulberg, but the latter, he lamented, was “very
cold” and “wouldn’t listen to reason.” Rothenberg emphasized his pique that the ILG seemed
unwilling to accommodate Judy Bond’s predicament. Had he not been “mishandled” by the
union, he surmised, he might have kept some contract work in New York or invited the ILG to
organize Brewton workers at a suitable wage differential. As it stood, though, Judy Bond was
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Alabama-bound. Rothenberg himself was Palm Beach-bound for the next month but he gave
Tuvim young Millard’s home phone number in case further negotiation became possible. 78
The growing competition of the 1950s had squeezed blousemakers from all sides. The
combination of non-union production—including the rogue, often mob-linked shops of the
North, imports from low-wage Japan, and the growing number of southern manufacturers—and
inflexible terms from increasingly powerful retailers put the unionized, New Deal blousemakers
of the NABM in an increasingly untenable position. Records of the negotiations over the 1959
contract reveal NABM members’ consternation over the “economic sickness” of an industry
where “pricing patterns make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to ‘pass on’ any increase in
labor costs.” Between 1951 and 1966, the “internal discipline” exerted by fierce competition
meant that wholesale prices in the garment industry rose by less than one percent, while those in
other lines of manufacturing increased by nearly ten percent, the ILG research director noted to
Congress in 1967. With little to no price flexibility, profits could only emerge from holding
down garment workers’ wages, which remained so low that Dubinsky would privately confess
during the 1959 negotiations that he was “ashamed” of the union’s performance in this regard.
Still, he assured Jack Rothenberg that the ILG was prepared to make concessions for producers
outside the Northeast. Indeed, in 1954 Dubinsky had pledged a three-year moratorium on
organizing any southern manufacturer who pledged to maintain wages at fifteen cents above the
federal minimum. None of them bit. 79
During the same negotiations, Rothenberg asked Dubinsky point-blank—“how are you
going to organize the South?” Dubinsky was frank—they couldn’t, at least not without the help
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of the federal government. Legislators would have to raise the minimum wage to at least $1.25
an hour before the ILG could stand a chance against southern garment manufacturers. Even this
proved to be overly rosy—the federal minimum reached $1.25 an hour in 1963, but that didn’t
help at Judy Bond or a number of other southern manufacturers. For the NABM and the union, it
seemed, there was no way out. The effort to maintain a high road that combined durable
profitability with non-sweatshop conditions was quickly collapsing. 80
“The Land of No Overhead”
The town of Brewton, Alabama sits at the confluence of Murder Creek and Burnt Corn
Creek in the southernmost portion of the state. Fifty miles to the south lies Pensacola, Florida,
gateway to the Gulf of Mexico. According to local legend, Murder Creek won its name in 1788
when a gang of bandits robbed and killed a party of South Carolina royalists fleeing to thenSpanish Florida with the aid of the prominent Creek loyalist Alexander McGillivray. The first
Euro-American settlement at what is today Brewton was Fort Crawford, built by the US military
as a frontier outpost during the First Seminole War. The region, covered by vast pine forests,
never developed the plantation economy that characterized other portions of the state, remaining
an area of small farmers and lumbermen who floated their wares to the Gulf at Pensacola. The
region’s economic geography was reflected in its politics—Conecuh County narrowly voted a
unionist to represent it at Alabama’s secession convention. In 1868, Alabama’s Reconstruction
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legislature split Conecuh County, establishing a new county called Escambia. By 1880, Brewton
was the county seat. 81
Between the Civil War and the Great Depression, Brewton was a lumber town. The
lumber workers of southern Alabama cut, sawed, and shipped their longleaf pine to builders
across the United States, who turned it into homes, barns, railroads, and ships. Sap from the trees
became resin, pitch, and turpentine, which in turn became glues, soaps, solvents, and the naval
stores that held together the world’s sailing ships. Proceeds from the extraction and sale of
timber engendered a class of wildly rich lumber “barons” who dominated the politics of
Brewton, which by the 1890s boasted a bank, two newspapers, electric power, a municipallyowned waterworks, hotels, rooming houses, and downtown merchants, in addition to its six
working sawmills. At the turn of the century, Brewton was one of the wealthiest towns in the
United States on a per capita basis—a figure that, given the town’s small size, reflected the
privilege concentrated in its upper class, whose palaces dotted Belleville and Evergreen
Avenues. The golden age would not last, however. The barons’ hunger for short-term gain issued
in “unscientific and merciless cutting,” denuding the region of the forests that had made them
rich. Lumber production in Alabama peaked in 1901 and declined until the federal government
stepped in to supervise reforestation efforts that began in the 1930s. 82
The specter of deforestation prompted the barons to diversify their capital. One answer
was manufacturing. The bulk of manufacturing in Brewton remained tied to forest products. As
the government and the forestry schools replaced the native longleaf pines with quick-growing,
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easily replenished slash pines, a pulp and paper industry emerged as Brewton’s next bet. The
Container Corporation of America box factory, owned today by multinational giant Georgia
Pacific, remains the town’s largest employer. The second strategy was to lure northern runaways,
especially labor-intensive industries with low start-up costs. The pioneer was the Bonita Ribbon
Mill, opened by Horace Levy, an industrialist with plants in New York City and eastern
Pennsylvania. Levy cut his wage costs beneath even the average for Alabama textile plants by
hiring almost exclusively African American women at the federal minimum wage. This “Negro
project” was the brainchild of Levy and E. V. Lovelace, president of the Brewton Chamber of
Commerce. Lovelace’s ancestors had founded the Lovelace Brothers Lumber Mill and could
count themselves among the timber barons who had run the town since the nineteenth century.
For decades, Brewton’s elite gathered at the Lovelace Hotel downtown. Today, another Lovelace
is Brewton’s mayor. 83
E. V. Lovelace and the Brewton Chamber of Commerce were instrumental in bringing
garment work to the town, as well. The plant that became Brewton Fashions, the pseudonym
adopted by Judy Bond to refer to its southern operations, had been established by another
northern company, H. D. Baskind & Co., in 1954. Baskind, a maker of men’s shirts
headquartered in Manhattan, operated a plant in Meyersdale, Pennsylvania, southeast of
Pittsburgh, and had closed one further east in Lebanon, leaving between three and four hundred
people out of work. In 1953, Lovelace and two other Brewton officials traveled to New York to
solicit runaway garment manufacturers. They convinced Baskind to bite. 84
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At Brewton Fashions, between 250 and 500 people worked sewing men’s shirts in a
municipally-owned factory leased to Baskind. Between thirty and forty of these were “colored
girls” who were forbidden from working on the machines. During the late 1950s, Brewton
Fashions worked mainly on Bud Berman label sport and dress shirts, a task they shared with
factories in Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. In 1957, the United Garment Workers signed a
contract to represent the Brewton Fashion workers. Scouts for the Amalgamated Clothing
Workers of America, who represented the firm’s workers in Pennsylvania, reported that the
Alabama workers appeared “dissatisfied” with the UGW. 85
In late November 1961, Jack Rothenberg had visited Brewton and toured the Baskind
plant. His decision to make it Judy Bond’s main factory signaled two shifts. First, Brewton
Fashions would be an “inside shop”—a factory run by one employer, without contractors, where
the relationship between employer and employee was relatively transparent. In the Northeast, the
inside shop had not survived because the ILG could reach it. But the South was different. The
combined effects of anti-union legislation, state repression, geographical distance from the
strongholds of union power, and a desperate, unseasoned workforce left the ILG unsure at best of
its ability to organize Southern garment workers. The South, regional director E. H. Kehrer told
the ILG convention in 1956, was “the land of no overhead and no labor difficulties,” where
tightly-knit oligarchies enjoyed “tight political control combined with tight control of the jobs,
plus the use of police power and vigilantes to destroy or hamper our organization.” As evidence,
he shared the story of ILG organizers kidnapped from their motel by a group of small-town
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Alabama businessmen, which included a distressingly nonchalant attitude on the part of local
Federal Bureau of Investigation agents when confronted with evidence of the crime. 86
Thirty years prior, their counterparts in Pennsylvania had made similar promises to
frustrated New York manufacturers. ILG Northeast Department director David Gingold often
recalled his arrival in Sayre, Pennsylvania during the mid-1930s. Workers, reeling from the
closure of the Erie-Lackawanna Railroad yards, had been encouraged by their supervisors at the
Belle Knitting Mill and the town’s newspaper to pelt Gingold with tomatoes as he stepped off the
train, even as they forked over ten percent of their salaries to the company as part of a deal the
town fathers had struck to help amortize the plant. When Min Matheson arrived in Sayre,
“people came out to watch my mother go down the street to see if she had horns and a tail
because my mother was Jewish,” her daughter recalled. Employers jumped at the opportunity to
set their workforce against the “foreign” organizers “conniving to take their jobs and work
away.” For these reasons, the ILG effort in Pennsylvania became at once economic, political, and
cultural. It had taken decades. Northeast Department organizers who had spent their careers
defending employees of the Pennsylvania runaways now lamented the “grim irony” by which
they now became the victims of a new round of runaways. Organizing the South would be
Pennsylvania all over again, in even more unfriendly political territory and in the face of
competition that was multiplying on a worldwide scale. 87
By fleeing to Alabama, Judy Bond had crossed a border. Trading in one politicalgeographical regime for another also permitted the company to alter the organization of the work
process in its factories in order to keep up with its competitors. Outside the reach of the ILG,
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Judy Bond could realize the advantages of the inside shop while shielding itself from the upward
pressure on wages exerted by the union’s efforts on behalf of garment workers. Men’s clothing
factories had always been bigger than those producing for women, a function of the greater
standardization permitted by the less ornamented styles that prevailed in the menswear market.
The Brewton plant had been one such factory. Judy Bond’s purchase of the Brewton plant
marked its entry into the realm of large, integrated factories—an acknowledgement that the
principles of menswear manufacture were invading the women’s wear market.
The threat was immediate. To justify his firm’s actions, Millard Rothenberg sent David
Dubinsky information on the new breed of women’s wear manufacturers. The first was
Donkenny, a fast-growing manufacturer whose wares spanned the market from jackets to shirts,
skirts, and pants. Its owners operated three new plants in Virginia under lease from various local
development corporations. They were now taking the company public in order to raise funds for
further expansion. The second firm, Cos Cob, was even larger. Cos Cob was a division of Oxford
Manufacturing, a large menswear manufacturer moving into women’s clothing. Since August of
1958, Oxford had slain and absorbed eleven vulnerable women’s wear manufacturers, whom its
officers criticized for their low capitalization and antiquated, family-owned structure, which
depended on “the personal skills and know-how of one or two individuals.” Oxford, on the other
hand, promised to combine “specialized cost accounting, data processing installations for cost,
inventory and merchandising controls and specialized production engineering” with “the finest
unspoiled labor market in all of America”—the American South. The firm had shuttered any
plants not located in the South, concentrating its operations in Georgia, South Carolina,
Alabama, and Mississippi. Cos Cob managers boasted degrees from MIT and built the large,
specialized factories that would help them put that knowledge to use. “The South will rise
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again,” promised William Perry, Jr., Cos Cob’s Northern-born president. In terms of revising the
work process as well as the politics of garment manufacture, southern production was the
Pennsylvania experience on steroids. 88
In order to accommodate the envisioned economies of scale, Judy Bond and Brewton
boosters teamed up to expand the plant on the town’s eastern edge. The revamped shop would
serve not only as a signal of the evolving contours of garment work, but as an investment
opportunity for the town’s oligarchs, who sought to take advantage of the recently passed Small
Business Investment Act to marshal the US government as a financial backer of the runaway.
Because the federal government would not lend directly to municipalities and because Judy
Bond was not a “small” business according to the letter of the act, backers, including Horace
Levy protégé and Brewton Chamber of Commerce “new industries” chairman Jack Hines,
formed a “Brewton Development Corporation” that would serve as the building’s formal
owner. 89
When they learned of the scheme, ILG officials bombarded the Small Business
Administration with messages pointing out that the Brewton Development Corporation was a
front for Judy Bond, “one of the largest blouse and sportswear manufacturers in the United
States” and a runaway to boot. When the government rejected the loan, Brewton’s City Council
formed an “Industrial Development Board” under the terms of the state’s 1949 Cater Act, which
permitted municipalities to issue tax-exempt bonds to finance industrial development. Tax
exemption was a key feature of the scheme—“if the bonds lost their tax-free status, they would
no longer be profitable,” complained regional director Kehrer to Dubinsky that summer. The
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ILG believed that Jack Hines, who they alleged “owns most of Brewton already,” had purchased
the lion’s share of the bonds. In part, Hines would be paying himself, since his firm would also
handle construction of the new expansion. The Hines Realty Company is still active in Brewton
today. Meanwhile, investors liked Judy Bond’s new look—in the same letter, Kehrer intimated
that several parties had approached Jack Rothenberg seeking to buy the firm. 90
Another Judy Bond plant, built three years later in Bonifay, Florida, eighty miles to the
southeast in that state’s Panhandle region, was financed in a similar manner. The town of
Bonifay was established in the 1880s as a business venture, its name drawn from an official of
the Louisville and Nashville Railroad that bisected the town. Now, Bonifay was a railroad depot
looking for a new reason to exist. During the 1960s, Holmes County was one of the poorest and
most conservative places in Florida, stuck near the bottom of the state in per capita income and
having bled one-fifth of its residents during the past decade. Later in the decade, the county
would register some of the strongest support in the country for segregationist presidential
candidate George Wallace. Landing the Judy Bond factory was an event—Florida governor W.
Haydon Burns noted with relief that Holmes County had been “in danger of becoming a ghost
county” and fêted Millard Rothenberg and other Judy Bond officials at a news conference in
Tallahassee to announce construction. Among the guests was Joseph Sipos, a thirty-seven year
industry veteran whose father, Hungarian-born Oscar, had started the Oscar Sipos neckwear firm
in Manhattan, until recently one of Judy Bond’s regular contractors. Its former employees,
mainly Puerto Rican-born women, would be among the most energetic activists in the
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burgeoning Judy Bond boycott. For his part, Joseph would be relocating to Florida to manage the
new Bonifay plant. 91
Judy Bond and its local partners named the plant the Holmes Manufacturing Company.
Its owner was the Holmes County Industrial Corporation, financed with sixty thousand dollars in
contributions from townspeople on land purchased from George Banfil, a descendant of the
town’s founders. This was the “Dixie socialism” of which northern trade unionists complained so
bitterly. The townspeople understood themselves to be buying jobs—ILG organizers reported
their pique when Judy Bond began importing workers from Brewton to fill some positions.
Worse, the company, not content with the wage savings derived from one relocation, began
playing the two plants off one another, shifting work from Brewton to Bonifay and fostering the
insecurity that made workers reluctant to join the ILG. It was a re-run of the worst abuses of the
Depression days in the Northeast, where workers paid for the right to be put on the auction
block. “It’s understandable that the fear of being laid off, on one hand, and hope of being called
back on the other would make people shy of being seen with the Union,” sighed a Brewton
organizer. The similarities multiplied—at Christmas time, Judy Bond officials took to giving out
turkeys, like an old Tammany ward heeler. 92
“The People Are Scared to Death”
By early 1962, the runaway had become a fait accompli. Judy Bond was producing all its
blouses in the South, shipping them from Birmingham pending completion of the plant
expansion in Brewton. Unable to force the company back north, the ILG adopted a three-pronged
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strategy. First, it would hound Judy Bond in the courts, seeking to make the company pay for
violating its prior union contract, with the goal of setting an expensive example for budding
runaways. Second, it would mount a boycott campaign, “appealing to all shoppers not to buy
Judy Bond” while the union was on strike against the company. Third, it would try to organize
the workers in Brewton and elsewhere into the ILG. 93
The ILG launched into all three efforts simultaneously. By mid-year, the union had
secured a $108,761 judgment—nearly a million dollars in today’s currency—against Judy Bond
for funneling orders to non-union shops while still under contract with the ILG. The award,
ordered by industry impartial chairman George Mintzer, was “one of the heaviest ever imposed
on an apparel producer under the industry collective agreements,” explained Women’s Wear
Daily. Two years later, Mintzer would award the union an additional $40,000. Judy Bond fought
the award bitterly, accusing Mintzer of misconduct and complaining of the union’s supposed
dictatorial power. A collective bargaining agreement in the garment industry “was not a contract
reached between equals,” Judy Bond claimed, “but one where union bargaining power was so far
superior to the association … as to have the contract, in effect, dictated by the union”—a rich
claim, given the ILG’s quiet strategy of suppressing wages in New York in a vain attempt to
stem the runaways. The firm also appealed to the government’s ongoing anti-trust prosecution,
foreshadowing the position of the Slate Belt contractors who quietly hoped for the prosecution to
succeed in dismantling their union contracts. 94
Judy Bond pursued its claims all the way to the US Supreme Court, which declined to
hear the case, allowing a state Supreme Court ruling to stand and forcing the firm to pay. The
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recriminations over arbitration, too, had the feel of a family dispute, with Judy Bond grumbling
that Mintzer’s sympathies lay with the ILG. Mintzer was indeed close to the union, having been
honored on stage at its conventions, for example. Then again, Jack and Millard Rothenberg had
once been close to the ILG, lunching casually with its officers and spending weekends at its
summer resort. The real issue was the break-up of the familiar Northeastern dispensation and the
industry’s ongoing relocation to a new geographical and political regime. The role of the
impartial chairman, close to both parties, whose decisions one could live with, if not enjoy, was
one of the features of the New Deal settlement employers like Judy Bond now sought to escape
and worked only in the context of this larger consensual framework. The Northeast, in other
words, was not just a place—it was an idea, a collection of organizations, a set of norms, and a
set of practices that by the 1960s could no longer permit profitable operation of a clothing
manufacturer. 95
At the same time, the ILG tried to bring Judy Bond’s southern workers into the union
fold. The first obstacle was the United Garment Workers (UGW), an old AFL union whose
narrow outlook and penchant for corruption was anathema to the broader, more politicized
notion of trade union activity that motivated the newer industrial unions like the ILG and the
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, the latter born of a split from the UGW in 1914.
When Judy Bond leased the Brewton plant, the company inherited the Baskind firm’s
relationship with the UGW, which had represented workers there since 1957. For Judy Bond, the
UGW, whose contract paled the northeastern ILG agreements in terms of wages, hours, and
conditions, represented an opportunity. Working with local UGW representatives, Millard
Rothenberg quickly concluded a renewal that locked in terms inferior in every way to the firm’s
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previous ILG contracts. Even better, re-establishing the UGW as the formal agent of Brewton
workers would, in a de facto way, enlist the federal government as a bulwark against the ILG. 96
By purchasing Brewton Fashions, Judy Bond had not just bought a building—it had
bought a company union, a pliant labor organization willing to sign “sweetheart” contracts and
provide insurance against the ILG. At Judy Bond’s temporary Birmingham warehouse, managers
herded workers into the office and instructed them to sign up with the UGW on pain of losing
their jobs. “I ain’t never seen anything get organized as easy as this,” one worker commented
wryly. Other southern manufacturers were even more frank. Nat Nast, a maker of bowling shirts,
gathered his employees and told them they had three options—keep the UGW, sign up with an
explicit company union, or invite the ILG and lose their jobs to non-union contractors. Nast had
previously written George Meany personally to beg the labor chief not to “rock the boat,”
offering to put Meany in touch with his creditors to substantiate his pleas. 97
The ILG waged a bitter fight, led by Dubinsky himself, to oust the UGW at Brewton.
This fight was waged not on the shop floor, but in what passed for the halls of power in the labor
movement. ILG officials bombarded UGW president Joseph McCurdy with telegrams accusing
the union of abetting a runaway and helping to break the strike at Judy Bond. “Basic concepts of
trade union morality” demanded that the UGW withdraw immediately, thundered Dubinsky.
Receiving no reply, Dubinsky took his case straight to the top, enlisting AFL-CIO head George
Meany, who shepherded the ILG complaint through the organization’s dispute resolution
mechanisms. UGW leaders had played dumb when confronted with the charge, disavowing any
knowledge that it was Judy Bond with whom they were dealing, prompting Dubinsky to call
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McCurdy a “crook” and a “coward” to the latter’s face during a series of heated meetings.
Despite agreeing that the UGW had lied to all concerned, an umpire ruled that the ILG did not
have an “established relationship” with the workers at the new plant and could not summarily
dislodge the UGW. Realizing that this meant sanctioning the runaway, Meany created a special
committee with himself as chair that reversed the umpire’s decision and encouraged the ILG to
capture Brewton from an unrepentant UGW. Bureaucratic prowess had removed one obstacle to
winning back Judy Bond. 98
“BIG NEW YORK UNION TRYING TO DESTROY ALABAMA INDUSTRY” was
the message from the UGW to workers in Brewton. “This STRANGER in our MIDST,” stressed
a second flyer, was “attempting to coerce Judy Bond into abandoning its operations in Alabama
and returning North.” For the next several years, Judy Bond, the UGW, the Brewton Standard,
and town oligarchs would work together to leverage fear as the motor of cost savings for the
company and return on investment for bondholders. “The image of the big New York Union
trying to deprive the local citizenry of employment is still our biggest organizational handicap,”
complained Southeast Region director Martin Morand to Dubinsky in 1965, after three years of
unsuccessful attempts to sign up enough Brewton workers to trigger a representation election in
the plant. 99
The intimidation largely worked. During the opening months of 1962, ILG organizers
worked the plant gates, handing out leaflets and copies of Justice, the ILG newspaper. They were
able to secure the allegiance of a small but important minority of workers. When two of them,
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Fay Madden and Lynn Estes, attempted to wear ILG buttons inside the plant, they met with a
violent reaction that descended into a “near-riot,” in the words of company attorneys. Several
women seized Madden and held her while others tore the ILG button from her dress. The
assailants repeated the maneuver with Estes. Later that day, Estes and four other “outspoken”
ILG partisans were physically ejected from the plant by angry co-workers. This scene was
repeated in the ensuing weeks. 100
Workers were clear they feared the ILG would jeopardize their jobs. Their fears were
justified. While the assaults on ILG members were not organized directly by the company, Judy
Bond and its allies worked to create a context in which they came to seem a matter of survival.
The message from Brewton elites was plain—do not take the town’s newfound fortune “for
granted,” the Brewton Standard warned in an editorial that chided Brewton residents for their
alleged sense of entitlement. Within weeks of the ILG’s appearance in town, the local Chamber
of Commerce mounted anti-union meetings in which E. V. Lovelace, Jack Hines, and other
Chamber bigwigs told workers flatly the plant would close if they signed up with the ILG. “Mr.
Hines did most of the talking and was the one the boys told me said the best thing they could
[do] was leave Brewton and not come back,” reported an ILG sympathizer who managed to
sneak into the meeting. When Dorothy Dewberry, an ILG convert, appeared on a Pensacola
television program to reveal conditions in the plant, a meeting took place at City Hall after which
“nobody would have anything to do with me.” These meetings continued for years—“the
Chamber of Commerce has come out openly fighting us,” lamented Brewton organizer Alice
York to her superior in 1965. “And the people are scared to death, even the organizing
committee is falling apart. It’s just plain hell.” It is possible the “boys” gathered by the Chamber
“Brief of Petitioner Brewton Fashions, Inc.,” Box 41, Folder 1, ILGWU Southeast Region Records, Collection
5780/058.
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of Commerce to absorb the anti-ILG gospel included local unionists. According to Alice York,
the ILG could not expect unqualified support from other Brewton unionists, who existed at the
sufferance of oligarchs who had handed them their posts “on a silver platter” in exchange for
sweetheart deals. 101
Judy Bond’s main enforcer on the shop floor was plant manager James Byrd, a holdover
from the Baskind days. Men like Byrd, who emerged as a kind of frontline specialist in union
suppression, were indispensable to the Jack and Millard Rothenbergs of the world in their new
roles as employers of non-union Southern labor. On paper at least, the National Labor Relations
Act prohibited employers from firing workers for joining or advocating a union. Byrd’s
technique, therefore, consisted in devising ways to punish employees for flirting with the ILG
without creating a paper trail that would lay bare the company’s habitual violation of the law.
The arsenal included surveillance, harassment, intimidation, blacklisting, and the services of
private detectives who formed part of the infrastructure of the runaway movement.
When Aurora Nall was spotted riding in the car of an ILG organizer, for example, Byrd
stood by her machine for days at a time, glaring over her work. She was soon fired on invented
charges of forging her production record. Prior to this, a warehouse supervisor had warned Nall
that she was “talking myself right out of a job.” The same man told Louise Blair she had the
“stink of organizing labor” on her and would never work in Brewton again. Judy Bond could
count on local elites to intervene on its behalf in the personal lives of employees, utilizing
relationships of indebtedness as a disciplinary tool. In one instance, Grace Kast, an open ILG
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supporter, received a letter from her bank asking her to come in for a meeting. When she arrived,
the bank officer interrogated her about her support for the union. Kast was the main breadwinner
in the family—her husband, who owed money at the bank, had been disabled during the Second
World War and could work only part time. Later, the Kasts’ mailbox was destroyed by vandals.
The “undercover white female agent” from the Mark Lipman Service, with offices in New York,
Atlanta, Memphis, and Little Rock, on the other hand, was mostly a bust, injuring herself on the
third day and uncovering little of use to Jack and Millard Rothenberg. 102
When the temporary layoffs endemic to the garment industry affected work at Brewton,
suspected ILG partisans were invariably first on the chopping block. If they returned, they found,
like other workers, that their piece rates had been lowered. Despite the promises of year-round
employment made by the Brewton Standard and others, ordinary workers fell victim to periodic
layoffs as well. In general, Byrd and the company fought laid-off workers’ unemployment claims
bitterly before the Alabama Department of Industrial Relations. At other times, the plant
manager reveled in the leverage the state’s meager unemployment benefits gave the company.
When Christmas layoffs came in 1965, ILG organizer Josephine Clark reported, many of the
“girls,” as managers called them, were “begging for work” since “it is their only means of
support.” “Good girls” would be called back, Byrd explained, but their wages would be reset to
the $1.25 an hour minimum. “If any ladies don’t want to come in and work for $1.25, he invited
them to just say so,” Clark related, “and he would be happy to help them collect their
‘pennies.’” 103
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Despite the prevalence of overt repression, Judy Bond’s ultimate trump card was always
the threat that it would abandon Brewton altogether. Whenever the ILG secured a foothold, Byrd
and the Rothenbergs barraged employees with threats to close the plant. “Remember—it is the
Company, and only the Company, that can pay you wages, provide you with benefits and give
you steady work,” Byrd told employees. “The record of the ILGWU in the blouse industry is one
of decline, business failures and the elimination of jobs for many union members,” he argued in
another circular. In the same letter, Byrd rattled off the names of non-union blouse firms.
Membership in the New York-based NABM was collapsing, he explained, and along with it the
ILG’s grasp on the industry. “These are facts!” he emphasized. 104
In truth, Byrd contended, neither Jack nor Millard Rothenberg was really the boss of
workers in Brewton. There were nearly seven hundred firms producing blouses in the United
States, sewing around two hundred million garments a year. The average consumer, when
passing through the doors of a department store, was confronted with twelve to fifteen competing
brands. “Do you really think the consumer would pay the additional $.75 or $1?” to help garment
workers, he asked. “This is the competitive situation in which we live and work every day and it
imposes restraints on what we can and what we cannot do,” Byrd explained. In the end, the
market—this “free enterprise system” which had brought “great benefits to this great country”—
ruled them all. 105
The ILG’s boycott campaign, despite its magnitude, met with similar intransigence. At its
inception, ILG publicists boasted of the union’s hundreds of thousands of “women members”
and the backing of other labor organizations “with a combined membership of more than
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17,000,000.” Translating this potential into an effectively scaled boycott proved difficult,
however. The campaign was aimed at three targets. Shoppers were urged to reject Judy Bond
blouses while retailers were urged not to offer them, or, failing that, not to promote them. “Why
buy what’s harder to sell?” was the ILG pitch. The union also implored unionized trucking firms
not to transport Judy Bond goods. 106
Despite the massive promotional efforts—millions of leaflets and shopping bags,
thousands of volunteer hours—the boycott campaign scored clear successes only in New York
City, where the ILG was part of the city’s social fabric, in other union-dense cities like Fall
River, Massachusetts and Birmingham, Alabama, and in “small towns dominated by one or two
union industries,” such as the coal towns of western Pennsylvania and southern Illinois. The
campaign was more popular among small businesspeople than the large stores whose pricing
policies helped drive factory relocation. Small businesses tended to be more isolated, more
vulnerable, and more responsive to customers than the large stores that punished the
independents with scale efficiencies and whose decision makers were often several times
removed from the shop floor. 107
The strategies of the big New York department stores illustrate how large retailers could
absorb, if not relish, the ILG’s agitational picketing. Their main goal was to limit disruption and
wait out the storm. This translated into a slippery approach designed to placate the ILG, Judy
Bond, and shoppers as the short-term context demanded. Over time, ILG representatives became
wearily accustomed to this runaround. By disrupting commerce through picketing, although this
activity was circumscribed by byzantine legal rules codified in the recent Landrum-Griffin Act,
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the ILG could sometimes wrangle a meeting with store managers. At Macy’s Herald Square
flagship, for example, store managers generally declined to call the police when women
volunteers from the ILG approached shoppers inside the store, a strategy that did not always stop
bribe-hungry officers from showing up to demand payments on pain of arrest. Many of these
Manhattan ILG stalwarts, like Camila Belen and Rosita Rodriguez, were drawn from the union’s
growing corps of Spanish-speaking garment workers. Whereas the employees of Judy Bond’s
Pennsylvania contractors were mostly white women, the roster of the firm’s Manhattan
contractors, like Oscar Sipos, reveals a heavily Latina workforce. These women endured hostility
from salespeople and sometimes physical abuse from customers to deliver the boycott
message. 108
Macy’s officials declaimed sympathy with the out-of-work garment workers as well as
their southern cousins. But no retailer wanted to be the first to come out for higher wages. They
faced a collective action problem analogous to the one confronted by jobbers—in an industry
whose basic dynamics enacted a race to the bottom, to buck the trend on one’s own was to risk
suicide. On April 19, 1964, ILG representatives met with Macy’s personnel director G. G.
Michelson—later a deputy chairwoman of the New York Federal Reserve, member of the New
York State Financial Control Board, and chair of Columbia University’s Board of Trustees—and
a Macy’s vice-president named Fisher. The executives insisted Macy’s “did not want to get
involved” and that “no sides would be taken”—a stance, of course, that meant effectively taking
Judy Bond’s side. ILG representatives sought to appeal to executives’ sense of “ethics and
morals,” but the two worried that opening the door for moralism would put the firm on a slippery
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slope of “giving in to others.” Challenging the executives, an ILG representative said “supposing
I tell you, you were buying from a firm owned by out and out murderers and gangsters”—not an
idle hypothesis, given the reality of the garment business. If it were “convenient for Macy’s,” it
would be “OK,” shrugged Fisher. 109
Did the boycott hurt Judy Bond? The evidence suggests that the ILG was able to create
real but ultimately manageable problems for the firm during the first two years of its southern
transition. Some of the problems were logistical. Even an industry as technically unsophisticated
as garment manufacture required some production expertise, as evidenced by the way that Judy
Bond imported experienced northern contractors to oversee its southern plants. Moreover, there
is evidence that the women first attracted to the ILG came from a burgeoning elite of production
workers. Lynn Estes was a cutter—Dubinsky’s own profession and one widely acknowledged to
contain the “aristocrats” of the garment trade. Other early ILG members ousted from the plant
included “service girls,” whose demeaning name belied an important role in speeding garments’
progression through the more elaborate division of labor that characterized the larger, nonmetropolitan plants. A Northern analogue would have been the machinists and maintenance men
described in the last chapter, whose confidence, skill, mobility, and independence made them
among the likeliest early converts to a movement that could marshal these talents in their own
interests. When Estes and the other ILG partisans were thrown out of the plant by fellow workers
fearful for their jobs, production dropped by around half “and the quality of the work has
suffered,” reported an organizer. 110
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While production problems plagued the Brewton plant, Jack Rothenberg travelled across
the South seeking contractors to fill the breach. Smaller plants like Jamel Inc. in Spartanburg,
South Carolina were more vulnerable than Judy Bond, lacking the conscious ruling class united
front the company enjoyed in Brewton. In Spartanburg, pro and anti-union Jamel workers settled
their quarrels in the streets, prompting the city council to pass a strict picketing law that would
limit the ILG’s ability to interrupt production. The violence was not limited to South Carolina. In
Birmingham, site of the company’s temporary warehouse, a driver loyal to Judy Bond told
investigators ILG pickets had beaten him with steel pipes and thrown him from a moving
vehicle. The turmoil at Brewton and the southern contractors sent a perturbed Jack Rothenberg,
who felt the situation had become “red hot,” on a desperate journey across Alabama to ferret out
new plants or contractors. At every stop he was tailed and harassed by ILG pickets, who
managed to convince some contractors Judy Bond work was not worth the headache. At the
same time, the production problems prompted some stores to return Judy Bond blouses for what
union representatives believed was “inferior workmanship.” In an industry as competitive as
clothing, even a temporary absence from shelves might prove dangerous. 111
In the end, however, Judy Bond recovered, stabilized, and outlasted the union. In periodic
circulars to retailers, the firm projected confidence, noting that women’s apparel was
increasingly made in non-union plants and praising the Macy’s line against concessions, which it
warned would end in union control of production. To cushion the effect of the boycott, the firm
began manufacturing blouses under alternative names, like “Brookby Classics.” The company
frequently filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board seeking to prevent the ILG
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from picketing retailers. And it assured retailers outside New York that the ILG could mount a
sustained critical mass of pickets only in New York City. This was basically true—in the end, the
union did not have the capacity for sustained nationwide disruption. Outside New York, some
ILG officials themselves were lukewarm on contributing to the campaign, reflecting the way the
fragmentation of the industry fragmented the union’s ability to govern it. By 1969, Millard
Rothenberg could sigh with satisfaction—labor relations were “nice and quiet.” “I always had
the feeling I’d make it,” the Judy Bond heir told Women’s Wear Daily. “I did have a little head
start.” 112
One-half of One Percent
The next year, Millard Rothenberg was dead. Control of the firm passed to his sister
Elaine and her husband Robert Postal, previously a Judy Bond vice president. Ultimately, Judy
Bond’s sojourn in Brewton lasted fewer than twenty-five years. The battle over unionization
remained at a simmer, with a minority of women remaining committed to the ILG and the firm
fighting them all the way. The battle lines remained unchanged. In 1978, during one of the ILG’s
periodic offensives, employees told James Byrd, now Judy Bond’s Vice President for
Manufacturing, that if they had a union they would have a retirement plan. Byrd reached into his
desk, pulled out a “Don’t Buy Judy Bond” boycott flyer from 1962, and brandished it at the
employees, telling them that had it been up to the ILG, they would not have jobs at all. That
same year, managers forced a speed-up, eliminating jobs for some and doubling up work for
those who remained. When the company told cutting room workers their jobs would now include
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hauling bundles weighing anywhere between three and seven hundred pounds into the sewing
room, most refused and partnered up to push the cumbersome carts. Managers seized the
opportunity to fire Kathleen Chavers, an ILG mainstay already fired and reinstated by the courts
during the 1960s battles. In a perverse twist, Judy Bond insisted that to deny Chavers the
opportunity to push a five hundred-pound cart would constitute gender discrimination under the
1964 Civil Rights Act. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and ordered the
reinstatement of Chavers and another fired employee. 113
The 1978 speed-up was not enough to save the jobs in Alabama, however. The ability to
scour the globe in search of cheap sewing labor clothing curtailed the amount of time jobs were
likely to remain in any one geographical location—a phenomenon that some economists call
“premature deindustrialization.” Already, by the late 1960s, southern garment producers were
complaining of a “labor shortage” that threatened their profitability. “Labor shortage” has a
specific and relative meaning in the context of capitalist competition, however. These executives
did not mean that there were no women willing to work—they meant that in the context of the
burgeoning industrialization of the South, competition among employers for their labor in the
region’s metropolitan centers threatened to squeeze profit margins below what might be achieved
by exploiting cheaper labor elsewhere. 114
This reality was driven home in Brewton when Judy Bond opened two factories in Haiti
in 1984. For US apparel makers, Haiti, with fifty percent unemployment and the world’s lowest
per capita income, was a golden opportunity. Judy Bond, Kellwood, and other veterans of the
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struggle against the ILG in the southern United States flocked to the island, a “low-wage capital
of the world” where pay severely lagged the now-maturing apparel centers of Taiwan, Hong
Kong, and South Korea. When the Reagan administration established the Caribbean Basin
Initiative in 1983, apparel was not among the products on which tariffs were eliminated. Still, US
Tariff Schedule 807, which permitted reductions on apparel sewn from textiles cut in the United
States, became the vehicle for the explosion of clothing manufacture in Haiti. During the mid1980s, a coalition of retailers and textile and apparel producers secured additional quota and
tariff reductions under the “Super 807” provisions of the administration’s new Special Access
Program for Central America and the Caribbean. In Haiti, the Duvalier regime sweetened the
deal with a fifteen-year tax exemption for foreign manufacturers. 115
The Caribbean Basin Initiative and its offspring secured freedom of movement for capital
while seeking to deny it for people—whether the hundreds of thousands of Haitian refugees the
Reagan administration hoped would stay put or the union organizers for whom Haiti was even
further out of reach than southern Alabama. If Alabama was Pennsylvania on steroids, Haiti was
an overdose. In 1984, the island was ruled by “president-for-life” Jean-Claude “Baby Doc”
Duvalier, who inherited the presidency from his father François, popularly known as “Papa
Doc.” Under the Duvaliers, “workers who attempted to organize were routinely murdered by
state-sponsored death squads,” according to the US-based National Labor Committee, a group
funded in part by American trade unions. To win inclusion in the CBI, Baby Doc made vague
promises to respect the right of workers to organize. This was largely a farce. 116
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In 1995, investigators from the National Labor Committee visited Port-au-Prince, where
contractors for Judy Bond, Kellwood, and other garment giants stitched clothing for sale at
prominent US retailers, including Sears, Wal-Mart, and J. C. Penney. Despite a minimum wage
of 36 gourdes, or $2.40 per day, instituted by Baby Doc in 1980 as cracks surfaced in his rule,
the Committee found that more than half of US garment firms in Haiti ignored the law, even as
inflation eroded the real value of the minimum wage by half between 1980 and 1996. At Quality
Garment, a large Haitian contractor, workers averaged 25 gourdes per day, seven of which went
to transportation and six to a small plate of rice and beans and a glass of juice, which for many
workers constituted the only meal of the day. Factory owners, who pined for the days of Baby
Doc, deposed in 1986, complained that workers were too hungry to meet their production quotas,
which owners repeatedly augmented in order to cancel out minimum wage gains ordered by
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. To make ends meet, some workers reported working fifty days
straight while their bosses ignored the country’s overtime laws—“scraps on a piece of paper,” as
an ILG Pennsylvania veteran had once put it. Seventeen percent of women factory workers in
one Port-au-Prince neighborhood reported being forced to have sex with their bosses, who
routinely called them “bitch,” “whore,” and “dog.” On orders from their bosses, workers sewed
“Made in USA” tags into the garments they churned out. In a world where capital fostered such
important but alienated relationships between producer and consumer, who was to know? The
National Labor Committee calculated that workers sewing Disney-branded pajamas in one
Haitian factory were paid one-half of one percent of the garments’ selling price. Their salaries
trailed that of Michael Eisner, the Disney chief (and grandson of American Safety Razor’s
Milton Dammann), by a factor of 325,000. 117
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At the top of this pyramid was Andrew Postal, Jack Rothenberg’s grandson and now Judy
Bond’s president. Postal was a leader in securing the political conditions that facilitated the
exploitation of Haitian workers by firms like his. He was a prime mover in Caribbean/Latin
American Action, a lobbying organization for US apparel makers seeking Caribbean production
sites. In Senate testimony, Postal noted that Haiti’s chief appeal for garment makers was its lack
of natural resources or other “strategic location features,” which left Haitians little to fall back on
besides the ability to sell themselves cheaper than other Caribbean workers. Like contractors on
the ground, Postal preferred dictatorship to the popular government of President Aristide. When
the Haitian military deposed the new president by force in 1991, Judy Bond was among the firms
that worked to resist international sanctions while Postal disparaged Aristide in the press. After
bucking the sanctions for three years, Judy Bond withdrew from Haiti under pressure, relying
instead on its production sites in China, Macau, Thailand, the Philippines, and Mexico. When the
sanctions were lifted, Postal sought financial incentives from the US government to return so
Judy Bond could continue to “give the Haitian people the opportunity they deserve.” 118
In 1995, an investigator from the National Labor Committee shelled out the $600 to
attend the annual Miami Conference on the Caribbean and Latin America in that city’s swanky
Hotel Intercontinental. Postal, perhaps unaware of the presence of human rights workers in the
audience, informed the gathered manufacturers that he told retail buyers not to worry so much
about bad publicity stemming from exposure of working conditions in a place like Haiti. In the
end, he explained, customers did not really care about such things—they cared about the number
on the price tag. A better answer, given the stagnating real wages in the US to which he had
helped contribute, was probably that customers shopping at Wal-Mart could not afford to care
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about much besides the price of a blouse. At any rate, Judy Bond’s problems would not be
Postal’s for much longer—in 1995, the firm was acquired by the Bonaventura Group, a Hong
Kong-based apparel producer. Today, Postal works as a financial consultant to apparel firms like
the one he used to run. Back in Brewton, meanwhile, the Alabama factory was not long for the
world once Judy Bond jumped the border. By 1987, Dun & Bradstreet could no longer find
Brewton Fashions, Inc. “Investigation on April 24 1987 revealed subject has discontinued
operations at captioned address,” reported the rating agency’s investigator. “Directory assistance
has no listing. Unpaid obligations, if any, unknown.” 119
Collapse of the High Road
Throughout the history of the garment industry, the size, juridical form, and geographical
location of firms appear as a perpetual, bewildering flux. These shifts become intelligible,
though, in the context of the relentless pressure to cut costs—or, more accurately, to shift those
costs away from owners and onto workers—that are imposed by capitalist competition. One way
to cut costs is to engage in a perpetual search for vulnerability—for workers whose
circumstances make them desperate. Once brought into the labor force and made to compete for
a scarce number of jobs, this vulnerability—the willingness to take anything one can get, as an
alternative to non-survival—becomes leverage against existing workers whose victories have
heretofore depended on their relative indispensability. One goal of the New Deal settlement, with
its effective restrictions on the size of the garment workforce, was to buttress that
indispensability. From this perspective, runaways were fundamentally about increasing the size
of the labor force. Their basic principle was to increase pressure on workers by putting them
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competition with one another. The serial emigrations of Judy Bond, from New York to
Pennsylvania to Alabama to Haiti and beyond, put workers in each of those places in competition
with one another, enabling the firm’s owners to maintain their power to profit.
The New Deal settlement I have described in this chapter was a phenomenon at once
economic, political, cultural, and geographical. Economic, because it sought to limit the size of
the labor force to engineer an equilibrium to permit conditions that surpassed those that emerged
from an era of freer competition. Political, because it relied on New York’s unique socialdemocratic tradition and the political class it hatched—people like Herbert Lehman, George
Mintzer, and David Dubinsky himself. Cultural, because union legitimacy and union power were
part of the common sense of New Yorkers—even, as we have seen, factory owners themselves—
in a way unparalleled in other parts of the United States, even today. And geographical, because
it was crucial for the ILG to fix garment work in space unless and until it could establish in other
parts of the United States the power it enjoyed in the Northeast. The alternative was what
occurred—a precipitous return to the pre-union days, in which the only way to survive was to
treat workers more poorly than one’s competitors.
In retrospect, it is clear that this stab at a high road to profitability was fragile and shortlived. One hesitates even to call it a high road, given the way workers and owners alike tended to
flee the industry and encourage their children to pursue other paths. But why did it prove so
fragile? As we have seen, technical conditions in the garment industry made it especially
footloose. The legacy of previous struggles, especially the failure to organize the South,
preserved the wage differentials that made running away so attractive. In New York, part of what
made the New Deal settlement vulnerable was that it was elite-led—brokered by firm owners,
union leaders, and sympathetic elites in politics and the law. When its terms began to falter, there
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was no constituency, no movement, that could meaningfully oppose its disintegration—or
imagine a more durable solution. To its critics, the ILG had dug its own grave by suppressing
rank-and-file activism and casting its lot with political elites. The only organization with a lifeor-death interest policing the settlement was the union, thrusting the burden of regulating a
chaotic and now worldwide industry onto garment workers themselves. To attempt this on a
firm-by-firm basis piled on the difficulty.
At the broadest level, the collapse of the New Deal settlement in the garment industry
indicated that collective bargaining alone could not secure a reasonable and reliable subsistence
for the workers who stitched the clothes that protected their fellow inhabitants from heat, cold,
rain, and whatever else may come. A more durable solution had to be a political one, perhaps
even a revolutionary one—curtailing production for profit, finding a way to release social
reproduction from the straitjacket of the profitability of private firms. Ultimately, the union, as
much as the manufacturers themselves, was a creature of the political economy of the clothing
trade—more a loyal opposition than a motor of transformation. Unless it could find a way to
breech the rules of the game themselves, the runaway juggernaut was as inevitable as it
eventually came to seem.
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Chapter Three
“If Profit is the Only Name of the Game, God Help America”: Organizing the Unorganized
in the Era of Deindustrialization
A look at New York’s major newspapers for the third week of March 1972 reveals a city
in the grip of a gathering crisis. “Meat Kicks Cost of Living to the Sky,” warned the Daily News,
while a Post editorial described “A Lengthening Shadow of Unemployment” and implored the
state’s Congressional delegation to do something about it. Testifying before a Congressional
committee that week, Mayor Abe Beame lashed out at the credit rating agencies for downgrading
the city’s bond rating, which he revealed had cost the city $41 million in increased interest
charges over the past year. Meanwhile, a representative of those agencies told a nationwide
gathering of bankers and municipal officials that unless the federal government assumed
responsibility for the spiraling welfare and transportation costs of the major cities, “the ability of
the banks to finance the municipalities” would be in jeopardy. Within three years his prediction
would come to pass, as the banks refused to market the city’s bonds, precipitating the legendary
New York City fiscal crisis. 1
The same week, Oklahoma Senator Fred Harris travelled to New York to hold hearings
on the subject of runaway plants. The hearings, the first in a set of three that would take the
senator from New York to Newark and then Chicago, focused on the decisions of two companies
to shutter their plants in New York City. The first was Bendix, the Michigan-based multinational
that had decided to shift production of its car-ignition systems from a recently-acquired plant in
Queens to a new facility in San Luis Potosí, Mexico. The second, the Joseph Schlitz Brewing
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Company, had announced the previous December it would close its Brooklyn facility and shift
production to breweries in Texas, North Carolina, and Tennessee.
Harris's opening statement evolved into a disquisition on the problems of the capitalist
state. After introducing Theodore Kheel, the New York-based labor mediator who helped
arrange the hearings, Harris outlined the ways in which both citizens and governments depend on
the health—in other words, on the profitability—of the businesses in their midst. “We are here
today to discuss and investigate some of the most basic problems the ordinary person in this
country faces,” he began. “The fact is,” he continued, “that every community, large or small, is
utterly dependent for its economic, political, and social life on the companies that employ its
workers. People simply would not live there and they would not tax themselves to pay for public
services if there were not big employers there.” 2
Harris continued, outlining the hidden subsidies to private business that form part of the
everyday workings of government in a capitalist society—the ways in which companies sought
relentlessly to claw back costs, actual and potential, via gifts from the citizenry organized and
administered by the state. “The local government builds roads and sewers,” he noted, and “hires
police and firemen,” while “the school board builds schools and hires teachers to help educate
the children of that company's workers.” Harris called for an honest accounting of these costs as
well as the way in which companies appropriated the fruits of these efforts for private gain.
Firms like Bendix and Schlitz, whose representatives occupied the hot seat for that day's
hearings, demanded extraordinary commitments from municipalities, Harris argued, all the while
reserving the right to void their end of the bargain abruptly and at will by shifting production—
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and the jobs on which these communities depended—to distant locales the moment it became
profitable, leaving workers and governments alike bereft. 3
“What are the corporation's responsibilities to the people it leaves behind?” Harris asked.
“Can we develop ways to make corporations pay the full cost of moving away?” Harris was
talking about what economists call “externalities,” or costs that are not borne by those who stand
to benefit from a given economic decision. Externalities are essentially a response to
competition, which imposes remorseless pressure on businesses to cut costs. One way to do this
is to dump those costs onto others, increasing the proportion of returns that can be converted into
profit. Colloquial versions of this idea had gained currency in the past decade under the moniker
“corporate welfare,” a phrase popularly attributed to the consumer advocate Ralph Nader.
“Socialism for the rich and capitalism for the poor” was how the socialist Michael Harrington
put it in his popular 1963 book The Other America. Harris cited recent efforts to elaborate and
share more equitably the costs of environmental pollution, the classic example of a negative
externality, in which a group of people engaged in a business venture sloughs off the real costs of
its activities onto everyone else—all the while reserving the right to keep the profits from those
activities in private hands. The Clean Air Act, signed by President Nixon two years prior, had
signaled the willingness of Congress and large swaths of the public to compel polluting
companies to account for the true costs of their activities in service of a qualitative, noneconomic goal. Harris now proposed to apply the same logic to runaway plants. “We can make
corporations pay the real costs of moving away just as we are now starting to make them pay the
real costs of pollution,” he argued. Harris promised to introduce legislation later that year
requiring federal charters for any corporation involved in interstate commerce. These charters
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would, he hinted, “be the appropriate place to set out its responsibilities to workers and
communities it leaves behind.” Harris, the son of Oklahoman sharecroppers and an avatar of
what he called the “new populism,” sought a 1970s version of the old populist dream of
democratic control over capitalist enterprise, using the state as a vehicle. 4
It might not have seemed obvious at first why Harris, a senator from a midwestern state
whose economy depended primarily on natural resource extraction, should have been interested
in the urban poor of New York City. Harris's background, however, had converged with his
ambition and his legislative experience to prepare him to address these issues and to propose a
solution in what he called a “new populism”—a term that had begun to permeate American
political and intellectual circles during the early 1970s. Harris, born to sharecroppers in the midst
of the Depression and raised in the aptly-named Cotton County, Oklahoma, had direct links to
the old agrarian Populist movement that rocked American politics during the 1890s. Intensely
ambitious, he worked his way through law school on scholarships and by age twenty-six had
gotten himself elected to the Oklahoma State Senate, where he won a reputation for tempering
that ambition with dedication to unpopular but morally righteous causes. When Robert Kerr, the
doyen of Oklahoma Democratic politics and “uncrowned king” of the US Senate, died suddenly
of a heart attack on New Year's Day in 1964, Harris sought the seat and rode the Lyndon
Johnson landslide to defeat former Oklahoma Sooners football coach Bud Wilkinson in the
general election—no small feat considering that Wilkinson had delivered three national
championships to the football-mad state. 5
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As a senator, Harris developed a reputation for hard work and fealty to his patron in the
White House. Within two years he had won a seat on the prestigious Finance Committee, under
whose banner he now wielded the gavel in New York that morning. Loyalty to Johnson,
awareness of the President's vindictiveness, and attention to the growing conservatism of his
home state had initially kept Harris tethered to Johnson's agenda, including support for the
increasingly unpopular war in Vietnam. But when over a hundred American cities exploded in
violent protest during the summer of 1967, Harris joined fellow Senate liberals to demand an
effort to learn why the outbursts had occurred. During his time on the newly-formed National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, popularly known as the Kerner Commission, Harris
found a sympathetic companion in New York mayor John Lindsay. Together, Harris and Lindsay
became the two most active members of the commission, visiting the affected neighborhoods and
conducting in-depth interviews with sometimes hostile residents. Recalling these extended field
trips through riot-scarred cities, Harris told an interviewer in 2008 that “jobs is what we heard
everywhere.” His resistance to Johnson's preferred explanation for the riots—that they had been
planned in advance and foisted upon unsophisticated ghetto dwellers by “outside agitators,” that
favorite mythical figure of the politician with an incentive to ignore root causes—marked his
first significant break from Johnson, whose presidency would collapse in March of 1968, one
month after the release of the Kerner Commission report, whose findings he had ignored. For
Harris, however, his experiences on the Commission alerted him to the crisis of joblessness that
afflicted American cities at a time when most national politicians, reassured by armies of
economic advisors, assumed the problem of unemployment had basically been solved. 6
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Harris used the hearing to urge a rational accounting of the costs and benefits of private
enterprise as practiced in the United States. His first witness, Kenneth Patton, a one-time
neighborhood activist and now Economic Development Administrator for New York City,
offered a similar plea for investigation, planning, conscious control over investment, and
attention to human need freed from the straitjacket of profitability, calling for “an affirmative
program for dealing with the problems of the environment, plant modernization and
technological change in places where people are right now.” Patton complained that the federal
government operated as a mechanism for the geographical redistribution of wealth, funneling
revenue away from the country's large cities towards less-developed areas. New York City had
261,000 private business establishments, he explained, but its “single greatest export” was taxes
paid to the national government, which turned around and used the money to subsidize the
concessions offered by other states to lure manufacturing establishments away from their
erstwhile urban locales. Moreover, he argued, the human cost of such policies fell most heavily
on those who could least afford the consequences. Cities like New York were shedding their
roles as vehicles of upward mobility for the migrant poor. The interstate highway system, “paid
for, again I might mention, by our tax dollars,” Patton said, had freed manufacturing from its
once-settled locational constraints. The mobility of people, on the other hand, had not caught up
with the mobility of capital. Migrants, whether from the American South or abroad, continued to
settle in New York in hopes of obtaining work that, however grueling or abusive, promised an
improvement on their previous situation. The asset-less poor could not afford to pick up and
relocate along with industry to suburbs that discriminatory zoning practices and the costs of
automobile ownership placed out of their reach. The taxpayer-subsidized migration of industry to
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the suburbs and to once-rural areas had turned cities like New York from sites of opportunity
into social traps. 7
Like Harris, Patton lamented the apparent contradictions between the logic of capital
accumulation and the set of basic expectations regarding trust, fairness, and accountability that
many humans, to the chagrin of their employers, stubbornly continue to bring to their
relationships with others. The decision to relocate “is often made in a highly technical, that is to
say almost inhuman, fashion,” he complained, citing the unseemly competition that reduced
states and municipalities to beggars. Like Harris, he sought an antidote in coordinated
government activity to the seemingly anarchic qualities of the system. “This country has never
had a valid geographical economic policy,” he argued. “It has permitted things to go willy-nilly,
people to take advantage and exploit circumstances no matter how transient—a sort of economic
nymphomania pervading the country with each person trying to seek out a place in which to land
to its own advantage.” Anarchy of production, decision-making mediated by market signals,
human relationships cloaked and perverted by mysterious, illegible, but immensely powerful
forces—listening to Patton's testimony that morning, one would be forgiven for wondering if
Karl Marx had somehow landed in the Federal Building in downtown Manhattan. Patton insisted
he was describing a system that had somehow gone wrong, but from the standpoint of the heads
of major American corporations, including those about to testify at that morning's hearing, plant
closures like the one in Long Island City were a signal that things were finally again going right.
Shorn of the value judgment, Patton had offered a basic description of free-market capitalism. 8
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The unenviable task of defending the behavior of America’s giant corporations fell to
William L. Miron, president of Bendix's automotive division, who presented a defense both of
his company's actions and of the political-ethical framework that permitted a firm like Bendix to
shutter a plant and abandon its employees with little notice and as little compensation as
possible. Bendix had closed its Long Island City plant—once a family-owned firm called P & D
Manufacturing—because of “severe competitive pressures” and “deteriorating business
conditions” that made it “impossible to operate that factory profitably.” “The outlook for the
ignition products market,” he explained, “indicates that as demand reduces in relation to industry
capacity, even greater pressure to reduce prices will be present. Continued Bendix participation
in view of this price and volume environment requires that we not only employ automated
processes, but also obtain labor costs lower than those available at P & D.”
For Miron, his firm's decisions were evidence of the “dynamic and changing” nature of
American capitalism, without which the country would fail to reach its potential. “Through the
years, if we had refused to make changes whenever we were threatened with temporary
dislocations and upsets,” he argued, “we would still be an agricultural nation.” While plant
closures might be harrowing for the employees of that particular factory, they represented a
positive contribution to “national welfare” considered in the aggregate. “The balance is
important,” Miron claimed, “and the balance is favorable.” Comparative advantage dictated that
Bendix put its resources where they would be most productive, thereby generating “maximum
benefits” for the United States as a whole. From the standpoint of a laid-off Queens factory
worker, Miron's testimony was a counterintuitive brief for international trade, automation, and
every other economic phenomenon that was said to be hurting American workers by the early
1970s. Multinational corporations like Bendix, even when they closed plants and moved the jobs
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to Mexico, supposedly created them in the United States by increasing demand in other countries
for American-made products. Automation, despite threatening specific categories of work, would
in the end prove a boon to both workers and employers. All in all, Bendix's practices, which
Harris, Patton and others sought to expose in the harsh light of that day's hearing, were normal,
natural, and a prime motive force in what Miron described as a “healthy, growing economy” in
the United States. 9
There were contradictions in Miron's testimony, however, for neither Bendix nor the US
economy was as healthy or as normal as Miron suggested. American capitalism was certainly
“changing” during the early 1970s, but to characterize those changes as “healthy” might have
struck an odd note to many observers. The early 70s were a time when the cracks in the
institutional arrangements underpinning the US-led postwar world economy were becoming
increasingly visible, while the US economy itself was beginning to enter a crisis in the basic
sense of that word—a turning point where familiar procedures cease to produce their expected
effects. Seven months prior, President Richard Nixon, realizing that a weakened US dollar could
no longer bear the weight of the obligations assumed at Bretton Woods, had ordered the Treasury
to renege on its obligation to convert dollars into gold. An initial devaluation of the dollar
followed with the Smithsonian Agreement of that December. It was not enough—by 1973, the
dyke burst as worldwide dollar gluts and the appearance of huge, unregulated financial flows on
what had come to be called the Eurodollar markets had made a mockery of American attempts to
maintain the value of the currency. That year, American policymakers ratified what had become
a foregone conclusion, ending convertibility for good, floating the dollar, and permitting the
collapse of the international monetary system established at Bretton Woods. These pressures on
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the dollar reflected, in part, the declining competitiveness of American exports on the world
market, a phenomenon which had been gathering steam as the American-sponsored
reconstruction of the European and Japanese economies helped turn them into formidable
competitors. As historian Judith Stein points out, 1971 was the year that a “dreary statistic”
known as the merchandise trade deficit went negative for the first time since 1893, alarming
American policymakers and alerting them to the declining effectiveness of Keynesian
management techniques in the face of increasingly internationalized production.
The term “multinational,” notes Stein, entered Webster's Dictionary that same year.
Instead of producing in the US and selling abroad, these firms, of which Bendix was a notable
example, sought lower wages and a means to avoid other countries' trade barriers by locating
plants abroad, selling their products either in the country where they were produced or exporting
them to the US, which since the end of World War II had embarked on a lopsided trade
liberalization that left its markets relatively open to foreign producers who enjoyed protection at
home. Now, multinational firms like Bendix threatened to burst the distinction between “foreign”
and “domestic” production altogether. Appraising the terrain of class struggles in an essay
published in 1972, the longshoreman and labor radical Stan Weir warned that to confront the
new breed of multinational corporation, labor officialdom would have to “make considerable
changes in the structural, governmental, and administrative forms of the unions they lead,” since
“for the first time in American working-class history objective conditions demand that workers
develop a consciousness of their international role and lead in the establishment of international
solidarity.” “To organize all the major work places owned by a corporation within the US and
Canada is no longer sufficient even for the needs of the labor bureaucracy,” Weir asserted. After
offering some statistics on the precipitous rise of this new strategy on the part of capital to break
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free from geographical boundaries and political control, Weir remarked of the new
multinationals that “with their new world view it is easy for them to pick the country in which
they can produce goods at the lowest costs, and pick the country in which to declare profits
because of low taxes.” 10
The next witness called to comment on the Bendix affair was Sam Meyers, president of
United Auto Workers Local 259, which had been established in 1937 to organize New York
City-area collision shops, but gradually found its niche working to organize mechanics and other
employees at the dealerships that emerged to sell and service the automobiles that had become
ever more central to American commerce and life. Meyers, schooled in the heady days of the
1930s and 40s and committed to an active and expansive notion of trade unionism, was not
content to rest there. Under his leadership, the local branched out into organizing workers in area
parts manufacturers like P & D Manufacturing, a family-owned firm that Bendix had purchased
in 1965—and had now shuttered when Meyers and the employees succeeded in organizing the
plant and winning a first contract after a grueling six-week wintertime strike.
During his tenure, Meyers had witnessed the gathering transformations in the gender and
racial composition of the New York City working class, and Local 259 had long been among the
more dynamic unions in the city in terms of responding to the special problems these shifts
presented. As early as 1945, union members had elected Dolores Carroll, a twenty-something
auto mechanic from Cork County, Ireland and the first female mechanic in the New York City
automobile trades, as vice president of an organization that now counted women as thirty-five
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percent of its membership. The same year, James Farrington, an African-American letter painter
and chairman of the grievance committee, became president of the local, a post he held for three
years. The campaign to organize the parts manufacturers immersed the local even deeper into the
issues confronting a diversifying New York City working class—at the Bendix shop, Meyers
explained as he opened his testimony, ninety percent of employees were women and the vast
majority were immigrants, hailing mainly from Latin America. In taking up the cause of these
minimum-wage workers, Local 259 became one important voice for New York City’s new
working poor. 11
Meyers went on to detail the circumstances of the impending shutdown at P & D,
pointing out what he portrayed as several instances of bad faith on the part of company
management. In January of 1972 Bendix representatives had traveled from Detroit to New York
and demanded a meeting with the shop committee at the Long Island City plant, whom they
informed that the plant would be closed on or around July 1 of that year. At a second face-to-face
meeting in early March, Bendix officials confirmed the company's intention to close the plant
and resisted the union's request for arbitration to judge whether the company possessed the right
to shut down a plant in the middle of an existing collective bargaining agreement. All the while,
Meyers claimed, Bendix officials refused to reveal to the union or to employees precisely where
they intended to move production. At the January meeting, Meyers explained, Bendix officials
claimed the work would remain in the United States, but insisted they did not know where. This,
Meyers claimed with exasperation, was a lie. It was not until Miron’s testimony, just minutes
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before, he explained, that he learned where Bendix would now produce its ignition switches.
Only under the pressure of the Senate Finance Committee had Bendix agreed to reveal its plans.
The corporation, which had grown fat on government contracts, now afforded its workers in the
US “neither loyalty nor consideration towards well-being. It knows only one loyalty—its greed
for greater and greater profits without boundaries,” Meyers thundered. “If profit is the only name
of the game,” he concluded, “God help America.” 12
The Local
Of the city’s myriad labor organizations, Local 259 and its leader, Sam Meyers, were
well-placed to organize the unorganized. Local 259’s roots stretched back to the earliest days of
the UAW and, in an age when many on the left lamented the conservatism and bureaucratization
of the labor movement, the organization retained something of the crusading spirit of the CIO’s
halcyon days. In the spring of 1937, when sit-down strikes rocked American industry and a
“fever of organization gripped working-class communities in a huge arc that spread from New
England through New York, Pennsylvania, and the Midwest,” as historian Nelson Lichtenstein
put it, a group of truck body builders and collision repair mechanics calling themselves the
United Vehicle Workers wrote the fledgling UAW requesting a charter from the organization
that had so improbably brought General Motors to heel. Their new organization, Local 259, was
only the third UAW local in the entire Northeast and the second in New York City, although it
would soon absorb its predecessor, an isolated and neglected remnant of the pre-CIO UAW. 13
By the early 1940s, Local 259 was the fastest-growing UAW local in the New York City
area, mushrooming from two hundred members to three thousand in its first three years of
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existence. Where the legendary UAW locals in the Midwest took on the car manufacturers at the
point of production, Local 259 focused on the mechanics working in the dealerships attached to
the big manufacturers, where the opulent fronts that dazzled consumers concealed a bitter reality
of low pay and rough conditions for the technicians who toiled in the rear. Workers at the
Packard shop and showroom located in Inwood, at the upper tip of Manhattan, for example,
complained to Local 259 organizers of being forced to work all night on pain of dismissal as well
as summary firings for union activity. The union’s first breakthrough was at Mab Motors in the
Bronx, where a two-week strike without support from the international nonetheless won a robust
wage gain, a shorter work week, and vacation and holiday pay for the beleaguered mechanics. As
soon as that strike ended, seventeen more shops went out, seeking a uniform contract with the the
employers grouped in the Vehicle Body Builders Association. In their joint strike, the mechanics
at these seventeen shops addressed what would become an abiding concern for Local 259, one
that it would confront when it sought to equalize the wages of the Bendix workers in Long Island
City with those of their counterparts at plants covered under the master Bendix-UAW contract,
like the workers who assembled aircraft instruments across the Hudson at Teterboro, New
Jersey. In an industrial landscape like that of New York City, characterized less by giant, Detroitlike factories than legions of relatively small and specialized shops, it was a paramount concern
to standardize wages and conditions across shops and to develop institutions, such as Local 259,
that could coordinate action across the myriad shops to build a collective that could take on the
employers. Once the strike against the Builders Association had netted a forty-hour week, forty-
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five more shops conceded and signed contracts with Local 259. By 1940 the Local had contracts
with 120 different employers. 14
While Local 259 embarked upon this organizing whirlwind, a twenty-year-old Brooklynborn sheet metal worker named Sam Meyers was cutting his teeth across town in the raucous
world of the Brewster Aeronautical Corporation in Long Island City, an aircraft factory whose
UAW affiliate developed a national reputation for unruliness. UAW Local 365, one of the
union’s new “war baby” locals, represented workers at the Brewster plants in Queens, Newark,
and Bucks County, Pennsylvania, where they participated in the all-out war boom, building
fighters for the US and British militaries. As former Brewster worker and UAW partisan Al Nash
remembered in a 1977 article, this local was distinguished—or notorious—for its “militancy,
political consciousness, union democracy, and its refusal to abandon union standards” even in
the face of the no-strike pledge offered by CIO leadership after Pearl Harbor. To build aircraft a
hop, skip and a jump from midtown Manhattan proved complicated, not only because sections of
each aircraft were produced on different floors and hauled via elevator for testing—only to be
promptly disassembled so they could exit the factory and make their way to Long Island for
flight testing—but because the plant’s New York City location delivered a workforce laced with
radicals of all stripes, whose shopfloor militancy and unremitting hostility to a corrupt and
incompetent management netted a degree of control over plant operations that upset not only the
US Navy, Congressional representatives, and the Washington Post, which turned the Brewster
plants into Exhibit A in its brief for a rollback of the Wagner Act and a return to the open shop,
but the UAW’s national leadership, who with exasperation referred to the troublesome outpost as

Nash, “Local 259”; “Auto Workers Walk Out Here,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, April 29, 1937. On the structural
challenges posed by New York City’s unique industrial landscape, see Joshua B. Freeman, Working-Class New
York: Life and Labor Since World War II (New York: New Press, 2000), 40–47.
14

204

“a bunch of anarchists.” Local 365 was not only an example of the phenomenon, identified by
Nelson Lichtenstein, whereby the CIO unions were built “from the outside in, by well-connected
and ideologically motivated organizers who saw their trade union work as part of a larger project
of social reconstruction,” but proved a springboard to prominence in the New York City labor
movement for figures such as Meyers, local president Tom De Lorenzo, and Bernard Rifkin,
who helped guide AFSCME District Council 37 through the glory days of public sector
unionization in the 1960s and 70s. Local 365’s racial egalitarianism also foreshadowed Meyers’s
later efforts to combine militant labor organizing with a commitment to civil rights, affirmative
action, and black political power. One black worker, reminiscing on his experience at Brewster,
wrote to Nash that “You see to you boys it is an everyday occurrence to treat a colored boy as
one of you … I don’t mind telling you it gives me a lump in the throat every time I think of how
the men and the union accepted me impartially as one of the boys. Some of you even went out of
your way to make me feel at home. I’ll never forget you as long as I live.” 15
When the Navy cancelled its contracts towards the end of the war, the Long Island City
Brewster plant shut down, although not without the last hurrah of a plant occupation by Local
365, during which UAW Vice President Richard Frankensteen charged that the Navy “think[s]
that workers can move to new jobs as easily as soldiers are moved, as if labor families lived in
pup tents.” Of the three companies manufacturing the Corsair fighter in which Brewster
specialized, Brewster had the highest costs and was therefore first on the chopping block. “Glad
as they were that the war now seemed to be coming to an end,” Nash remembered, “still, some of
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the workers observed sadly that these good jobs now most likely would soon disappear. They
saw the closing of our plant as an early sign of this development.” They were right, although it
was hard to predict at this point the scale of industrial job loss New York City would suffer over
the ensuing decades. Sam Meyers, out of a job, went looking for work and wound up on the
payroll at Theurer Wagon Works, a commercial body builder on Manhattan’s West Side, where
he was promptly fired for attempting to organize the workers into Local 259. This was not the
first scrap between Theurer and the UAW—a 1939 National Labor Relations Board decision
scored Theurer for violating the Wagner Act by refusing to recognize the UAW, sponsoring a
rival company union, and firing ninety-seven employees when they struck for recognition. The
NLRB came down against Theurer, ruling that the company had “interfered with, restrained, and
coerced its employees,” and testimony revealed that upon receiving a petition for higher wages,
boss Theurer had berated his workers, calling them “foreigners, Communists, and radicals”—
which some of them probably were. “[I do] not care for the Wagner Act and [I run my] business
[myself],” Theurer had boasted. Six years later, he was still firing workers for union activity, and
when Meyers lost his job at Theurer, Local 259 president Milton Finestone, who preferred to be
called “Mickey Finn,” put Meyers on the payroll as a full-time organizer. 16
During the late 1940s and early 1950s, Local 259 organized assertively, mounting eightmonth and year-long strikes against recalcitrant Brooklyn dealerships. By the middle of the
decade, however, organizing slowed and questions surfaced about Finn’s leadership, which
included a mysteriously ballooning dues structure and allegations that he had collaborated with
the gangster John “Johnny Dio” Dioguardi to extort small, owner-operated auto glass shops by
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blocking deliveries until they agreed to join the local. When Finn fired the local’s most dynamic
organizers, including Meyers, the UAW international placed the local in trusteeship and
reinstated the fired staffers. The last straw came when it was revealed by Robert Kennedy, chief
counsel for the Select Committee on Improper Activities in Labor and Management—popularly
known as the McClellan Commission—that Finn had secretly met with Jimmy Hoffa and
accepted a charter to take Local 259 out of the UAW and into the racket-infested Teamsters.
Following this revelation, a Meyers-led slate swept the local elections, returned Local 259 to
probity, and reignited its vigorous organizing tradition. 17
Local 259 was also a conscientious participant in the great civil rights struggles of
midcentury and beyond. Along with Local 1199, District 65, and others, it was one in the stable
of New York City unions that had, in the words of historian Martha Biondi, “significant
memberships of people of color and close-to-left pasts,” and for that reason maintained a
proactive stance towards issues of race and gender at a time when the labor movement as a
whole beat a gradual retreat from its earlier zeal. An episode from the 1950s reveals 259’s
combination of straight-and-narrow integrity and commitment to marginalized, low-wage
workers. Sometime during the early 1950s, Local 259 took over the eight hundred employees of
EA Labs in Brooklyn, a staunchly anti-union company that made horns for Ford and other
automakers, from a UAW local whose leaders had been charged during the war with extorting
plant management to end slowdowns and stoppages. Under the leadership of 259, strikes were
mounted instead in the interests of the workers and when members were arrested, it was for
scuffling with the police on bellicose picket lines. Photographs of the strike reveal a multi-ethnic,
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multi-gendered workforce, few of whom, according to an internal union history, spoke English.
Speeches were translated into multiple languages, in a technique reminiscent of an earlier era of
New York City unionism. Plant officials had sought a return to the old ways by attempting to
bribe the negotiating committee to call off the strike, but were rebuffed. 18
In addition to defending exploited racial minorities at the workplace, Local 259 was
active in the broader civil rights movement. Local 259 members headed the regional UAW Fair
Practices Council, organized a bail fund for Martin Luther King, Jr., took part in the freedom
rides of the early 60s, picketed New York-area Woolworth’s stores to support lunch counter sitins in the South, and chartered buses to send 250 members to the 1963 March on Washington. In
1962, under the direction of shop steward Ana Luisa Romero, the local developed a consumer
education course and a credit union for Spanish-speaking workers. The next year, the local
partnered with the William Alanson White Institute to develop an experimental mental health
program designed for blue-collar workers. Meyers became noted for demanding at UAW
conventions that a seat on the International Executive Board be reserved for a woman. And the
local came out against the gathering conflict in Vietnam early and often, participating in the
National Labor Peace Assembly and the New York Labor Committee Against the War in
Vietnam and marching against the war in New York City. The local also continued its fight
against labor movement corruption. In 1972, the same year as the Bendix flight, attorneys for the
local won an National Labor Relations Board judgment against Amalgamated Local Union 355,
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a notorious “sweetheart” or company-dominated union whose leaders routinely colluded with
management to depress wages and conditions and stave off legitimate unions like Local 259 in
return for recognition and the financial rewards that accompanied it. Writing in response to a
New York Times editorial that condemned the “sweetheart” labor racketeers, long-time labor
movement attorney and Local 259 representative I. Philip Sipser explained the role of labor
racketeering in making sure the working poor stayed poor enough that their employers could
continue to make money. “A substantial proportion of the employees of auto dealerships,
enslaved by sweetheart contracts,” Sipser wrote, “are members of the working poor—blacks and
Puerto Ricans who have been shamefully exploited by these collusive agreements.” 19
In all, as the New York branch of the Democratic Socialists of America proclaimed in a
1987 salute to Meyers, Local 259 had consistently been “one of the most militant, democratic,
and politically and socially progressive unions in New York.” By the late 1960s, a time when
both labor radicals and large numbers of politically aware young people had lost or never
developed faith in the mainstream labor movement as a vehicle for meaningful social
transformation, Local 259 was one of a number of unions to consciously keep alive the flame of
the early CIO—its thrust towards a broad and inclusive “social unionism” and its promise to
rework the economy and politics of the United States in in a genuinely democratic direction.
Local 259’s ability to stand up to an aggressively multinational corporation like Bendix would be
a test of the ability of even the best sort of mainstream trade unionism to confront the challenges
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posed by capital as it embarked upon a new round of geographical reorganization, in search of
the renewed panache that would come to characterize the neoliberal era. 20
The Plant
The building that once housed P & D Manufacturing, a manufacturer of point-set ignition
systems and other parts for the automotive “aftermarket”—industry jargon for replacement
parts—sits, squat and grey, on a low-slung block a few hundred feet from the East River and
within spitting distance of both La Guardia Airport and Rikers Island, New York City’s massive
jail complex. Around the corner is Steinway and Sons, the famous piano manufacturer, itself a
one-time runaway whose owner, William Steinway, packed up and fled to a low-wage, nonunion periphery called Queens in the 1880s after a “revolution at our factory” in Manhattan
inaugurated an era of bitter labor strife, which mass firings, police nightclubs, and an industrywide lockout had failed to quell. The company town he built on a then-remote jut of land poking
into the East River, incorporated first into a new municipality called Long Island City in 1870
and then into New York City itself upon the amalgamation of the five boroughs in 1898, lends its
name to the street on which P & D once sat—Steinway Street. 21
In the middle of the last century, one could walk for fifteen miles through a virtually
uninterrupted stretch of noisy, belching industry, a vast belt traversing the entire western fringe
of Long Island from the Brooklyn Army Terminal in Sunset Park to the south, up through the
busy docks of Red Hook, past the venerable Brooklyn Navy Yard, up and around the waterfronts
of Williamsburg and Greenpoint, across the polluted Newtown Creek that divides Queens from
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Brooklyn, and on up along the Queens waterfront through Hunters Point, Ravenswood, Astoria,
and Steinway, where the island begins to curve around and the East River loses its focus,
distending gradually into Long Island Sound and finally into the Atlantic Ocean itself. In
between one would have encountered everything from sugar refineries to pharmaceutical plants,
coffee roasters, shipyards, lumberyards, glassworks, stonecutters, oil refineries, enormous
railyards, the world’s one-time largest natural gas plant, and innumerable smaller businesses—
chemical manufacturers, box makers, and food processing facilities of any kind imaginable,
including the famous Silvercup Bakery and the enormous Chiclets gum factory, which turned out
millions of the bite-sized squares until a massive explosion shuttered it in 1976. 22 The Federal
Writers’ Project New York City Guide, still one of the best evocations of the city in its pre-crisis
heyday, described the “intensively industrialized” Long Island City in near-rhapsodic terms:
Long Island City, fronting the East River and Newtown Creek around the approach to the
Queensboro Bridge, is a labyrinth of industrial plants whose harsh and grimy outlines rise against
the soot-laden sky. Within an area of a few square miles, gridironed by elevated lines, railroad
yards, and bridge approaches, are gathered about 1,400 factories, producing chiefly spaghetti,
candy, sugar, bread, machinery, paint, shoes, cut stone, and furniture. Its bakeries along turn out
about five million loaves weekly; its paint and varnish factories, about ten million gallons a year;
its stoneyards handle about 90 percent of the cut stone and marble imported into the United States.
On the oily waters of Newtown Creek, which separates Queens from Brooklyn, tugboats and
barges plow busily all day long, entering with coal and raw materials and leaving with
manufactured products. 23

P & D Manufacturing was part of this vast industrial ecosystem, one of the countless
small firms that formed the basis of a local manufacturing economy that employed more people
in absolute terms than any other in the United States. By the 1960s, P & D was large by New
York City standards—in a city where the average manufacturing establishment employed around
twenty workers, anywhere between three and five hundred at a time toiled in what the labor spy
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Al Goldstein described as dirty, dangerous, and “furnace-hot” conditions in the one-story factory
on Steinway Street. P & D was founded in the early days of the auto industry—the name stood
for Piffath and Danziger, its two founders, and the firm remained family-owned until Bendix
purchased it in the mid-1960s. P & D’s major product was ignitions of the “point-set” variety—
mechanical devices that ruled the market prior to the introduction of electronic ignition systems
in the mid-1970s. Over the decades, P & D had built itself, in the words of Bendix planners, into
“a respected aftermarket name for ignition components,” around eighty percent of which went to
the replacement market—mechanics, repair shops, and the like—and the rest into original
equipment produced by the big automakers. One of the ways the firm survived was by remaining
resolutely non-union and paying rock-bottom wages. Production employees were generally paid
the New York State minimum—in 1966, when the factory first came into Local 259’s crosshairs,
that minimum was $1.25 an hour, a figure that the legislature raised to $1.40 in 1967 and $1.60
in 1968. Point-set ignitions were not an especially technically sophisticated product—to
journalist Ron Chernow, visiting the plant on assignment for Mother Jones magazine, conditions
there “called up the early days of the Industrial Revolution: women hunched over long wooden
tables, assembling point sets and other auto-ignition parts; timing devices over the workbenches
clocking their output; women eating lunches from brown paper bags at their workplaces; and the
only water in the building bubbling out of a sort of vast baptismal fount that stood on the factory
floor.” 24
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The low wages, authoritarian work regime, and dismal environment in the plant reflected
the distinct political economy and labor regime of the auto parts sector, which differed from that
of the big producers of finished vehicles like Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler. “Nowhere in
the auto industry can one find such chaos and contradiction of organization and negotiation as in
the thousands of parts plants of all kinds that supply the auto makers,” wrote one prominent
UAW official. While these words could easily have come from Sam Meyers in 1972, they were
in fact penned by Walter Reuther himself, writing in 1938 on what he called “a life and death
question” for the union. “No union in any mass production industry can live with the industry
half organized and half unorganized,” Reuther wrote in his “Plan for Organizing Competitive
Plants,” presented to the UAW International Executive Board in May of that year. Thirty-four
years later, however, the problem remained unsolved. The persistence of this unevenness across
geographical space and social position—the workers at P & D were nearly all women and mostly
new immigrants—would menace the union even more severely in an era where the field for that
unevenness, given the gathering geographical mobility of capital, was about to expand in new
and bewildering ways. 25
By the middle of the twentieth century, the market for finished vehicles was dominated
by an oligopoly captured in the popular phrase “the Big Three.” The parts sector, on the other
hand, remained decentralized and highly competitive, lending it a cutthroat atmosphere that had
changed little since the UAW first confronted the industry in the 1930s. These pressures were
redoubled by the companies’ efforts to leverage race and gender distinctions to cow workers and
cut costs. Descriptions of conditions in a plant like the Yale and Towne Lock Company, for
example, where a 1937 UAW organizing effort went down to disastrous defeat, could be applied
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a plant like the 1960s-era P & D with little revision. In 1937, UAW organizers confronted what
Nelson Lichtenstein described as a “bipolar workforce,” where “a handful of northern European
craftsmen/foremen presided over a heavily female, Slavic, and southern European production
workforce.” Similarly, at P & D, a small group of quasi-managerial employees described by
Goldstein as “white and American”—mainly Italian-Americans from Queens—presided over a
workforce that was at least eighty percent African American and Latina. This privileged strata
administered what passed for a union at the plant—a company-dominated organization to which
many of the employees were not aware they belonged, although dues were extracted from their
paychecks to finance its operations and reward its officers. The lingua franca among production
workers at P & D was Spanish, reflecting the fact that many of the employees came from Latin
America—“Ecuador, Peru, Cuba, Colombia,” according to Chernow, not to mention “Haiti,
Greece, Ireland and Italy.” One of the main organizers on the inside at P & D was Agnes
Stevenson, a Scot whose determination to resist management’s nonchalant attitude towards
safety caused her to gravitate to the UAW when it first sought to organize the plant. Denied
protective gear, women would leave the factory with “giant sores all over their arms” from
working with glue, degreaser, and raw fiberglass, she explained to Chernow. The breaking point
for many came when one of their comrades suffered a miscarriage while working. Helped by her
fellow employees to a cot that was the closest thing to a medical device in the factory, she
promptly plunged through its rotted surface onto the factory floor below and had to be whisked
to the hospital with only paper towels to stem the bleeding. 26
In 1937, the Yale and Towne story ended with a runaway—the company decamped to
Connecticut, escaping the UAW and achieving the “sweatshop” conditions its managers sought.
Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit, 81; Goldstein, “I Was an Industrial Spy for the Bendix
Corporation: Part I”; Chernow, “San Luis Blues.”
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The 1938 fight at Federal Screw in Detroit, which ended in one of the several attempts on
Reuther’s life endured by the labor leader over the course of his career, similarly demonstrated
the way in which the auto companies that were assumed by many to sit at the leading edge of a
rationalized, maturing American capitalism relied significantly on less-visible firms whose
wages, conditions, and business practices hearkened back to the bad old days of the nineteenth
century. Indeed, it was the late-30s confrontations with the parts makers that prompted the first
expression of what would become a perennial Reutherite goal—“taking wages, hours, and
working conditions out of the sphere of industrial competition.” Like many of Reuther’s socialdemocratic dreams, however, this proved to be possible only in certain industries and only under
certain economic conditions—steady growth and stable, oligopolistic markets. When a resurgent
capitalism responded to the intensifying international competition of the postwar era by getting
back to competitive basics, the problems of the 1930s once again reared their ugly head. What
Reuther had written back in 1938—“if this type of competition is permitted to continue, the
workers in higher paid shops will have organized themselves out of a job”—would in the case of
a P & D-turned-Bendix prove prophetic. 27
The Campaign
Sam Meyers told journalists that he first became interested in organizing P & D in the
summer of 1966, about a year after Bendix purchased the family-owned firm for around $7.5
million. The acquisition was part of a breakneck mid-1960s expansion whose goal was
threefold—to expand the company, to diversify it in order to wean it from an overreliance on
government contracts, and to hedge against fluctuations in its myriad other lines of business.
Parts destined for the aftermarket, for instance, were a good hedge against slumps in demand for
27
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new cars, “providing a stabilizing influence on our business,” as executives put it in a 1974
Annual Report. This game of hedging and combining—acquiring, managing, and sloughing off
scores of sometimes unrelated businesses to generate the greatest short-term financial gain—
fueled the conglomerate wave that swept American capitalism during the 1960s, as firms strove
to maintain growth without running afoul of the country’s antitrust tradition, which sought to
preserve at least the appearance of nineteenth-century-style competitive capitalism in a world
whose basic dynamics commanded centralization. By the mid-1960s, Bendix was a behemoth,
part of a “‘new breed’ of companies … whose operations defy classification into one or another
of the rigid industrial categories”—“large, highly diversified, scientifically and technically
oriented, and—fortunately—growing,” as its late-1960s CEO boasted. Like many manufacturing
firms, however, Bendix was vulnerable to competition, rendering its profit margins both thin and
volatile. As a Fortune magazine writer explained in a 1956 feature on the company, Bendix’s
extraordinarily high sales volume did not guarantee similarly impressive profits, which hovered
at a prosaic ten-percent pre-tax during the mid-50s. The perpetual motion required to maintain
adequate returns would only intensify as the competition engendered by the recovery of Europe
and Japan, the entry into the manufacturing landscape of new producers in Asia and Latin
America, and the prying open of trade barriers under the GATT regime lessened the margin for
error on the part of American firms and punished complacency with distress and ultimately
death. 28
Having eliminated an erstwhile competitor by swallowing it, Bendix went about
tightening the profit picture at P & D. Executives moved to cut salaries and eliminate seniority
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among foremen, although shopfloor resistance scuttled the second initiative. Workers on the
floor at P & D did not necessarily know why this was occurring, as the transfer of ownership,
and thus the identity of their ultimate employer, was kept a secret from them. To maintain the
fiction for as long as possible, Bendix paid the former owners to continue roaming the factory
floor, lending the impression that they were still in charge. But the transfer of P & D to one of
the world’s largest manufacturing corporations—and one whose biggest plants had long been
covered by a UAW “master contract” that governed wages, benefits, and conditions in places
like Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, Virginia, and even closer to home in Teterboro, New Jersey and
Elmira, New York—put P & D in the sights of an enterprising UAW local like Sam Meyers’s
259. 29
That UAW master contract included several features, like cost-of-living increases and an
“annual improvement factor,” or productivity bonus, that had become standard elements of
UAW contracts with the largest auto firms since the famous (or infamous, depending on one’s
politics) “Treaty of Detroit” concluded with General Motors in 1950. The 1968 version of the
agreement included Supplemental Unemployment Benefits—the UAW’s truncated version of a
once-envisioned guaranteed annual wage—guarantees against temporary shutdowns, improved
pension and insurance plans, wage parity for the company’s Canadian workers, and increased
provisions for paid vacation and holidays. By purchasing P & D and running it under the radar,
Bendix had escaped its obligations under the UAW master contract and quietly returned to a
rawer form of wage determination. It had done so by locating an unseasoned, vulnerable
workforce, drawn from the countrysides of the world but gathered in New York, possessing scant
resources, few connections, and little leverage. In other words, what Bendix ultimately sought
Chernow, “San Luis Blues”; “UAW Bendix Report” June 1968, Box 46, Folder 1, UAW President’s Office:
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with its flight to Mexico, it first located in New York itself. The beginnings of what would come
to be called “globalization” in the auto parts industry lay in a place like Long Island City. 30
Meyers and his staff, faithful to the injunction to organize the unorganized and break the
regional and racial differentials that threatened organized and unorganized alike, set out to help
the women of P & D put themselves on an equal footing with their counterparts in a place like
Teterboro, ten miles to the west but a world away in terms of wages and conditions. Workers
there, mostly white and mostly male, made nearly twice what P & D workers did for notdissimilar work assembling aircraft gauges. In the summer of 1966, organizers, having first
acquired a few contacts within the factory, began a virtual siege, parking sound trucks on the
street outside to hurl amplified missives through the open windows of the sweltering plant,
encouraging the workers to abandon their company union and sign up with the UAW. Workers
gradually began to gravitate to the UAW banner, even when a series of unexplained but
remarkably frequent and precise immigration raids increased the pressure to remain in the
shadows. A series of test applicants sent by Local 259 had confirmed the company’s preference
for recent immigrants, especially the undocumented. 31
As a representation election approached, Bendix turned up the heat with a series of tricks
designed to stave off Local 259 at whatever cost. A detailed article from an unlikely source gives
us an up-close picture of the nuts and bolts of a representation campaign in late-1960s New York
City, as well as exposing the nexus between a leading multinational corporation whose chairman,
W. Michael Blumenthal, was a much-celebrated advocate of business “ethics”—a profile that
would within a few short years help catapult him to the head of Jimmy Carter’s Treasury
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Department—and a shadowy industrial underworld whose denizens were helping Bendix erect a
sweatshop regime it hoped would escape the reach of the UAW.
In July of 1968, Al Goldstein, a former newspaper reporter who would subsequently rise
to fame as the publisher of Screw, a magazine whose gleeful disdain for pretense earned it the
moniker “the Consumer Reports of sex” and whom the New York Times described as “a
cartoonishly vituperative amalgam of borscht belt comic, free-range social critic and sexobsessed loser who seemed to embody a moment in New York City’s cultural history: the sleaze
and decay of Times Square in the 1960s and ‘70s,” published an article in a radical weekly called
the New York Free Press in which he detailed his short-lived career as an industrial spy and labor
fixer on behalf of the Bendix Corporation. In the article, Goldstein revealed that his chief success
had been to scuttle the first UAW representation election at P & D. Now, in a fit of remorse and
fueled by the impulse towards compulsive disclosure that would guide him into the skin trade,
Goldstein penned a lengthy self-exposé that outlined in detail the ignoble means to which Bendix
had stooped in order to evade its responsibility to negotiate with Local 259. With characteristic
cheek, Goldstein claimed that his experiences with Bendix had so repulsed him that he opted for
a more honest career as one of the country’s leading pornographers. In an article that was halfbrag and half-lament, Goldstein wrote bluntly that “I was the secret weapon that was brought in
to fuck the worker and guiltily I confess my success.” 32
The story went like this. As the election neared, a friend-of-a-friend, working as a Bendix
proxy approached a broke, divorced, and desperate Goldstein and offered him some under-thetable work—cash income no judge could garnish for alimony. Goldstein’s task was to pose as a
P & D worker, report everything he heard to factory management, and to refurbish the company
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union headed by Josephine LeGay, a nineteen-year P & D veteran who “considered herself
management” but whom the company had decided was “not bright enough” to ward off the
growing militancy among P & D employees, who now held steady if furtive organizing meetings
once a week. Goldstein began work in the molding room, where he endured “the oppressive heat
that baked everything and the heavy soot which layered down a covering of coal-like particles
that saturated everyone and everything in its bleakness.” Beyond learning that factory work taxed
his “middle-class values” to their breaking point, Goldstein discovered that “the minority
groups”—in other words, most P & D production employees—“hated their lot,” harbored
“enormous hostility and anger,” and “felt that the company union was not only a phony, but antiSpanish.” Goldstein distinguished himself by complaining loudly and often about conditions in
the factory and soon found himself invited to one of the organizing meetings, where he
ingratiated himself with UAW organizers, including Meyers, who gave Goldstein part-time work
as a staff photographer for the local. Goldstein’s successful infiltration of the UAW campaign
was like “Bendix having a seat on the organizing committee,” he later wrote.
Even so, Goldstein remained convinced that the UAW, with its Spanish-speaking
organizers and concrete record of achievement at other Bendix plants, would win the
representation election. Bendix attempted to co-opt the rising militancy by placing a Spanishspeaker on the company union leadership ticket and promoting several black and Latino workers
to supervisory roles. Goldstein also tried to earn his pay by spreading rumors that Meyers was “a
Communist, a fag, anything.” But the coup came when, on the eve of the election, plant manager
Bob Spear summoned Goldstein to Manhattan’s plush Gaslight Club and directed him to pen a
late-night missive to employees explaining how the nearby Morganite Brush Company, once one
of Local 259’s biggest shops, had closed down and moved to the South in order to avoid its
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obligations to its workers and their union. The pamphlet, published the next day under LeGay’s
name, frightened enough workers to tip the election, which the UAW lost to the company union
by a vote of 203 to 198. To celebrate the win, LeGay toured the plant the following day sporting
a “bright red corsage” gifted her by plant management. 33
The pamphlet laid bare the stakes—P & D workers, the UAW, and Bendix were on a
collision course if workers persisted in organizing to defend themselves, their wages, and their
dignity. The campaign continued and at the next election, in 1970, a majority voted to join the
UAW, becoming part of Local 259. Meyers immediately set about negotiating a wage increase—
the initial demand was for $2.50 an hour, a nearly sixty-five percent increase—and a pension
plan for long-serving employees. A recalcitrant Bendix dug in and refused to budge on either
wages or conditions, and on February 6, 1970, P & D workers began an eight-week strike that
Meyers later called “a bitter strike during a bitter winter.” Workers took advantage of their New
York City location to picket not only the plant itself, but the Bendix International division
headquarters, then chaired by future-CEO Blumenthal, in the Time-Life Building in midtown
Manhattan. The picket lines drew politicians like Westchester Democratic congressman Richard
Ottinger, gubernatorial candidate Howard Samuels, and former Bronx Borough President, future
US Representative, and perennial mayoral candidate Herman Badillo. 34
The women’s protest also caught the attention of liberal journalists like Pete Hamill, who
chronicled the Manhattan picket line in an article titled “La Dignidad,” or “dignity.” Recalling
his visit, Hamill compared the women strikers from P & D favorably with the presumably
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comfortable construction workers who watched them “with puzzled faces” from a half-finished
skyscraper across the street and declined to join their picket line. For Hamill, the comparison was
a metaphor for the way in which he understood the labor movement to have decayed during the
postwar years, when many had “quit, or run, or collapsed, or decided it was just a job.” Hamill
excoriated Bendix chiefs and lauded the women of P & D as well as Meyers, “one of the few
labor leaders I know who is still committed to the vision men had in the 30s” and who “has come
to this strike with a sense of moral outrage that cannot be found, say, anywhere in the Plumbers
Union.” These were the working poor, Hamill explained—“women who live in the richest city in
the history of mankind, and yet the benevolent dukes who employ them cannot find it in their
hearts to pay them more than $1.60 an hour.” At these wages, which rendered them eligible for
supplemental welfare benefits, Bendix had effectively demanded and received a subsidy from
taxpayers. In the end, the striking women, who shouted “Viva la huelga!” down the corporate
canyons of Sixth Avenue and told reporters “we’re gonna show them they can’t scare us,”
endured two months of midwinter picketing and heightened penury before Bendix dragged itself
to the negotiating table. Meyers expressed pride in the performance of these new militants. “Just
look at them,” he told Hamill. “I don’t do anything else anymore, except work on this.” 35
The Flight
According to Meyers, the main goal in negotiations with Bendix was to “elevate the
wages of the people” to something resembling equal pay for equal work with Bendix employees
in other parts of the country. The first collective bargaining agreement between the company and
the workers gathered in Local 259 ended the minimum-wage regime at P & D, effecting an
immediate raise from $1.60 to $2.10 an hour, followed by subsequent raises to $2.25 and then
35
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$2.50 an hour. Within the space of two years, workers at P & D had, through collective action,
raised their wages by around sixty-five percent. While a wished-for pension plan fell by the
wayside in the first contract, plant conditions slowly “graduated into the 20th century,” according
to journalist Chernow. These included reasonably private bathrooms, a dedicated first-aid room,
a new lunchroom, blower fans to dispel the stagnant air, and protective gloves and ointment for
those working with raw fiberglass. 36
The plant began to change in other ways. Having outlived his usefulness at P & D,
Goldstein was dispatched upstate to spy on Bendix’s competitors in the parts field—General
Products of Seneca Falls and Guaranteed Parts of Union Spring, New York, both subsidiaries of
the Gulf and Western conglomerate. These companies employed a different strategy than P & D,
having turned to mechanization to cut costs while assuaging the workers who remained with a
paternalistic, welfare capitalist approach. In the words of Bendix executive Miron, these plants
were “very efficiently and highly mechanized and they have been the cost leader, the price
leader, in the original equipment manufacture of ignition parts, in particular for General Motors
and Ford.” Now under increased pressure to offset the cost of the new UAW contract, Bendix
began to install similar machinery and lay off production workers, a maneuver Local 259, in
keeping with widespread UAW practice, accepted on the company’s argument that in order to
preserve any employment at all at P & D, the plant would need to become competitive with
General Products and other suppliers. According to Miron, Bendix spent around a million dollars
on machinery intended to “decrease our cost to permit profitability.” 37
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At some point during the tenure of the collective bargaining agreement, however, Bendix
gave up on its efforts to mechanize the work at P & D. According to employee testimony,
management stopped introducing new machinery and declined to repair the existing machines
when they faltered. “The machines haven’t really worked since the day we got them,” reported
shop floor leader Agnes Stevenson. Stevenson, who worked in the plant’s aircraft department
making control grips for Army helicopters, blamed managerial incompetence for the downhill
slide at P & D. “We want the company to make a profit,” she said, “but they won’t listen to the
workers.” “If Ralph Piffath could make a profit all the years that he had the business … why
can’t Bendix make a profit?” she asked. Elsewhere in her testimony, however, she argued that “it
was no longer profitable because we had a bona fide union representing us, and we did get our
raises and we did get improvements.” 38
On this point, workers and management converged. The basic problem in the parts
industry, Miron argued in his Senate testimony, consisted in "severe competitive pressures" that
derived from a combination of "foreign competition," "domestic competition," "product
obsolescence," and "excessive wage rates." According to Miron, Bendix was caught in a vicious
circle at P & D. Its inability to cut costs left it unable to compete on price with companies like
General Products, causing Bendix to steadily lose market share. The firm could try to follow its
competitors and cut prices, but without a corresponding reduction in costs, this price-cutting
would reduce profits to the point where it would become impossible to make the capital
investments that would permit the economies of scale that would allow Bendix to flood the
market with cheaper parts and thereby recover that market share. The increased labor costs
associated with the new UAW contract had exacerbated this problem, Miron asserted. As a
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result, P & D had lost anywhere between half a million and a million dollars a year since 1969.
To exit this spiral, the firm needed to pursue both mechanization and the reduced labor costs that
would issue from relocation. In this, Bendix repeated the strategy of a firm like American Safety
Razor, the company explored in Chapter Two. At the most general level, Miron averred, industry
capacity had outrun demand. Bendix could leave the industry or it could adapt. Miron's
testimony suggests that in addition to its immediate difficulties, Bendix was caught in the
"system-wide overcapacity" on which Robert Brenner pins the collapse in manufacturing
profitability that devastated American manufacturers between 1965 and 1973. Runaways were a
solution to this crisis at the level of the firm, albeit one that exacerbated the problem of
overcapacity at a systemic level. 39
Miron told the Senate Finance Committee that internal company studies indicated it
would not be possible to realize a profit on wages anywhere over two dollars an hour—a figure
the US federal minimum would reach by 1975. As the postwar boom receded, then, Local 259’s
strategy to organize the unorganized was running head-on into the rapidly-shifting political
economy of US manufacturing. In this environment, the kinds of wages and conditions that
workers, New Yorkers at large, and the United States Congress considered minimally acceptable
to maintain human dignity no longer permitted companies in highly competitive and labor
intensive lines like ignitions to realize even a thin profit. The squeeze was on, and P & D
workers, many having already sacrificed dramatically to escape low wages and a dearth of
opportunity in their native countries, would find themselves the casualties. 40
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With hindsight, moreover, it is clear that the ignition sets being produced at P & D were a
canary whose fate described the future of the parts industry in general. In brakes, another of
Bendix’s core businesses, the market structure had not yet shifted to punish laggards the way it
had in ignitions. In the brake field, Miron explained, evenness still reigned. “The pricing in
relation to the cost depends on who your competition is—the costs they incur and so forth,” he
told the committee. Bendix could pay higher wages to workers making brakes in its South Bend,
Indiana factory because “our competitors have the same kinds of production facilities, have the
same type of labor agreements … and it’s not practical for several reasons to import those
particular parts, at least not yet.” In the brake field, in other words, the arrangements the UAW
worked hard to maintain, in order that wages and benefits be taken out of competition, still
obtained. It would not last, however. Today, a several-times restructured Bendix produces brakes
at its three plants in Acuña, a Mexican city just across the border from Del Rio, Texas. 41
In order to respond to its competitors, Bendix hit upon a solution that made it an
innovator and a harbinger for the destiny of the parts industry in general, and eventually that of
finished vehicle manufacturing as well. In 1971, as wages at P & D rose from $1.60 to $2.10 an
hour on their way to an eventual $2.50, Bendix quietly formed a subsidiary called Bendix
Mexicana, based in San Luis Potosí, a state in the Mexican interior around 220 miles northwest
of the capital. This former mining district, named via an aspirational comparison with the
legendary Bolivian silver town, now sought to remake itself by attracting foreign investment. In
December of that year, Lloyd’s Mexican Economic Report noted for its English-language readers
that Bendix officials, on the heels of meetings with Mexican president Luis Echeverría and
Finance Secretary Hugo B. Margáin, had announced their intention to build a four-million dollar
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plant in San Luis Potosí. Quoting an editorial in the Mexico City News, Lloyd’s explained that
“this project is also important to this administration’s plan for decentralization of industry, and
Mexican-produced goods for export.” While American firms had maintained an interest in
Mexican automobile production since at least 1925, when Ford established its first plant in
Mexico, these plants had mainly been devoted to production for the Mexican market. Now,
though, American firms sought to use Mexico as a low-wage platform to export to the US. The
plant’s location in San Luis Potosí also marked it as part of a transitional era in the history of
foreign direct investment in Mexico. While today, as a result of the Border Industrialization
Program hatched by the Mexican government around the same time, the operations of American
manufacturing firms are concentrated in the well-known maquiladoras of northern Mexico, at
this earlier stage of globalization, the concentration of infrastructure of all kinds around the
capital made interior locations like San Luis Potosí important sites for the provisional forays of
US firms into Mexico. 42
Bendix’s plan, still kept secret from P & D workers and their union, was to move
production from two sites—ignition components from the plant at Long Island City and its
bicycle coaster brake business housed at the Eclipse Machine Company, a Bendix subsidiary
located two hundred miles to the northwest in Elmira—to the new plant in central Mexico. A
once-confidential “Five-Year Business Plan” on deposit in an Eclipse Machine Company
collection at the Chemung County Historical Society in Elmira reveals in candid fashion the
rationale for the shift:
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The motivating factor behind this proposal is the unsatisfactory forecasted profit performance of
bicycle brakes and automobile ignition products in existing locations. This situation is attributed to
our non-competitive labor cost in the case of bicycle brakes at MCD, and lack of sufficient volume
base at P & D, coupled with expected labor costs under the UAW contract. To reverse this
situation and improve profitability, it is recommended that Bendix create a 100% Bendix-owned
subsidiary in Mexico to manufacture the above products for sale in the U.S.A. We have assurance
from the Mexican Government that an export operation of the type we are planning for San Luis
Potosi will not be subject to Mexicanization as is the case now existing at Frenomex. The
administrative, marketing, and engineering functions will remain in the U.S.A. substantially as
they now exist. 43

The increase in labor costs at P & D—a result, both workers and management agreed, of
the workers’ successful organizing campaign and the contract settlement it helped produce—
came on the heels of what the company characterized as “one of our most difficult periods in two
decades.” Between 1969 and 1970, the company’s after-tax profit had plunged from $50.8 to
$29.1 million. The reasons were several. 1970 marked the beginning of the decline in Vietnam
War spending, delivering a gut punch to firms like Bendix, whose sales depended heavily on the
defense budget. Even in better times, though, high sales did not guarantee satisfactory profits.
For example, the Automotive Group, of which P & D was a part, experienced a fourteen percent
decline in pre-tax profit for the year on substantially similar sales. By the early 1970s, the Bendix
margin for error had grown thin, and from the company’s perspective, the dogged efforts of the
women at P & D marked a decided step in the wrong direction. 44
To solve this problem, Bendix pursued two basic strategies—shift, as much as possible,
from government to commercial business, and pursue expansion abroad with a vengeance. The
purchase of P & D satisfied the first of these conditions while its closure and reopening in
Mexico fulfilled the second. In the company’s 1970 Annual Report, the International division, of
which Blumenthal was head, boasted that “Bendix has become a thoroughly ‘multinational’
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company”—the scare quotes denoting the lingering novelty of such a phrase in 1970. “For a
number of years,” the Report continued, “our business planning and resource allocation have
been pointed toward a global approach to investment and market development without reference
to national boundaries.” Where previous efforts to manufacture abroad, however, had been
aimed at selling in those countries—as late as 1970, the Annual Report emphasized this point,
arguing that “many countries outside the United States are experiencing faster economic growth
rates than can be expected in the highly developed American market” and promising high returns
based on this fact—the plant in San Luis Potosí represented a shift in that its products would be
exported for sale in the US itself. In the early 1970s, this strategy still marked an exception to
prevailing practice, as Blumenthal took care to emphasize in public statements to audiences
concerned about the effect of imports on US employment. In the coming years, though,
Blumenthal and his multinational compatriots would have their cake and eat it too, exploiting the
unevenness in wages and conditions across national boundaries while insisting on the right to
ship goods across them with as little friction as possible. Blumenthal was well-placed to engineer
these maneuvers—in an earlier career, had served as chief negotiator for the US during the
Kennedy Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, where he helped to extend the
American commitment to a mostly one-sided trade liberalization that culminated in the United
States confronting its first merchandise trade deficit in 1971. By this time, Blumenthal had
exchanged his job designing the political conditions for the export of capital for another, more
lucrative one at Bendix where he could try his hand at executing those transfers themselves. 45
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Transnational production had its roots in recent efforts by the Mexican government to
capture a greater share of the benefits of extant North American-owned factories for Mexico and
Mexicans. In 1962, the government of Adolfo López Mateos issued a decree mandating that
sixty percent of the components assembled into vehicles in Mexico had to be produced in that
country. Stringent enforcement quickly lifted this figure above the sixty percent threshold, and it
was due to rise to seventy percent by 1967. As UAW staff understood it, this policy had two
effects—it separated the wheat from the chaff, bouncing small, inefficient producers from the
scene, and it jump-started the Mexican parts industry, as companies like Nissan and Volkswagen
built new plants to supply their finished vehicle assembly operations. The problem was that the
Mexican domestic market was both small and competitive, meaning it could not absorb the kind
of volume required to achieve the scale economies necessary to meet the price points established
by that intense competition. This led to considerable “excess capacity … which has led Mexico
to seek external markets.” Given the existing state of play, for Mexico to develop, it had to
export. 46
Those UAW leaders who had their ears to the ground on such matters were concerned. In
1968, Victor Reuther, then director of the UAW International Affairs Department, wrote to
UAW economist and Special Projects Director Nat Weinberg that “it is quite apparent that the
Mexican government is moving in a manner to encourage a movement of producers of vehicles
who now have operations in Mexico, to expand their operations with the view of exploiting the
U.S. car market. … These developments are of such importance that I believe they call for
careful study by the officers of UAW with a view to developing a clear UAW policy in regard to
these moves.” Reuther suggested increased UAW support to Mexican unions and attention to
“Mexican Auto Industry” n.d.; “Interview with Mr. Campos Salas, Minister of Commerce of Mexico,” December
4, 1967, both in Box 102, Folder 23, UAW Special Projects Department Records.
46
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strengthening the Mexican Automotive Workers Council, established with UAW support and
inaugurated with a visit from Walter Reuther himself in December of 1966. 47
Even as Reuther wrote, the Mexican government under Gustavo Díaz Ordaz was
preparing new regulations to further promote the export of parts produced in Mexico. Under the
1962 directive, companies could still import forty percent of the parts they used to assemble their
finished vehicles in Mexico. The government now tied both those imports and the “basic quota”
governing how many finished vehicles any one company could produce to their willingness to
export parts in “compensation” for those privileges. A document issued in October 1969 by
Mexican Secretary of Industry and Commerce Octaviano Campos Salas laid out the rationale for
this step. “The rise in the export of domestic-built auto parts the auto and truck manufacturers
have been doing in order to get extra quotas for the manufacture of vehicles,” the agreement
stated, “and the still unused capacity of the facilities of the auxiliary automotive industry, show
that there are real possibilities of increasing such exports.” The goal was to further develop the
Mexican auto industry and improve the country’s balance of payments. Companies that did not
match imported parts with complimentary exports within five years would see their quota for
finished vehicles reduced. 48
Bendix planners were optimistic that Bendix Mexicana would help the company revive
its flagging profit picture. From their perspective, the move was the only feasible response to
what had become a zero-sum game. “It is anticipated that Bendix,” they wrote, “in operating a
Mexican production facility, can price competitively to allow increased penetration in the
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ignition components markets. Continuing to operate in the U.S. would force Bendix out of all
ignition components business other than that portion now supplied to ASD [another Bendix
division].” By this logic, Miron argued to the Senate Finance Committee, the move to Mexico
should be construed as a net benefit to Americans, given that the alternative was for Bendix to
exit the business altogether, taking any residual jobs in design, engineering, and sales with it. His
arguments mirrored the briefs in favor of free trade currently emanating from groups like the US
Chamber of Commerce. One cartoon-decorated pamphlet, for example, asked the rhetorical
question—“Could Foreign Competition Take My Job?” “Yes,” the pamphlet answered frankly—
but after all, “so could domestic competition.” Moreover, workers might, as Miron had implied,
even “owe” their jobs to foreign trade. And American consumers benefited from the low prices
enabled by low-cost production elsewhere. Such literature sought to warn American workers
about the dangers of tariff wars and enlighten them on the cheery nostrums of orthodox trade
theory. 49
The benefits expected from the new Mexican plant were significant. “The low labor rates
at BXM [Bendix Mexicana] and the high labor content of the new products makes us optimistic
about the future and our ability to generate a 15% profit while gaining 30-50% of the U.S.
market,” planners wrote. “ROA [return on assets] for the Mexican location alone is projected to
improve from 5.1% in 1973, the first year of operation, to 27.1% in 1976. The profit to sales
relationship is expected to reach 15.6% by 1976.” Elsewhere, they projected that “over the
period through 1976, it is expected that the move to Mexico should improve Bendix' before tax
profits by an aggregate $6,696,000 when compared to continuing operations at present
locations.” And there could be more to come. “This proposal includes only those benefits and
“Five Year Business Plan”; Chamber of Commerce of the United States, “Could Foreign Competition Take My
Job?” n.d., Box 80, Folder 22, UAW Special Projects Department Records.
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subsidies which have been confirmed with the Mexican Government. Additional benefits, such
as the conversion of excess tax credits to cash and the duty free importation of machinery and
equipment, are not included although the Mexican Government has advised us that these benefits
are now under consideration and will probably be available to us prior to our move and start of
operations.” 50
Bendix officials were clear—in confidential internal memos at least—that reduced labor
costs were the key to recovery. They would find these by scouring North America for places in
which they could enjoy once more the vulnerable workforce, dubious labor representation, and
economic desperation that could push costs down enough to restore profitability. San Luis Potosí
was a good candidate. With a minimum wage lower than that of many Mexican states and an
unemployment rate of anywhere between eight and twenty-five percent, depending on whom one
asked, the state promised a ready supply of impoverished job seekers. Bendix, through an
agreement with the state government, paid nothing for the site on which it built its factory.
Moreover, the agreement exempted the company from ninety-five percent of Mexican taxes,
state and federal, for the first ten years of operation and eighty percent for the second decade,
should there be one. 51
The plant’s restrictive work rules, which included punitive attendance policies and
docked paychecks for wear and tear to machinery, were enabled by the timid representation
afforded workers by their Confederación de Trabajadores de México (CTM) affiliated company
union, which facilitated the company’s return to P & D-like conditions in the days before Local
259 got hold of the plant. On paper, Mexico had some of the most worker-friendly labor laws in
the world, but in practice, CTM unions, born during the Cárdenas regime of the 1930s and
50
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hooked in symbiotic embrace with the party-state apparatus that became the Partido
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), worked with the government, using force and violence when
necessary, to create the kind of conditions employers, both domestic and foreign, found
amenable. In a process that paralleled in starker fashion the de-radicalizing trajectory of
American industrial unions during and after World War II, CTM unions became thoroughly
subordinated to the PRI, purged Communists and militants, and nurtured a generation of ironfisted, bureaucratic leaders, beholden to employers as well as their state patrons and known
pejoratively to members as charros, a name derived from the flashy, cowboy-style outfits
favored by CTM General Secretary Jesús Díaz de León and his followers. At the level of
officialdom, the UAW maintained friendly relations with the CTM, whose leader, Fidel
Velázquez, hosted Walter Reuther on a 1966 visit. In private communications, though, staffers
were harsh, averring that the CTM unions, “with too few exceptions, are neither democratic, nor
free, except from virtue,” and comparing them to their state-dominated counterparts in the Soviet
Union. 52
Many CTM unions were effectively company unions, and the one representing the
workers at Bendix Mexicana was no different. Chernow, who visited the union’s headquarters in
San Luis Potosí, described it as “a quasi-personnel office for Bendix,” operating an upside-down
version of the closed shop in a manner typical of captive CTM unions. The union’s head, if he
showed up for work, mainly screened applicants on the company’s behalf and helped would-be
employees put their paperwork in order. Workers at Bendix Mexicana shriveled from speaking
with Chernow without first consulting their union boss, who himself called Bendix managers for
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advice before speaking with the journalist. In all, Chernow observed, the union worked “hand-inglove” with the employer and the government to keep San Luis Potosí’s Zona Industrial “free of
labor troubles.” Bendix plant managers agreed. One, an American who had quit the job in
frustration at the arrogance and racism of his superiors, told Chernow that “the type of union that
exists in Mexico would never make it in the United States … I don’t have much respect for the
Mexican unions, though I do have respect for the United Auto Workers.” 53
The UAW and the Problem of Multinationals
Four years after the shutdown at P & D, journalist Ron Chernow, researching a story on
the closure and subsequent flight, confronted W. Michael Blumenthal, who had ascended from
his post at Bendix to become Secretary of the Treasury under President Jimmy Carter. The new
Secretary, whom the Detroit Free Press had described upon his anointing as “a hard-headed
businessman with liberal credentials,” had travelled to New York to negotiate new loan
guarantees that would sustain the federal government’s ongoing bailout of the near-bankrupt
city, felled by some of the same forces Blumenthal had helped administer during his tenure as
CEO of one of the auto industry’s pioneer runaways. Chernow turned up at the press conference
and ambushed the Secretary. “Mr. Blumenthal,” he asked, “do you see any contradiction
between your present role in helping New York and your decision in 1972 as Bendix chairman to
close up a major auto-ignition plant in New York and move it down to Mexico?” Blumenthal
dodged the question but not without dismissing P & D as insignificant, remarking that to him it
was a “very small” plant. 54
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Five years prior, just after the P & D shutdown, the UAW had an opportunity to confront
Blumenthal in an academic setting. The Bendix chair was not a typical American executive.
Born near Berlin to a pair of shopkeepers, he fled the Nazis, winding up in Shanghai, where he
was imprisoned by the Japanese. Arriving in the US in 1947, he worked odd jobs until landing a
spot at Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School of International Affairs, from which he moved to
the school’s economics department, where he earned a PhD in international economics and
began work as a professor there. The restless and ambitious Blumenthal turned down tenure at
Princeton for the business world, bouncing back and forth between there and the government
until his ascent to the Treasury. Blumenthal’s interests stretched beyond individual profitseeking. He was an apostle for tree trade, content not simply to execute the globalization of
production but determined to justify it. In doing so, he emerged as an intellectual architect and
public spokesperson for the emerging multinational order. 55
As such, Blumenthal was willing to engage in frank, if genteel, public discussions with
skeptics like Nat Weinberg—labor economist, Special Projects Director at the UAW, and an ally
of the Reuthers from the early days. One such encounter occurred at Maidenhead, on the Thames
just west of London, in April 1973. The occasion was a conference organized by C. Fred
Bergsten, a one-time assistant for international economic affairs responsible for foreign
economic policy under Henry Kissinger at the National Security Council and now a senior fellow
at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. The goal of the conference was to gather
business, labor, and government officials “to discuss trade policies among the industrialized
countries” in light of the “steady liberalization of world trade after 1945.” The conference, which
included panels on “traditional trade theories and the realities of the 1970s,” “multinational
Frank Greve, “From Casino Shill to the U.S. Till: The Rise of J. Michael Blumenthal,” Detroit Free Press,
October 2, 1977.
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corporations and the world economy,” and “national adjustment to economic disturbances caused
by international trade and investment,” followed up on a 1971 meeting of the minds co-chaired
by Blumenthal, Bergsten, Yale Provost Richard Cooper, and Council on Foreign Relations
economist William Diebold that took place in Bermuda in October of that year. Weinberg had
also joined Bergsten on an ill-fated US Chamber of Commerce task force on liberalized
adjustment assistance for workers displaced by international trade that met in November of 1972.
The goal of the task force was, as Weinberg appraised UAW President Leonard Woodcock, to
“find a good proportion of reputable people who will support a generous adjustment assistance
program.” The Chamber's interest in such a program was significant, reflecting the fact that “the
Chamber of Commerce itself is concerned about protectionism to a degree that is causing it to
adopt substantially more liberal attitudes towards adjustment assistance.” If a more generous
subsidy to displaced workers was the price of warding off protection, the Chamber of Commerce
was willing to listen. Nonetheless, the recommendations of the task force, which Weinberg
regarded as “amazing” given the Chamber's previous hostility to adjustment assistance, failed to
achieve a two-thirds majority of its Board of Directors, a fact that a “dismayed and disgusted”
Bergsten attributed to a combination of latent protectionism on the part of some members as well
as opposition to “government intervention in the economy” and unease over the transfer of
decision-making from the states to the federal level. 56
At Maidenhead, Blumenthal offered Bendix as a case study in the goals, priorities, and
consequences of the multinational corporation. Blumenthal's case was rhetorically slippery and
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came with many caveats—he insisted that differences in “motivations, behavior, and impact”
made generalizations about a presumed category of “multinational” corporations, in his words,
“suspect and often meaningless.” Nonetheless, Blumenthal spoke in passably concrete terms
about the reasoning of firms like Bendix. Mexico loomed large in this discussion, although
Blumenthal repeatedly insisted to this audience, as he had to the public, the company's Mexican
operations constituted an “exception” to some presumed rule. One example was the role of
differing levels of taxation in motivating location decisions for multinationals. Blumenthal
announced that “I do not recall a single case in which the tax rate has been a significant factor in
determining whether or not to enter a market.” In the next breath, however, he reported several
“exceptions” to this rule, including the important export platforms of Mexico and Taiwan.
“Frequently, countries provide one-time subsidies and initial tax breaks for a limited period of
time to attract local investment,” he admitted, explaining that this practice held for US states,
European countries, and the less-developed countries, perhaps begging the question of where this
purported exception did not apply. Blumenthal hedged his case by explaining that uneven
taxation did in fact affect location decisions, but were just one factor among many. They had
been a factor in attracting production to Mexico, where “substantial” incentives “made the
difference enabling us to export to third country markets or even, in a more limited way, back to
the United States.”
Blumenthal also muddied the waters where labor costs were concerned. They were “just
one element,” he cautioned, and “virtually never a factor in determining whether or not to enter
into direct production in a particular market.” This claim rested on an important distinction
between “direct production”—in other words producing goods to be sold in the country of
manufacture—and production for export, or producing goods in one country to be sold in

238

another. Where in the former case, labor costs were unimportant because “most of our
competitors in that market are faced with the same costs,” when it came to production for export,
particularly the export of relatively labor-intensive goods, labor costs were indeed significant.
Again, Mexico and Taiwan were offered as “exceptions” to the rule of nothing mattering much
or clearly. Referring to the new San Luis Potosí plant, Blumenthal admitted that “our limited
direct investment ... did, in the first instance, constitute a shifting of some jobs from the United
States to a foreign area.” Repeating Miron’s claims, however, Blumenthal insisted that whatever
Bendix did was a net positive for the United States, since “if we had not shifted the production
abroad, we would have lost the business totally, and under the alternative we adopted, the design,
engineering, distribution, and servicing for these products expanded Bendix' employment in the
United States.” In the end, while the real bottom line for Blumenthal was that “the basic business
objective of Bendix is to secure a maximum profitable share of the world demand for our
products in each major world market,” and that whatever maneuver got Bendix closer to that
goal was the one the company would adopt, he argued that by behaving in this way, “our foreign
involvement has had a positive impact on the U.S. balance of payments and trade, on the number
of work places in the United States, and on the development of foreign economies throughout the
world.” In this vision of free trade and multinational enterprise, no one could lose. 57
Weinberg, one of four unionists on the twenty-six person roster, rejected Blumenthal's
arguments. The contemporary multinational corporation—a term Weinberg rejected as insipid,
preferring “international” or “supra-national” to denote such a firm's constitutional disloyalty to
political boundaries—were a “far cry” from the virtuously competitive small capitalists of Adam
Smith's day. Weinberg reminded his listeners that Smith himself had opined that “merchants and
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manufacturers ... neither are, nor ought to be, the rulers of mankind,” and he went on to offer an
indictment of the multinational corporation from the perspective of workers, “not only as
employees but in their roles as citizens and consumers.” Where Blumenthal was general,
Weinberg was concrete, urging listeners to consider precisely what lay underneath terms like
“investment climate,” which he emphasized meant low wages, low taxes, limited public services,
weak unions, little to no health or safety provision, toleration for abuse of the natural
environment, and pliable, often personally corrupt political elites. These, he emphasized, were
the conditions in which Blumenthal's “basic business objective” could most effectively be
realized. Citing the then-current scandal of the attempts on the part of International Telephone
and Telegraph to enlist the US Central Intelligence Agency on its behalf to “nullify the result of
a democratic election” in Chile, Weinberg emphasized the connection between multinationals,
profit-making, and authoritarianism—“the ICs tend to form alliances with the most reactionary
elements in the host countries—sometimes displaying a particular compatibility with
dictatorships,” he argued. The phenomenon whereby companies played US states off one another
in a race to the bottom now occurred at an expanded scale, where the unevenness—and therefore
the leverage—was even greater. The extraordinary economic power and newfound mobility of
the multinational corporation permitted it to “blackmail nations into mutually damaging
competition that enables the ICs to extort concessions, subsidies, and special privileges that
largely nullify whatever public benefits might otherwise flow from their investments.” And to
the extent that the investments of multinationals helped to “develop” other countries, as their
partisans claimed, they did so only as a byproduct of the profit motive, meaning that
development was unplanned, piecemeal, and ultimately revocable. In short, the less-developed
countries were being permitted to “develop,” but only in directions amenable to the profit-
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making imperatives of those who maintained, in sovereign-like fashion, an absolute prerogative
over the disposal of the wealth the less-developed countries so desperately needed. Choice, will
autonomy—in other words, freedom— did not, according to Weinberg, enter into the question. 58
Weinberg, like Harris, Patton, and others, urged instead that the notion of cost and benefit
be expanded to include a genuine accounting of the costs and benefits of the measures taken by
private actors for societies as a whole. On the basis of this alternative balance sheet, he
envisioned a world where development would not be an accidental byproduct of the selfinterested decisions of those who enjoyed control over wealth, but the goal of investment itself.
To achieve this required input not from a small group of executives or a slightly larger group of
shareholders, but from all who would be affected by the location and manner of investment. In
short, he urged that the multinationals be subjected to democratic control, whether at the national
or the international level. Weinberg’s aspirations reflected his socialist background. In an earlier
era, the UAW and its confederates in the CIO had sought to force democratic ideals and
democratic practice in the autocratic realm of the American workplace. Now, with that
unfinished project in retreat, an era of unprecedented capital mobility presented an even more
daunting challenge.
The problem was a perennial one—unequal resources. While arguing that “the
international labor movement was the first major institution to react to the dangers inherent in
unchecked exercise of power by ICs,” Weinberg acknowledged that “the process of achieving
adequate coordination is slow and difficult for a variety of reasons.” “Unionists are well aware,”
he continued, “that collective bargaining is limited in scope, that unions alone cannot mobilize
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sufficient countervailing power to offset that of the ICs and that the latter endanger workers not
only as employees but also in their roles as citizens and consumers.” Referring to the days of the
New Deal, whose Wagner Act had inaugurated the present era of collective bargaining, he
explained that the labor movement “has always turned to governments for help.” The US
government should, for its own sake and for the sake of American workers, rein in the autonomy
of multinational corporations and subject them to a conscious, deliberate political process.
The UAW had sought to provide a model for what governments might do in a resolution
adopted by its International Executive Board in June of 1971, which proposed a government
licensing scheme to regulate the foreign investments of US-based corporations. To win a license,
corporations would have to demonstrate that their proposed investments would “serve the
interests of the United States economically” and agree to compensate any displaced American
worker for “loss of wages, fringe benefits, seniority rights, and so forth.” Moreover, corporations
would agree to observe a code of “good behavior” that included respect for “free collective
bargaining,” environmental stewardship, and other socially responsible practices. In all, this
arrangement would make the multinational corporations “transmission belts for good labor
standards,” binding them to a kind of Protocol of Peace for the world economy. With this idea,
Weinberg and the UAW Board sought to transform the current race to the bottom into a race to
the top. In political terms, they sought conscious and deliberate control over the activities of the
corporations—their subjection to a democratic process that would include greater swathes of
society in shaping the dispensation of its resources. What they left unsaid was that this amounted
to a proposal for the abrogation of property rights and managerial autonomy as well as a tacit
redistribution of wealth, since such a scheme would impose significant new costs on the
multinationals at precisely the moment when competition from abroad had sent them searching
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for new locales where low wages and the absence of regulation promised the cost savings they
desperately sought. As was clear from the distinctive arguments presented by Blumenthal and
Weinberg at Maidenhead, the definition of what would serve “the interests of the United States”
depended heavily on which Americans one was talking about, and win-wins were hard to come
by in the cut-throat environment of the early 1970s. As the workers at Long Island City and
Elmira discovered, what was good for the owners and managers of Bendix was not necessarily
good for its employees.
“In All of Its Grandeur”
Bendix managers may have respected the United Auto Workers enough to flee it, but
their ability to flee exposed the limits of the firm-centered approach to which even the most
socially and politically ambitious of American unions had retreated after the collapse of their
social-democratic offensive following the Second World War. Even a creative and tenacious
UAW local like New York City’s Local 259 could not transcend this disadvantage. For the
duration of the postwar boom, the country’s biggest firms had proven willing to trade higher
wages for union leaders’ retreat in the face of the ultimate prize—control over production,
including not only how but where it would take place. The latter question—who controls
production—is fundamentally political, and goes to the heart of who will control the productive
apparatus of society—the many (workers) or the few (owners)? For this reason, when the UAW
and General Motors concluded their 1950 “Treaty of Detroit”—a win for workers in a short-term
financial sense but a political defeat in that it effectively ceded a series of crucial principles to
the corporations—Fortune magazine announced that “GM may have paid a billion for peace but
it got a bargain.” In the years that followed, the auto firms and their suppliers would press to the
full the advantages they had secured during the period of reaction that followed the war. The
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limits of what Nelson Lichtenstein called “social pioneering at the bargaining table” had become
clear to Walter Reuther as early as the 1946 GM strike, but here, as in so many other matters, his
farsightedness did not translate into effective alternative strategies. 59
As the postwar boom fizzled out at the end of the 1960s, union leaders and the workers
they represented confronted a new problem—the old bargain, which many observers had
mistaken for a permanent settlement of the old antagonisms between capital and labor, no longer
obtained. The days of trading wage increases for control over production were over. Indeed, at a
firm like P & D, operating in a highly competitive, labor-intensive business like ignitions, those
days had never really arrived. Instead of imposing the rationale of the Treaty of Detroit and the
system of pattern bargaining it helped to instantiate onto the chaotic, competitive world of the
parts manufacturers, UAW officials watched as the world moved in the opposite direction,
seemingly travelling back in time. Instead of bringing P & D into the twenty-first century, the
automobile industry as a whole came to look more and more like P & D, even if it had to migrate
to far-flung locales to accomplish this transformation. The workers at P & D, as tenacious and
stouthearted as the cadre who had built the UAW in its glory days, were left holding the bag, as
was the City of New York, which would bear its share of their burden in increased social service
costs. “While they fled to come to the United States, Bendix, in all of its grandeur, goes to
Mexico,” a disgusted Sam Meyers had told the Senate Finance Committee in March of 1972.
The women of P & D, ambitious in their own right, had crossed national boundaries in search of
a higher wage and a more dignified future. But Bendix, in order to preserve its profitability,
moved in the opposite direction, leaving the women of P & D and New York City in the lurch.
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Chapter Four
“A Monument to Promises Unfulfilled”: IBM and Bedford-Stuyvesant
On August 2, 1968, International Business Machines (IBM) chairman Thomas J. Watson,
Jr. addressed the employees of IBM Brooklyn, a fledgling plant housed on four floors of a onetime warehouse the company had converted to manufacturing use. The plant, located in the
central Brooklyn neighborhood of Bedford-Stuyvesant, had opened in June to manufacture
external cables for shipment to other IBM plants in the region, where they would be installed in
IBM’s expanding line of computers, including the company’s wildly successful flagship, the
System/360. 1
IBM Brooklyn was not just a factory—it was a social experiment. For decades, capital
had fled Bed-Stuy, leaving behind a neighborhood that had become a byword for crumbling
infrastructure, joblessness, and intense, racialized poverty. There were few signs that private
investors wished to reverse this trend. “The afternoon I walk into my board of directors and tell
them that Bobby Kennedy was here today, and he thinks we should put a plant in BedfordStuyvesant, that is the afternoon they’ll have me committed,” one chief executive told Senator
Robert Kennedy, who had adopted the rejuvenation of Bed-Stuy as a personal project. 2
In December of 1966, Kennedy had announced the establishment of the BedfordStuyvesant Rehabilitation and Renewal Corporation, which quickly became one of the most
prominent of the “community development corporations” (CDCs) that would sprout across urban

Thomas J. Watson, Jr., “Mr. Watson’s Address to Employees at IBM Brooklyn,” August 2, 1968, Box 502, Folder
11, Thomas J. Watson, Jr. Papers, IBM Corporate Archives, Somers, NY (IBMCA).“SMD Brooklyn Plant
Celebrates First Anniversary,” IBM News: Brooklyn 6, no. 8, April 25, 1969, IBMCA. Franklin M. Fisher, James W.
McKie, and Richard B. Mancke, IBM and the U.S. Data Processing Industry: An Economic History (New York:
Praeger, 1983), 139–140.
2
Michael Woodsworth, Battle for Bed-Stuy: The Long War on Poverty in New York City (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2016), 303.
1

245

America during the late 1960s and early 70s. Generally speaking, CDCs were a conservative
response to the perceived failures of the War on Poverty, President Lyndon Johnson’s signature
domestic initiative. In place of the tumultuous mix of patronage politics and democratic
opportunity that characterized the government-sponsored Community Action Agencies, CDCs
offered a top-down model that worked “largely parallel” to these agencies and sought to enlist
the money and the ethos of private business to address the collective anger that had confronted
Kennedy on a visit to the neighborhood in February of 1966. As historian Karen Ferguson
observes, the Ford Foundation, in which the CDC idea had partially been hatched, had recently
“altered its strategy for social development in the ghetto to one that followed the national
political mood and its own ideological roots by shifting right. It moved toward individual versus
group-based initiatives; local rather than national programs; capitalist economic development
over social welfare programs; less government and more private-sector involvement in the
ghetto; the rejection of grassroots participatory democracy for the top-down leadership of the
elite theory of democracy; and the values and practices of corporate America, all the while
retaining the assimilation-through-segregation strategy of developmental separatism.” 3
By 1968, when the IBM factory opened, Bedford-Stuyvesant Rehabilitation and Renewal
had re-emerged as the Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation, following a Kennedyapproved split among Bed-Stuy’s fractious reformers. Over the course of the next decade,
“Restoration,” as it became known colloquially, would become a significant player in central
Brooklyn politics. IBM Brooklyn was not an official Restoration project, but it was closely
aligned. Watson, a political supporter and social acquaintance of Senator Kennedy, served on the
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board of the Bedford-Stuyvesant Development and Services Corporation (D&S), a separate body
established by the senator’s staff to inoculate the project against local control. For nearly a
decade, D&S, composed of wealthy white businessmen, would command Restoration’s staffing
and spending decisions.
What was the the IBM Brooklyn experiment? Part jobs program and part riot insurance, it
was a project that sought to re-establish manufacturing as a vehicle for upward mobility in an era
where the objective conditions for such an approach seemed to be disappearing and for a group
of people whose special role in a racialized economy made them among the least likely to repeat
that historical trajectory. IBM Brooklyn was also a class project, one that strove to fortify a black
middle class whose conservatism and faith in American capitalism might sway their poorer
brothers and sisters at a time when large numbers of the oppressed were engaged in the fitful,
chaotic process of forging alternatives. Lastly, it was a gambit that imagined American
corporations as capable managers of the social problems borne of an economic system that had
excluded millions.
The project’s weakness was a result of these unworkable ambitions. “We are a profitmaking corporation,” Watson warned employees during his inaugural blessing. “We are not a
charitable operation. We’re not CORE; we’re not the NAACP—so this has to be a business
operation.” But Watson did not always follow his own advice. To an interviewer in 1970, he
confessed that “the costs are way out of line.” “I just don't think ... the IBM company can run
that over a very long period at a very inefficient level. So I try to tell the blacks who work there
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that after a preliminary period we really must get it on line as efficient as any other IBM plant.”
From the beginning, the writing was on the wall. 4
“A business operation.” Watson seems to have presumed that the assembled guests knew
what he meant by this admonition. What, though, was “business?” In the abstract, the word
connotes sustained activity, seriousness of purpose. Here, the word did more work. In BedfordStuyvesant, a restive place in a radical age, “business” was a metaphor, one that connoted
hierarchy, competition, fealty to established norms rather than challenges to them, and buying-in
to the system instead of throwing it out. IBM was not CORE, whose 1964 street protests against
the police murder of an African American teenager had mushroomed into the first of the urban
rebellions that would shake American cities. It wasn’t even the NAACP, an organization whose
moderate approach now struck many African American city-dwellers as sheepish and ineffective.
Most broadly, the word “business” referred to capitalism, a set of activities structured by
specific compulsions and specific relationships. More concretely, it referred to American
capitalism, whose managers had long embraced and deployed a set of ideas about human
difference we call “race.” Implicitly, the IBM Brooklyn project posed a question—was there
now room for private profit and the well-being of black New Yorkers? Could IBM forge a nonracial capitalism amidst the crumbling sidewalks and social despair of Bedford-Stuyvesant?
For a moment, the answer seemed to be yes. At midcentury, the firm was at the peak of
its power. Engineering a cross-class, cross-racial connection between the bearers of that power
and the marginalized was at the heart of the Bedford-Stuyvesant project. Kennedy had wanted “a
wealthy company who could go in and do something in the ghetto,” Watson surmised. “A
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company that was a marginal operation really couldn't. Because the trouble in the ghetto was it
was filled with marginal operators already.” The question of why marginal places existed,
though, why they lay “outside the great chain of investment, production, and consumption,” as
Kennedy put it, and why they were filled with people set off in large part by the color of their
skin remained mostly unaddressed. Ironically, within twenty years IBM would find itself
slipping to the margins. During the 1980s, the company suffered “the most dramatic fall from
grace in corporate history,” as two historians of the industry put it. In 1993, a cost-cutting binge
claimed the jobs of 100,000 IBM employees, including everyone at IBM Brooklyn. After
twenty-five years, the experiment was over. 5
What Was IBM?
In its own words, IBM is a company that specializes in “collecting, quantifying and
analyzing information.” By the late 1960s, the firm had capitalized on this practice to become the
most valuable company in the United States. From the start, the company’s fortunes were linked
to state power. Herman Hollerith, the father of the punched-card technology on which IBM
would vault to industrial supremacy, began his career working for the United States Census. This
experience prompted him to devise a tabulating machine that combined the punched-card storage
techniques pioneered by textile magnate Joseph Marie Jacquard and refined by computing
pioneer Charles Babbage with the power of electricity. Hollerith’s machine cut turnaround time
for the census by a factor of five and saved the government millions. In 1911, Charles R. Flint,
whom the newspapers dubbed the “father of trusts,” consolidated Hollerith’s Tabulating Machine
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Company with a series of computing scale and time card manufacturers to create the ComputingTabulating-Recording Company, which in 1924 renamed itself International Business Machines,
or IBM, in a nod to the firm’s multinational aspirations. 6
In 1916, Flint tapped Thomas J. Watson, Sr., a refugee from the National Cash Register
Company, to run IBM. National Cash Register—famous enough at the turn of the century to be
known simply as “the Cash”—and its founder, the imperious John H. Patterson, were celebrated
names in American management circles. Patterson, who has been called “the father of modern
salesmanship” so many times it is impossible to determine the attribution, schooled Watson in
his idiosyncratic but highly effective management techniques before dumping the junior
executive in 1914—one of the few business decisions Patterson was said to regret. To Hollerith’s
technical achievements Watson brought the evangelical marketing zeal he had absorbed at the
Cash, guiding IBM to tens of millions in annual profits and winning himself the largest executive
salary in the United States. 7
The growth of governments meant growth for IBM. In the United States, the New Deal,
which substantially expanded the scope of government, created enormous informationprocessing needs that the company was well-placed to fulfill. While most New Deal programs
boosted IBM’s fortunes, it was Social Security that sent them to the moon. Once IBM won the
contract to supply the government, it could turn around and market its machines to large
employers who were now obligated to provide untold reams of data to that government. During
the 1930s, while other companies suffered, IBM expanded its manufacturing and research
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capabilities and embarked upon a hiring binge. In 1938, the firm broadcast its triumph with a
new “world headquarters” at the corner of Madison Avenue and 57th Street, decorated with the
slogan “World Peace through World Trade.” Peace or no, trade served IBM handsomely—
through its German subsidiary, the firm was an enthusiastic collaborator with the Nazi regime,
which used IBM machines to help organize the Holocaust. 8
At home, IBM’s Watson was a full-throated supporter of Franklin Roosevelt and the New
Deal, a position that put him at odds with many businesspeople. The flush 1930s also permitted
Watson to fashion a distinctive employment regime for which the company became famous. At
the Cash, Watson had absorbed his mentor’s enthusiasm for welfare capitalism, or the idea that
the foundations of a secure and dignified life for workers should be dispensed at the prerogative
of their employers instead of extracted through independent self-organization. It was not until the
30s, though, with IBM profits bulging and a reinvigorated labor movement beating at corporate
gates, that Watson could convince IBM’s board to establish what Watson regarded as a kind of
private New Deal. These arrangements included relatively high wages, robust benefits, and a
“no-layoff” policy in exchange for intense effort, repudiation of the labor movement,
conservative social mores, and fealty to the company as personified in its manager-king, Watson.
IBM encouraged its workers to think of themselves as part of a family, eroding the boundary
between public and private life and demanding they shape themselves outside the workplace to
augment their performance inside it. It was this ethos, which characterized IBM’s labor policies
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for half a century, that the company would bring to Bedford-Stuyvesant during the 1960s and
70s. 9
IBM’s alliance with the government continued through the war and into the postwar
period. IBM machines crunched numbers on behalf of the first peacetime draft, wartime wage
and price controls, and the new system of income-tax withholding. During the war, IBM
machines traveled with American soldiers to Italy, France and North Africa, while stateside
bases were furnished with IBM products that wrote checks to soldiers’ families, typed wireless
messages from overseas, and deciphered encrypted enemy transmissions. Responding to the need
for war matériel, IBM turned out weaponry and munitions for the US government, expanding its
plant space by 140 percent and hiring nearly eight thousand new manufacturing workers.
Meanwhile, the military’s computational demands fueled an explosion of research into digital
computing, which would gradually supplant the electro-mechanical technology at the heart of
IBM’s earlier business. In 1945, researchers at the University of Pennsylvania developed
ENIAC, the machine that “inaugurated the era of digital computing in the United States.” The
machine’s initial task was to compute firing tables for the Army. As World War slid into Cold
War, IBM worked with Pentagon officials and defense contractors to design its first electronic
computer, the IBM 701, popularly known as the Defense Calculator. 10
While the war and its attendant craze for computation spawned a surfeit of companies,
IBM used its robust sales and marketing apparatus to dominate the commercial market for
computers, even when, as in the case of ENIAC, it had not been the first to develop a given
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technology. Meanwhile, demand for the new computers exploded. The Cold War fostered the
growth of a business-government-university nexus devoted to applied research, while social
scientists predicted the “automation” of everything from housework to missile defense.
Government expenditures for military electronics ballooned. For the fiscal year ending June 30,
1941, for example, the US government spent $100 million on military electronics. Five years
later, the number was $1.5 billion. The rising tide of the Cold War brought military electronics
spending to $3.9 billion a year by 1957. Meanwhile, companies like IBM worked to adapt and
market their new technologies for civilian use. 11
Watson the younger, who assumed control of IBM in 1952, shepherded the firm’s
transition to a digital age. The results surpassed all expectations. By the mid-1960s, with the
success of the System/360 computer, demand for IBM machines outstripped the company’s
capacity to manufacture them, even with the expanded plant capacity acquired during the war. In
October 1965, IBM announced the construction of over three million new square feet of
manufacturing space, locating plants across the Western hemisphere from San Jose to France. To
staff its plants and sell the new machines, IBM embarked upon a hiring blitz, adding 70,000 new
employees between 1964 and 1967. At the end of 1970, the company posted worldwide revenues
of seven-and-a-half billion dollars—nearly fifty billion in 2019 dollars. 12
IBM Brooklyn was part of this wave of plant construction undertaken during the late
1960s. Its political significance, though, outweighed that of the other new factories. The second
half of the 1960s was a moment of transition for American big business. As historian David
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Vogel notes, the extraordinary economic growth of these years fostered the belief among both
politicians and the general public that “business could afford to rebuild the inner cities, hire the
chronically unemployed, make safer products, clean up air and water pollution, provide all
Americans with a healthy and safe working environment, and, at the same time, still further
improve their own living standards.” At the same time, the mid-60s marked the beginning of a
period of rising public skepticism about the compatibility of private profit and the “public
interest.” In this environment, IBM, like many major corporations, embarked upon a stepped-up
public relations effort to repair the breach. The firm began fishing around for a “major ghetto
project,” as Watson called it. “We’d done some sporadic things in Harlem and a little bit in the
west coast ghettos,” he told an interviewer, but “we finally began to think that what we ought to
do is put a plant in the ghetto, not only to learn better about how to handle the Negro, but also to
try and have a kind of test-tube example of what a major corporation might do.” In this sense, a
goal of IBM Brooklyn was to demonstrate that capital could repair what it had abandoned. 13
Why Brooklyn? First, there were personal connections. Unlike many corporate
executives, the Watsons, father and son, were supporters of the Democratic Party. The elder
Watson had been a vociferous defender of Franklin Roosevelt, mobilizing IBM’s considerable
public relations machinery to promote the New Deal. Watson Jr. had been a political supporter of
John F. Kennedy, whom his wife Olive had known socially since their New England prep school
days. Two Kennedy confidants, Burke Marshall and Nicholas Katzenbach, became higher-ups at
IBM on the strength of Robert Kennedy’s recommendation. And Robert, now the senator from

David Vogel, Fluctuating Fortunes: The Political Power of Business in America (New York: Basic Books, 1989),
1–15; Watson, Jr., interview with Roberta W. Greene, Robert F. Kennedy Oral History Program. On the relationship
between American corporations and an evolving black liberation movement, see Laura Warren Hill and Julia Rabig,
eds., The Business of Black Power: Community Development, Capitalism, and Corporate Responsibility in Postwar
America (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2012).

13

254

IBM’s home state of New York, was a personal friend—the Watsons and Kennedys skied
together at Vermont’s exclusive Stowe resort and the IBM chief made a summer habit of loaning
the senator his yacht, which Kennedy used to sail to old-money retreats on the Maine coast. 14
Kennedy’s community development project had been specially designed to appeal to
corporate executives like Watson. Restoration’s two-pronged structure established a firewall
between poor and rich, between black and white, between the disenfranchised and the overenfranchised. And unlike some of the Community Action Agencies associated with the War on
Poverty, Restoration made little attempt to alter the bases for these social hierarchies. The D&S
board, for its part, read like a who’s-who of wealth and power in New York. In addition to
Watson, the board included investment banker and former Treasury Secretary C. Douglas Dillon,
former Tennessee Valley Authority head David Lilienthal, George S. Moore, chairman of the
First National City Bank, James F. Oates, Jr., chairman of the Equitable Life Assurance Society,
William Paley, head of CBS, Benno C. Schimdt of J. H. Whitney and Co., the first venture
capital firm in the United States, J. M. Kaplan of the Kaplan Fund, and Roswell Gilpatric, former
Deputy Secretary of Defense and a partner in the law firm of Cravath, Swaine & Moore. The
corporation’s most active members were André Meyer, an investment banker whom David
Rockefeller dubbed “the most creative financial genius of our time,” and Eli Jacobs, another
investment banker who had roomed with a Kennedy staffer at Yale. 15
From the beginning, this arrangement was widely decried as a “colonial structure,” as
Pratt Institute planner Ron Shiffman, an influential figure in the community development
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movement, put it. “The only reason D&S could have had to put these nice young white fellows
in here is that they said to themselves: ‘We’ve got to have some of our guys to watch those
people over there, or they’re going to steal the money,’” one Restoration staffer noted acidly.
Even Franklin Thomas, Restoration’s first president and no radical, chafed under the
paternalism. “Ostensibly your purpose in being in there is to bring guidance to the natives,” he
told an interviewer in 1972. 16
According to many, though, Thomas’s “natives” didn’t represent Bed-Stuy either. From
the beginning, Restoration defined itself in contradistinction to a War on Poverty that was
chaotic but somewhat democratic—in some ways, chaotic because it was somewhat democratic.
While the leaders of Youth in Action, the neighborhood’s Community Action Agency, found
themselves vulnerable to the demands of the poor for actual decision-making power, Restoration
had a “handpicked” board accountable mainly to D&S, private foundations, and the federal
officials who oversaw the Special Impact Program, the 1966 amendment to the Equal
Opportunity Act by which CDCs became eligible for government support. At a protest organized
by activists shut out of the nascent corporation, angry attendees waved signs reading “Go Home,
Mr. K—We Don’t Need Your Kind of Help” and “Black Power Is Black Togetherness, and
You’re Not with Us, Uncle Tom Jones,” the latter directed at Judge Thomas Jones, Restoration’s
chairman. 17
This top-down approach to fighting poverty appealed to Tom Watson, Jr. Like
Restoration, IBM was not a democracy. Watson, Sr. had unabashedly posited himself as a father.
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“As the head of the family, [he] expected commitment, loyalty, and obedience,” recalled an
intimate. As the firm grew to gargantuan size, Watson the son cultivated a growing corps of
managers while retaining the paternalistic culture and encouraging the fevered internal
competition that kept managers’ eyes on the chief. Kennedy’s staff had spurned Harlem for what
they thought was the “virgin soil” of Bedford-Stuyvesant, where no powerful black politician
could interfere with their plans. IBM similarly discarded its Harlem flirtation for the Kennedy
project, which Watson extolled for “trying to develop Bedford-Stuyvesant on an integrated
basis”—in other words, under the supervision of whites like himself. “Integrated” was a curious
term for a divided body whose boards, separate and unequal, were known casually as the “black
board” and the “white board.” At any rate, it was what Watson was looking for. 18
Even IBM had to be dragged a little, though. While company-sponsored accounts painted
Watson as a political visionary, Carter Burden, a socialite and Kennedy staffer who later served
three terms on the New York City Council, had a different view. In 1974, he told an interviewer
from the Kennedy Library that IBM had only located in Bed-Stuy as the result of a “last-minute
switch, and only after heavy lobbying” by both Kennedy and other D&S board members. “Here
was a guy who was on the board and it didn’t occur to him that they put the IBM plant into
Bedford-Stuyvesant,” Burden sighed. According to consultants employed by the federal
government to evaluate Restoration, the IBM plant received $1.2 million in “non-SIP” money,
where “SIP” referred to the Special Impact Program, the enabling legislation for the community
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development corporations. This contravened claims by IBM and other that the plant had not been
subsidized.19
Frustration was widespread. Franklin Thomas recalled a D&S meeting at CBS
headquarters where an exasperated Kennedy “just gave them hell”:
They just were not doing what they said they were going to do, and that it wasn’t a problem that
was going to go away, it was going to get worse and if this group couldn’t come to grips with it
and do the things asked of it, then what the hell was going to happen to the country? And, you
know, what kind of representatives were they, of the best that the business world could produce?
He really went right at them.

While other firms sporadically contributed money, office space, political connections, or
manpower to Restoration’s efforts, in the end only IBM invested in a visible, material way in
Bedford-Stuyvesant. Members of the D&S board, while prominent as individuals, mostly
demurred at committing their firms to action, which would require convincing shareholders. The
hesitation contributed to a “general disillusionment about what the private sector was really
willing to do in terms of a project like this,” recalled Burden. 20
Least Possible Risk
In a December 1967 memo to IBM president T. Vincent Learson, Tom Watson, Jr.’s
personal secretary stressed that “the only thing to do at Bedford-Stuyvesant is to make the
biggest possible splash with the least possible risk.” Because IBM Brooklyn was a political
project, the planning process, while characteristically thorough, departed from orthodoxy in
several ways. To begin with, there was no strictly economic reason to locate a factory in central
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Brooklyn. With this acknowledged, Watson enjoined managers to “throw away the book.”
“Write your own book,” he told them. 21
To plan its “ghetto project,” the company established a committee headed by George
Carter, a black Philadelphian who had come to IBM from the Peace Corps, where he had served
as Regional Director for North Africa, the Near East and South Asia. Since IBM wished to
“make the biggest possible splash with the least possible risk,” Carter’s committee considered
sponsoring a black entrepreneur to operate as a third-party contractor in Bedford-Stuyvesant.
This strategy could reduce costs, win IBM its plaudits, and insulate the company from criticism
should the project fail. Outsourcing the project would also cordon off the company from labor
unions, whom executives feared might circle if IBM opened a production facility in union-dense
New York City. Anti-unionism was a core value at IBM—the desire to avoid unionization lay at
the heart of IBM-style welfare capitalism and the company, despite its seeming invulnerability,
remained sensitive about the topic. “One of the things we don’t like to talk about is unions, or the
absence of unions in IBM,” Watson admonished the conservative political scientist Edward
Banfield, whom the firm hired to document its Brooklyn foray. 22
Nonetheless, the firm decided to open up a bona fide IBM factory whose employees
would be full-fledged members of the IBM family. This meant IBM wages, IBM benefits, IBM
amenities, and IBM policies, like the fifteen-to-one employee-to-supervisor ratio the firm
maintained at its other plants. IBM would have to shoulder these added costs, planners warned
Watson. An IBM plant in Bedford-Stuyvesant could not be justified on a “strictly business”
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basis, they felt. If IBM chose that option, it would have to be on “emotional” grounds. Watson
rejected third-party operation as well as a consortium idea whereby IBM would sponsor a facility
jointly with several prominent firms. He decided to put IBM on the hook and stomach the costs.
The decision was partly borne of political urgency. In 1964, Harlem and Bed-Stuy had erupted
into open rebellion. In 1965, it was the Watts neighborhood of Los Angeles. In the summer of
1967, Detroit, Newark, and hundreds of smaller cities joined the list. It was imperative to
forestall another “long, hot summer” in American cities. For this reason, IBM should act, and act
fast. 23
Quickly, IBM put together a team to run the plant. The new general manager, Ernest
Friedli, was a white Brooklyn native who currently ran IBM’s plant in Kingston, eighty miles up
the Hudson from New York City. Friedli had not lived in Brooklyn since he was a teenager and
knew little about Bedford-Stuyvesant. The plant would need black managers as well, but IBM
had few black employees and fewer black managers. Working from a list of all black employees
of IBM—a company that employed 150,000 people—Friedli was able to identify six candidates,
four of whom agreed to come work in Brooklyn. Friedli and his new lieutenants prepared for
what they imagined they would find. They traveled to Los Angeles to tour the Aerojet General
subsidiary recently opened in the Watts neighborhood. They visited Rochester, where EastmanKodak had established an outreach program for the city’s black residents. In Yonkers, just north
of New York City, officials of the Otis Elevator Company, where seventy percent of the
workforce was African American or Puerto Rican, told them their fears of crime, vandalism, and
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poor work habits were probably overblown. Finally, reaching Bedford-Stuyvesant itself, they got
a tour of the neighborhood from Restoration head Franklin Thomas. 24
The plant’s new managers prepared to leave places like Boulder, Colorado, San Jose,
California, and Kingston, New York. While they were willing to come work in Bed-Stuy, none
of the initial crew of managers consented to live there and weather the conditions faced by
ordinary Bed-Stuy residents. These included housing that was both dilapidated and expensive,
crowded and poor-performing schools, and pervasive street crime. Instead, they settled in places
like suburban Rockland County or Poughkeepsie, the latter a two-hour drive from Brooklyn.
Eugene Douglas and Henry Jackson, two of the new black managers at IBM Brooklyn, confessed
to Banfield’s assistant that while they had grown up in black neighborhoods, they had spent the
majority of their adult lives in the company of whites. “To them,” Banfield wrote, “the Negro
underclass was hardly less alien than it was to Friedli.” For their part, IBM Brooklyn production
workers told researchers they thought their managers black “only in the technical sense.” 25
Like George Carter, who headed IBM’s first “equal opportunity” program, Douglas and
Jackson were part of an emerging black middle class whose formal integration into whitedominated enterprises distinguished them from earlier black elites, whose social position rested
on their roles as merchants and professionals serving a segregated African American market. By
the late 1960s, black executives like Carter were a “precious commodity,” according to a
Wharton School professor. Some observers took a more cynical view. “Suddenly, in a current
phase of the civil-rights movement, industry is demanding ‘instant Negroes,’” wrote Gene Grove
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in the New York Times. “Yet few instant Negroes are available,” he continued, “and those few
can pick and choose.” Franklin Thomas was a prominent example. “Everybody was looking for a
black trustee at that point,” recalled Carter Burden, and the Restoration chief soon parlayed his
D&S connections into seats on several corporate boards. To outsiders like Robert Kennedy,
Thomas, a former assistant US attorney who came recommended by Manhattan District Attorney
Robert Morgenthau, represented “a black leader whose gender, education, and even outward
appearance mirrored the liberal establishment’s own self-perception,” as historian Karen
Ferguson explains. Evaluators for the Ford Foundation marveled at Thomas’s “towering,
attractive figure” and Judge Thomas Jones claimed that the former basketball star’s physical
stature was among his chief sources of appeal to Kennedy. For this small group of African
American men, entering the halls of power was not always a smooth process—an April 1970
New York Times article, for example, outlined a number of problems facing the newly-minted
black manager, which included discrimination in housing and club membership as well as
tenacious social and sexual myths about blacks to which many white executives still subscribed.
At the same time, they endured suspicion from working-class African Americans. “When young
blacks call guys like me Oreo—black on the outside, white on the inside—they're absolutely
right,” admitted Carter. For these “young blacks,” to be bourgeois was to be white. 26
Was it possible to be bourgeois and black? If there was a social theory at work in IBM’s
plans for Brooklyn, it was the idea that the plant could be a crucible in which the “hard-core”—
establishment argot for supposedly unemployable ghetto dwellers—could remake themselves
and join the middle class. Restoration’s political philosophy, the Ford Foundation noted,
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amounted to “a plea for involving the Negro middle class in the ghetto.” “Again and again, the
recognition to involve the hard core was coupled with urgent pleas to ‘hold the middle class,’” its
analysts reported. According to Watson, the goal was “mobility”:
I believe if we can bring decent payrolls into Bedford-Stuyvesant and encourage other companies
to bring decent payrolls in here that we will give Bedford-Stuyvesant residents mobility. Some of
you may want to move out and that’s fine, go ahead and move out, and others of you may want to
stay here because the community is improving and that’s good too. As long as you have the
mobility and freedom of choice the rest is really up to you. That is the main aim of IBM in
Bedford-Stuyvesant. 27

If all went well, the African American poor could transcend the categories that had heretofore
circumscribed their opportunities and dissolve smoothly into mainstream America. BedfordStuyvesant would cease to exist in its present sense. The ghetto would become just like anywhere
else.
Meeting the “Hard-Core”
Having decided to eschew a third-party contractor and put “‘IBM’ on the front door,”
IBM needed to find a front door. With the help of Restoration, its Real Estate and Construction
division learned of an eight-story warehouse on the corner of Gates and Nostrand Avenues, the
rough geographical center of Bed-Stuy. The firm hired a black architect from Connecticut to
design alterations. A black-owned contractor, backed by a loan from Restoration, performed the
work. One sticking point was air conditioning—Watson, concerned that IBM might set too high
a standard for imagined future local employers, questioned whether this standard feature of IBM
factories should be introduced in Brooklyn. Friedli and his staff objected and convinced the chief
that Bed-Stuy workers should not be made to feel like second-class IBMers. Meanwhile, IBM
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planners decided to start the factory out producing computer cables—a simple, low-risk
product. 28
In May of 1968, managers began to accept applications for the four hundred or so
positions soon to open up at IBM Brooklyn. By October, two thousand people had applied, and
by the end of the year the figure reached 2,500. By December of 1969, nearly four thousand
people had formally sought work in the plant. The young, especially those between eighteen and
twenty-two years of age, outnumbered the old, and women outnumbered men. This latter point
disturbed IBM managers, who had made an explicit decision to favor men in staffing the plant.
For one, they thought male employees more amenable to eventual transfer in fulfillment of
Watson’s injunction to upward and outward mobility. In this, they joined policymakers of all
stripes in an effort to extend to African Americans the patriarchal “Fordist family wage” at the
heart of contemporary anti-poverty politics. With this in mind, hiring managers tipped the scales
towards men, making them three-quarters of all new hires. 29
IBM managers defended their decision by insisting to researchers that “black people
themselves wanted it that way.” They chose to cast the issue in psychological terms. “Employer
prejudice had always been strongest against men,” the theory went, “with the result that women,
‘matriarchs,’ dominated Negro life, and men, having inferior jobs or none at all, were not
respected and could not feel self-respect.” Precisely which black people “wanted it that way”
was left unspecified, but the claim corresponded with the gendered battles then being fought in
Brooklyn anti-poverty circles and the black freedom movement more generally. Restoration

Banfield, “An Act of Corporate Citizenship,” 40–41.
“SMD Brooklyn Plant Celebrates First Anniversary”; Banfield, “An Act of Corporate Citizenship,” 43; “IBM
Brooklyn: Eighteen Months’ Experience, July 1968–December 1969,” n.d., Box 30, Folder 15, Thomas J. Watson,
Jr. Papers, IBMCA; Melinda Cooper, Family Values: Between Neoliberalism and the New Social Conservatism
(Brooklyn: Zone Books, 2017), 7–24; Marisa Chappell, The War on Welfare: Family, Poverty, and Politics in
Modern America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 21–64.
28
29

264

itself had been born in a coup against the group of women, led by community activist Elsie
Richardson and allied with future Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm, who had dominated its
predecessor, the Central Brooklyn Coordinating Council. The victor in that struggle, Restoration
board chairman Judge Thomas Jones, was a frank misogynist whose penchant for hysterics about
neighborhood “matriarchs” “cutting off his balls” became part of Kennedy staff lore. 30
Jobs were a precious commodity in Bedford-Stuyvesant. The official unemployment rate
in the neighborhood stood at double the national figure. Moreover, in the context of now-yearly
urban uprisings, Labor Department economists had begun to question whether the conventional
statistic adequately described the nature of chronic deprivation in places like BedfordStuyvesant. They devised a new measure called “sub-employment,” meant to account for “the
special problems of limited employment, low-wage employment, and those who are so
discouraged that they have ‘given up.’” Bedford-Stuyvesant, in other words, wasn’t like the
places that pulled the national unemployment rate to record lows during the late 1960s. Many
residents had left the labor force, and merely having a job, especially if it was of the sporadic,
precarious, and generally unremunerative type prevalent in America’s racialized ghettos, did not
guarantee a minimally-acceptable standard of living. Reflecting this dawning institutional
awareness, Labor Secretary Willard Wirtz acknowledged that the realities of the labor market in
depressed American cities made national averages “utterly irrelevant.” “If a third of the people in
the nation couldn’t make a living,” he wrote to President Lyndon Johnson in late 1966, “there
would be a revolution.” 31
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When it opened, IBM Brooklyn might have seemed like the beginning of an antidote. A
job at IBM offered pay, benefits, and security that far outstripped anything available to most
Bed-Stuy residents. The lowest-paid worker at IBM Brooklyn received eighty-five dollars a
week, a figure that exceeded the state minimum wage by twenty-five percent. Moreover, the
company had in 1958 placed all manufacturing workers on salary instead of paying an hourly
rate, an advantage to workers in the event of sick days or family emergencies. While not a family
wage—the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated basic living costs for a family of four in New
York City at $111 a week—IBM pay still beat much of what was available in Bed-Stuy. Beyond
this, IBM jobs typically included substantial health benefits, paid vacations, subsidized
education, and even access to the local IBM Country Club, although it was virtually impossible
to reach Sands Point, on Long Island’s tony North Shore, without a car. Perhaps best of all, since
the 1911 merger that created IBM proper, the company had never laid off an employee. All of
this was part of the “lifetime employment contract” that companies like IBM helped to
institutionalize in the prosperous years following the Second World War. Those lucky enough to
be hired at IBM Brooklyn would find themselves incorporated into this regime, heretofore
reserved mainly for white workers. In exchange for this security, the company demanded
enthusiasm and obedience. Friedli, for example, proudly recalled ordering workers to report to
the plant at six in the morning the Friday before Christmas in order to meet a monthly quota. 32
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IBM Brooklyn bucked trends in other ways. Here were four hundred new manufacturing
jobs in a city that had shed more than a hundred thousand during the past decade. This was a
small factory by IBM standards—the typical IBM plant was ten times the size of IBM
Brooklyn—but large for New York City, where smaller establishments were the norm.
Fordism—shorthand for large, capital-intensive plants that utilized an intensive division of labor,
machine pacing, and the relentless de-skilling of the workforce—had mostly passed New York
City by. Instead, the city’s manufacturing ecosystem revolved around “small-batch” production,
turning out products that were either made-to-order or fashioned in limited runs, like blouses.
The political economy of New York manufacturing was such that “it was almost a rule … that as
soon as a product became standardized and began to be sold in large quantities, its production
was moved out of the city, and often out of the region entirely,” as historian Joshua Freeman put
it. 33
The electronics industry was a case in point. The early development of the industry
required collaboration between scientists, engineers, and highly-skilled workers, a situation for
which New York provided an ideal environment. As consumer electronics became standardized
in the late 1920s, however, large firms began to move out of the city. This was not the end of
electronics production in New York, however—while standardized production had migrated
westward, specialty electronic components—those produced in relatively small batches for
scientific, industrial, and military applications—continued to be produced in the city. 34
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Computer cables and power supplies—the stock-in-trade of IBM Brooklyn—were not
technically sophisticated products. On the whole, their assembly was labor-intensive, the work
“repetitious and low-skilled,” according to the city’s former Assistant Commissioner of
Manpower. IBM managers had chosen these lines in part because of their expectations regarding
the inexperience of their projected workforce. The products of IBM Brooklyn were not sold to
consumers, but instead were shipped to other IBM plants to be assembled into the large
mainframe computers in which the company specialized. There was a cost structure—it was
possible to compare unit costs with IBM’s power supply operation in Kingston as well as with
third-party vendors—but IBM would not be out of power supplies, much less out of business, if
its small Brooklyn operation faltered. A firm subject to more immediate market discipline, like
American Safety Razor, Judy Bond, or any other of the thousands of firms that left New York
during these decades, might have moved the work to a low-wage haven. IBM’s might, on the
other hand, likely provided a cushion for experimentation. 35
With four thousand applicants for four hundred jobs, IBM had a large pool from which to
draw. Each application represented someone’s vision, someone’s strategy for survival,
someone’s desire, molded as it might have been by the sobering realities of time, place, and race.
In staffing the Brooklyn plant, IBM dispensed with many of its typical requirements for new
hires. Demanding a high school diploma, for example, would have disqualified substantial
numbers of applicants. At first, managers sought to discover applicants’ police, prison, and credit
records, as was standard procedure at IBM. Gradually, though, they decided to overlook these
factors when job-seekers pled convincingly about their motivation to make it work at IBM. The
company also revised its customary secretarial test when Dolores Minott, a Howard University

35

Banfield, “An Act of Corporate Citizenship," 51; Schrank and Stein, "Industry in the Black Community.”

268

graduate who became the plant’s staff psychologist, argued the exam was culturally biased. In
the early months of hiring, the firm favored applicants who had already been employed
elsewhere. Over time, however, they switched their attention to the “hard-core,” anti-poverty
jargon for unemployed young men who had not finished high school. By the end of 1969, sixtyfive percent of IBM Brooklyn’s staff had been unemployed before coming to work at IBM.
Eighty-seven percent of all employees, including half the managers, were African American. 36
In a time of intense political ferment, few organizations were more identified with the
establishment than IBM. Restoration, with its slick image, establishment ties, and conservative
outlook, found itself in the same boat. IBM was set to announce the Bedford-Stuyvesant project
when Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated in Memphis on April 4, 1968, prompting
rebellions in more than a hundred American cities. In New York, the damage was less severe
than in Baltimore, Washington, DC, or Chicago, a result some attributed to Mayor John
Lindsay’s soft touch. Nonetheless, the tense political atmosphere in New York’s African
American neighborhoods prompted IBM to postpone the announcement for two weeks. On April
17, the firm, eschewing a public ceremony, hosted a luncheon at McDonald’s Dining Room on
Stuyvesant Avenue to present IBM Brooklyn to local notables. Organizers decided to soft-pedal
the connection between IBM and Restoration. In 1968, Franklin Thomas was a controversial
enough figure in Bed-Stuy that they thought it best that he not sit on the dais, although he did
stand to deliver brief remarks. Tensions in the room ran high—when a young CORE member,
understood by attendees to be a proxy for Brooklyn CORE leader Robert “Sonny” Carson,
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needled the Restoration chief on details, Thomas told the youth to stand when addressing the
meeting or “shut up.” 37
IBM, a painfully white organization, trod more gingerly. Following the announcement, a
public relations team roamed the neighborhood on a glad-handing tour. Their goal was to convey
the impression that Bed-Stuy residents might find in IBM Brooklyn a vehicle for selfdetermination. IBM spokespeople emphasized to residents that Bedford-Stuyvesant was “their
community.” “Local people would participate in total plant operations, including management
positions,” they stressed. Open houses were held at the soon-to-open factory. IBM bussed
Kingston employees and their families to Brooklyn to take part in community events. Gradually,
face time with locals seemed to bear fruit. “Frequented local establishments, boot blacks,
restaurants, shoe repair and tailor shops; made point of talking with people on front steps or
sidewalks during summer months; confrontations were dealt with on a positive note rather than
defensive or offensive,” IBM representatives reported to Watson. Skepticism remained— “we
were ‘tested’ by locals to see if we practiced what we preached,” noted the flacks. 38
IBM managers’ fears and expectations about the presumed work habits of the “hard-core”
also reflected their social distance from Bedford-Stuyvesant. Some of these expectations, like
oft-cited concerns about personal hygiene, were plainly racist, reflecting the fear and alienation
that separated middle-class IBMers from their fellow citizens in Bedford-Stuyvesant. Others, like
apprehension about employee vandalism, drug and alcohol abuse, and interpersonal violence at
work, were fueled by news reporting. Some were encouraged by business owners themselves.

Banfield, “An Act of Corporate Citizenship," 44–46; Vincent J. Cannato, The Ungovernable City: John Lindsay
and His Struggle to Save New York (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 210–215; Jason T. Bartlett, “The Politics of
Community Development: A History of the Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation” (PhD diss., Temple
University, 2014), 327.
38
“IBM Brooklyn: Eighteen Months’ Experience.”
37

270

One owner of a small factory in Bedford-Stuyvesant told IBM planners that his employee
turnover was three-hundred percent a year. Over time, though, IBMers came to believe this had
more to do with the nature of jobs than the nature of workers. “Many companies complain they
cannot find reliable workers in the ghetto,” reported a city labor official in 1969. A closer look
revealed that the jobs on offer were “tedious,” “demeaning,” and low-paid. The owner of a
“chicken feather cleaning” operation, for example, lamented his inability to find people who
would reliably man the midnight to eight a.m. shift, toiling in a “cloud of dust and feathers” for
the minimum wage of $1.60 an hour, or sixty-four dollars for a forty-hour week—less than one
might make for the tedious and demeaning task of navigating the city’s public assistance
bureaucracy. Neither strategy made for a living wage in 1960s and 70s New York—a consulting
firm retained by the federal Office of Economic Opportunity reported in 1970 that ninety dollars
a week was “the figure accepted by most job seekers as a minimum decent level of pay.” 39
When the plant opened in July 1968, few of these fears were realized. No one defaced the
plant. Turnover and absenteeism remained at levels the company was willing to tolerate. Two
dozen employees were promoted, some into management. Over the course of 1969, as managers
pivoted towards hiring the “hard-core,” dismissals for insufficient attendance increased,
concentrated among the young, the previously unemployed, and those who had not completed
high school. The close of that year marked the end of a sort of grace period where managers
worked with employees to meet IBM norms, an effort that proved “more time-consuming than
expected.” During this first eighteen months, some managers had doubled as de facto social
workers, going so far as to personally retrieve absentees from their homes instead of firing them.
But were absenteeism and turnover problems only in Bedford-Stuyvesant and other so-called
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“ghetto” areas? The late 60s and early 70s were an era when commentators across the country
diagnosed a “revolt against work” rooted in “apathy and anger on the assembly line,” as Life
magazine put it. In the end, IBM managers judged their initial expectations “unduly pessimistic”
and revamped IBM Brooklyn to produce not just computer cables but power supplies, a more
complex product. 40
From an economic standpoint, IBM Brooklyn performed adequately in its first years of
operation. In the beginning, it took employees five times longer than their Kingston counterparts
to construct a power supply unit, but within two months, the figure was down to twice as long. If
this trend continued, IBM Brooklyn had the potential to meet or beat Kingston on unit cost. The
plant was helped in this regard by the youthful nature of its workforce, which meant most
employees were still working at the bottom of the pay scale, and its location, which enabled it to
share a health facility with IBM’s Manhattan offices. Compared to the cost of third-party
vendors, who charged steep handling fees, IBM Brooklyn came out on top. In time, the factory
would rank in IBM’s top ten for productivity. 41
It is clear that in some cases, IBM met its mandate and became a vehicle for its
employees to reach or remain in the middle class. In this respect, the firm joined a series of
institutions that produced and reproduced a black middle class making itself increasingly visible
during the 1970s. As political scientist Adolph Reed notes, “the most significant shift in the
occupational structure of the black population in the decade after the 1964 Civil Rights Act was a
relative expansion of its elite component. Between 1964 and 1974 the percentage of minority
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males classified as "professional and technical" workers increased by half; the percentage
classified as nonfarm, salaried "managers and administrators" quadrupled over that period.” The
travails of this new social group were chronicled in magazines like Essence and Black
Enterprise, the latter a brainchild of former Kennedy staffer Earl Graves, who had worked on the
Restoration project in its early stages. In 1978, the New York Times Sunday magazine profiled a
“flourishing and swelling” black middle class, “carving a distinct identity for itself,” mounting a
“double-door exit from the ghetto” and making it “increasingly hard to define a ‘black
community.’” 42
Editors of IBM News: Brooklyn, the factory’s monthly newsletter, published enthusiastic
profiles of this upwardly mobile group. George Abercrombie was an example. Born in 1922 near
Selma, in Alabama’s Black Belt, a young Abercrombie moved with his family to Birmingham,
Alabama’s biggest city, where his father worked in the nearby coal mines. Drafted into the army
out of high school, Abercrombie trained as one of the now-famous Tuskegee Airmen, a
pioneering group of African American aviators. As part of a psychological warfare unit during
World War II, he participated in radio broadcasts and leaflet drops over occupied Europe. After
the war, he matriculated at Howard University, completed his studies at the RCA Institute of
Technology in New York, and worked in the Army’s Signal Corps. Stationed in Germany during
the 1950s, Abercrombie fell in love with and married a German woman, Edeltraut Mellein,
beginning a relationship that would last fifty-five years. In 1968, Abercrombie ended his thirtyyear military career with the rank of Chief Warrant Officer, among the highest ranks available to
a non-commissioned officer. He immediately began a second career at IBM, working at IBM

Reed, Jr., Stirrings in the Jug, 248; Alexis Pauline Gumbs, “Black (Buying) Power: The Story of Essence
Magazine,” in The Business of Black Power, 95–115; William Brashler, “The Black Middle Class: Making It,” New
York Times, December 3, 1978.

42

273

Brooklyn as an engineer and settling in Staten Island’s leafy Arden Heights neighborhood.
Abercrombie put in twenty-five years at IBM, retiring in 1992 and moving to Florida. 43
Halvan Lieteau, who succeeded Friedli as plant manager in 1971, was another example.
Born in New Orleans to a Creole family and educated at the private Xavier Preparatory High
School, Lieteau went on to Xavier University, where he earned degrees in business and
accounting. Lieteau served in the US Army during the Korean War, after which he settled in
New York, eventually landing at IBM. After his stint in Bed-Stuy, Lieteau rose to become
Executive Vice-President of the Far East and South American Division, traveling widely across
those regions and living for several years in Campinas, Brazil. Upon his return to New York,
Lieteau settled in Jamaica Estates, a gated enclave in eastern Queens that until recently had been
an “exclusive and nearly all-white place, resistant to outsiders and largely impenetrable to
minorities.” The neighborhood’s elegant single-family homes were the consequence of a
concerted effort on the part of developers like Fred Trump, father of the real estate developer and
future president Donald Trump, to restrict multi-family dwellings, a policy that doubled as a
euphemism for racial segregation. The Trumps themselves lived in a handsome, twenty-three
room home on Midland Parkway. Lieteau became an avid golfer, playing in tournaments in
several countries, as well as a noted donor to Xavier University, his alma mater. In retirement, he
joined the swelling number of African American New Yorkers departing the city for the South,
living out his final years back in New Orleans. 44
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Military service was a common denominator among the proposed role models at IBM
Brooklyn. Both Abercrombie and Lieteau were Army veterans. So was Joe Owens, who received
a bonus for his suggestion that the company install a confidential waste container in the Data
Processing area. Owens adapted this suggestion from his experience as a personnel clerk
working in Danang, Vietnam. Another was higher education. Walter Dula, promoted to a
management position in 1969, had grown up in Bedford-Stuyvesant, attended the prestigious
Brooklyn Technical High School, and studied economics for two years at Brooklyn College.
Senior Benefits Analyst Borah Hornstein, born on Hancock Street in Bedford-Stuyvesant, went
from Brooklyn Tech to Columbia and then on to graduate training in the field of “industrial
relations” at the New York University Graduate School of Business Administration. Another
Bed-Stuy native, Allen Morton, won straight-As at Franklin K. Lane High School, attended
Brooklyn College, and cut short a doctoral program in mathematics at Yale to take a job as an
IBM engineer. Morton, who had since moved out of Bedford-Stuyvesant, was Vice President of
Community Educational Assistance for IBM as well as head of the Computer Personnel
Development Association, a tuition-free institute whose goal was “to secure openings in the
computer field for individuals from ghetto areas.” 45
Morton’s advice to students was “study, more study, and still more study.” For him, this
strategy had borne fruit. The idea that education—and more specifically, job training—could
solve the problems of underemployment and the racial wealth gap seized the imaginations of
liberal reformers during the last days of the postwar boom. The flip side of recurring panics
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around automation was a buoyant technophilia whose adherents lodged their faith in technology
itself as an escape hatch from the dogged social antagonisms reflected in places like BedfordStuyvesant.
This optimism came in two varieties. The first posited that racialized unemployment was,
first and foremost, a result of imperfect information. If this were true, then computers, at bottom
machines to process information more efficiently, might plausibly represent a solution—“a
technology that has to do with a black thing,” as Jack White, a deputy commissioner in the city’s
Manpower and Career Development Agency, told the New York Times in 1969. That year,
staffers at Bedford-Stuyvesant Youth in Action, the neighborhood’s War on Poverty agency,
acquired a computer terminal connected to an IBM 1130 Computing System that sat proudly in
the window of IBM’s data processing center around the corner on Bedford Avenue. Punch a
series of numerical codes into the terminal, White explained, and the 1130 would send back the
job that most closely matched a given applicant’s attributes in terms of age, gender, location,
educational attainment, and desired wage. The computer was an ideal interlocutor—“no fuss, no
muss, no back-talk, no contentiousness and nobody saying you can’t find a job for a kid like
that,” White explained. Sometimes, though, the computer could not find jobs for kids like that.
While dutifully comparing White to Jesus Christ—“a magician waiting for water to turn into
wine”—and transcribing the claim by Cyril Tyson, the city’s highly-paid manpower
commissioner, that the computer represented “a new tool in the black struggle,” the Times
reporter quietly noted an elephant in the room—the database for the entire city contained only
2,000 jobs. 46
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The second hope was that computing would create more jobs than it erased. “Computers
Also Create Employment,” ran a hopeful 1966 headline in the New York Amsterdam News, the
city’s leading black newspaper. The article described the emergence of “retraining” schools like
Commercial Programming Unlimited, located near Manhattan’s Union Square, which offered
instruction on the IBM 1401 computer. In 1968, IBM lent several pieces of equipment to the
State University’s Urban Center on Vanderbilt Avenue in Brooklyn, where instructors taught
students how to program a variety of IBM machines. The school encouraged a gendered division
of labor, offering a separate course on less-skilled data-entry work for women. 47
These schools promised much but often failed to deliver. Morton’s not-for-profit
Computer Personnel Development Association, for instance, enrolled seventy-nine students,
graduated thirty-two, and found jobs for seventeen. “Why were only seventeen of the thirty-one
graduates placed in jobs?” asked two staffers in a post mortem. “The remainder were qualified,”
they argued, “but they just didn’t gain entrance into the tough labor market of New York City,
where it had been assumed that hundreds of computer operator jobs were available.” Worse, the
seventeen jobs were bought dearly. To secure these results, the program had borrowed the talents
of “six teachers, twelve counselors, eight outreach workers, and about a dozen more individuals
in placement, tutorial, curriculum, measurement, and family assistance,” all working on a
volunteer basis. “Teach them to code”—today a bitter cliché to denote facile labor market
optimism—has deeper roots than we might assume. 48
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For employees with a foot in the door at IBM, things could be different. The company’s
extensive educational offerings were tied to its employment practices, especially the commitment
to promoting from within. In addition to its robust program of extracurricular activities, which
included dances, picnics, fashion shows, and an IBM-only basketball league, the company
offered an array of courses for employees to pursue during their off-hours. No other subject was
so intensively promoted in the plant’s newsletter. This “voluntary education” program offered
tuition-free instruction in “company-sponsored subjects,” including typing, shorthand,
mathematics, blueprint-reading, electrical engineering, English, writing, personal finance,
“instructor training” and data processing fundamentals. The program also included a high-school
equivalency course for the thirty-eight percent of plant employees who thus far lacked a diploma.
An in-house library stocked course materials, contemporary literature from the likes of Claude
Brown and Gordon Parks, whose autobiographical novel The Learning Tree Watson had credited
with opening his eyes to the problems of black people, as well as subscriptions to popular
newspapers and magazines, including black-oriented publications like Ebony and the New York
Amsterdam News. For employees who could afford the initial outlay, the company operated a
reimbursement plan that covered tuition for approved courses at institutions outside IBM.
Company data showed that during the plant’s first year, thirty-five percent of new employees
enrolled in Voluntary Education courses. One example was Hyland Gear, an “engineering
change analyzer” already twice promoted from receiving clerk, whose goal was to become the
first black vice president in IBM’s Systems Manufacturing Division, IBM Brooklyn’s
organizational parent. 49
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A job at IBM also made for an ongoing education in anti-unionism. Here, a generational
shift made itself felt. African Americans who got jobs at American Safety Razor during the
1940s found themselves in a hothouse, an ultra-politicized environment where a militant union
made issues of race, gender, class conflict, and solidarity immediate, explicit, and actionable.
The declining reach of the city’s manufacturing unions, battered by the industrial exodus, meant
that their 1960s and 70s counterparts were more likely to encounter the time-capsule sweatshop
of a P & D Manufacturing or the enlightened anti-unionism of an IBM.
The idea of a union assumes that there exists some degree of antagonism between the
owners of a firm and those they hire to perform the work. At IBM, this proposition was
strenuously rejected in favor of the idea that the company was a patriarchal family, a social
organization governed by a different logic. Over the course of five decades, obligation,
deference, trust in hierarchy, trust in the firm and in the Watsons themselves as its benevolent
captains lodged themselves as the controlling themes in IBM’s idea of itself. “To Dad it seemed
perfectly natural that his photograph should hang in everybody’s office,” wrote Watson, Jr. in his
autobiography. According to historian Mike Davis, IBM’s labor relations philosophy amounted
to “a slick refinement of Ford-style authoritarianism.” 50
During the postwar years, as IBM grew to mammoth size and power, IBM-watching
became a sort of cottage industry. Journalists, academics, and other commentators peered with
ethnographic interest into the firm’s unique—and, according to some, uniquely weird—corporate
culture. The firm’s mantra—“focus on the individual”—was a cipher for anti-unionism and not
an incitement to autonomous thinking or unconventional self-expression. At IBM, the pressures
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to conform could be strong, even wacky. Conservative social mores, teetotaling, revival-style
tent meetings, and the uncomplicated equation of selling with moral virtue evoked the culture of
the burned-over district of western New York from which Watson had sprung, while the gospel
of salesmanship, sadistic treatment of upper-level managers, and commitment to welfare
capitalism reflected the chief’s education at the knee of John H. Patterson, who once fired an
executive by hauling the man’s desk onto the front lawn and setting it on fire. For more than one
observer, IBM’s Stakhanovite atmosphere and unabashed personality cults evoked the Eastern
Bloc. In a book that Watson, Jr. called “the best account of my father’s life,” a journalist
explained how Watson
commissioned a symphony for IBM, copies of which remain in the possession of old IBM men
and in scattered music libraries, which could make him cry. … Its first movement was not
substantially different in its intent from the art of Stalinist Russia; if it didn’t explicitly make one
love a collective’s tractor or deify the adventure in Spain, it did melodically recite the struggles of
mankind and cry out instrumentally that IBM was excitement, confirming that there was the place
to be, in privilege and hope.

For his part, Watson, Jr. admired the Soviet Union and later served as the US ambassador to
Moscow under President Jimmy Carter. “I was prepared to believe there might be some good in
communism,” he wrote in his autobiography. 51
These principles came to Bedford-Stuyvesant not only in the form of the bias towards the
idea of a patriarchal family wage and the promotion of buttoned-down rectitude, but in an array
of management practices designed to prod employees to address workplace problems on a “manto-manager” basis—in other words, to eschew collective action in favor of a one-on-one
approach that left the individual worker isolated, outnumbered, and dependent on managers for
relief. One was the “Open Door” policy, a company-sponsored alternative to union grievancehandling by which any employee was ostensibly permitted to approach any manager, up to and
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including Watson himself. At a more realistic level, the “Speak Up!” program encouraged
employees to write senior management with complaints, whose solutions would be trumpeted in
the plant’s newsletter. The company also used incentive pay to extract extra effort from
employees. 52
The “Speak Up!” columns in the IBM Brooklyn publication reflected specific social and
political concerns of the residents who lived and worked there. The first such column sought to
mollify employees upset about a perceived price increase at plant vending machines. The
dissatisfaction stemmed not from the mere fact of higher prices, but from concern that IBM had
unwittingly perpetuated the price-gouging that had long been a bane of black city-dwellers. “It’s
a known fact that predominantly Negro areas suffer from abuse by merchants (pay the highest
prices but get sub-standard merchandise), but do we have to allow this in our plant?” one
employee asked. The apparent price increase was in fact the result of a clerical error—an
attendant had placed items in the wrong slots—but the episode revealed that IBM would be
applying its time-tested formulas to a different set of social and political realities from the ones
that obtained in Boulder, San Jose, or Westchester County. A subsequent column discussed, for
example, the paucity of banking facilities in Bed-Stuy—long distances and long lines meant that
some employees had trouble cashing their Friday checks in time for the weekend, and some
openly worried that the company’s practice of issuing checks late on Friday afternoon would
indirectly support the makeshift check-cashing outlets that charged captive residents high fees.
IBM responded by arranging with two local banks to extend their hours to 7:30 p.m. on certain
evenings. 53
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During the early 1970s, IBM Brooklyn realized three related goals for the company. The
plant was a relative success in economic terms, with satisfactory productivity and unit costs
relative to other IBM facilities. Second, the factory provided steady, decent-paying jobs for
around four hundred Bed-Stuy residents, giving some a path to promotion and a lifetime with
IBM, if they chose to pursue it. Finally, the endeavor won IBM excellent press coverage,
securing the company a public image as “an industry leader in social concerns as much as in
sales and profits,” as a sycophantic profile in Earl Graves’s Black Enterprise put it. These
articles, which included a 1972 award for “business citizenship” bestowed by Business Week
magazine, were meant to convince readers that there was no inherent conflict between the pursuit
of private profit and a citizen’s duty to attend to one’s fellows. Black Enterprise took an even
more conservative position, insisting that “the blacks in IBM’s management ranks aren’t where
they are because of the company’s sense of social responsibility—they are there because of
IBM’s good business sense .” Here, capitalism was cast as the solution to white supremacy
instead of its accomplice. In all, its ability to manage a successful “ghetto” operation put IBM at
the forefront of the emerging public relations strategy of trumpeting “corporate social
responsibility,” a phrase that came into vogue during these years. 54
By the middle of the decade, IBM had decided to reinforce its commitment to Brooklyn
by building a 168,000 square-foot facility on land acquired by the city as part of the Central
Brooklyn Community Development Plan, an urban renewal program approved in 1968. First, the
city sold the land to Restoration, and Restoration then sold the parcels to IBM. The purchase
price was just over a half-million dollars. Restoration officials used their connections in city
government to grease IBM’s path through the permitting process. Plans were developed by Bond
Robert J. Imbriano, “IBM: The Corporate Citizen,” Black Enterprise, March 1974; Milton Moskowitz,
“Emergence of the Corporate Conscience,” New York Times, January 6, 1974.
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Ryder Associates, the firm of New York’s leading black architect, whose works included the
Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture and the Studio Museum, both in Harlem, and
the Martin Luther King Jr. Center for Nonviolent Social Change in Atlanta. The BedfordStuyvesant plant, which cost ten million dollars to complete, took advantage of an incentive
zoning arrangement that permitted larger structures in exchange for including public spaces in
the plans. Restoration promised that at least half of all construction workers on the project would
be minorities and forty percent of the dollar volume would go to minority-owned firms. The new
building, completed in 1979, did not employ more workers than the old eight-story warehouse at
Gates and Nostrand. Instead, its low-slung construction afforded the floor space required to
automate production and improve productivity. 55
“Their Own Hands”
The fanfare around the new plant might have been muted had boosters known that only
eight years of manufacturing remained for IBM Brooklyn. During the 1980s, IBM suffered what
in previous decades would have seemed an unthinkable collapse. The firm failed to anticipate
technological shifts towards personal computing and the client-server network architecture that
posed a challenge to its flagship mainframe computers, ceding these crucial markets to a new
breed of competitors. The consequences were severe—after several years of distress, IBM in
1993 posted a five-billion dollar loss, the largest ever recorded for a private company. That year,
new Chief Executive Officer Lou Gerstner slashed the company’s workforce, putting a swift end
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to Watson-esque personnel policies like the commitment to lifetime employment. Removing
“fat” became the company’s top priority, spokespeople told a Wall Street Journal reporter. IBM
Brooklyn workers soon learned they were part of the “fat.” The facility, already demoted to a
repair center as IBM rushed to consolidate its now-excess manufacturing capacity, found itself
on the chopping block. Its two hundred remaining workers would join 100,000 IBM employees
worldwide in losing their jobs. 56
At the last minute, though, the firm, its employees, the city, and the state organized a
reprieve. With the help of $10.5 million in financing, IBM Brooklyn became Advanced
Technological Solutions (ATS), an employee-owned company that was “one of the last major
manufacturing operations in the city” and at the time the largest minority-owned company in the
United States. Under the terms of the deal, IBM would sell the Brooklyn plant to ATS for $6.5
million—“favorable terms,” in the words of a scholar who studied the deal. Funding came from
several sources, reflecting the “political clout” retained by IBM Brooklyn and the hold on civic
leaders’ imaginations the idea of a successful black capitalism could still exert. Chase Manhattan
Bank provided a $2.5 million loan and a $3 million line of credit. The state’s Job Development
Authority kicked in another $2.8 million in loans. IBM itself, prodded by a now-elderly Tom
Watson, Jr., bought a $1 million equity stake in the new firm and extended another million in
credit. ATS managers completed the package with a $250,000 contribution of their own. IBM
promised the new firm five years’ worth of business repairing and refurbishing IBM products.
The former employer was by far the new company’s largest customer—for the time being, ATS
was essentially an IBM contractor. To keep the business afloat, its managers would have to find
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new manufacturing business in what hopeful journalists conceded was a competitive and
crowded field marked by the presence of low-cost suppliers in East Asia and Mexico. 57
Politicians touted ATS. “The self-reliant employees of ATS took their future into their
own hands,” said New York governor Mario Cuomo. David Dinkins, the city’s first black mayor,
promoted the firm in the language of social justice. “For me, this is a question of values,” he
said. “Can we make our economic system more inclusive? More fair? Can we invite everyone to
participate and thereby expand competition?” Some posited employee ownership as a path to
renewed competitiveness. “Hundreds of New York firms are using employee ownership to
increase productivity and increase worker involvement,” said Jan Stackhouse of the New York
Center for Employee Ownership. “By joining forces with New York City and the private sector
we have forged a partnership that saves jobs and bolsters the Brooklyn economy.” 58
Employee ownership was not as empowering as it sounded. In order to meet the
competition, workers took a nearly twenty-five percent pay cut and a reduction in benefits.
Beneath the rhetoric, they still effectively worked for IBM, but as contractors in a casualized
relationship that absolved the larger firm of its traditional commitments. In exchange, workers—
still mostly African American and Latino, but now including immigrants from the Caribbean,
Eastern Europe, Africa, India, and Iran—became part-owners of ATS, receiving stock in the
company equivalent to ten percent of their total compensation for the first five years. Owning
ATS was not quite like owning IBM. For ordinary workers at a small, struggling firm, employee
ownership meant reduced wages and more direct exposure to short-term performance. Turning
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each employee into a manger did not endow anyone with control or autonomy—instead, it
distributed the role of taskmaster, lodging the coercive impulse in the brain of every last
employee. 59
From the beginning, ATS president Wesley Ratcliff worried the firm might not survive.
ATS workers, cast from IBM’s reassuring embrace into the shark tank of the world market, felt
the risks keenly. In addition to the wage cuts, a new crop of managers demanded more output.
They achieved this the old-fashioned way—by turning ATS into a sweatshop. Rejecting what he
called the “old, soft” culture of IBM, new production chief Max Moore substituted a harddriving, “abrasive” management ethos designed to “intensify production schedules and reduce
costs,” explained a Columbia University researcher who studied the firm. Production workers
complained they were routinely “disrespected’” and threatened with dismissal. Women reported
a new culture of sexual harassment. “Democratic participation has been devalued to increase
productivity,” the researcher concluded unhappily.
In an anonymous survey, seventy-seven percent of employees reported that morale was
low; seventy-one percent asserted that ATS was “unfair” to its employees. Seventy-nine percent
believed the company’s compensation practices were “unfair,” while eighty-eight percent said
managers paid themselves too much. Despite the nostrums from Governor Cuomo, ATS workers
did not feel they had taken their fate into their own hands. Eighty-four percent said employee
ownership had not given workers a meaningful say in how the company was run, and over half
confessed they did not fully understand what it meant to be an employee-owner. The company
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could not afford to be democratic until it made some money, Ratcliff argued. “The more we
sweat, the more we get,” he told Black Enterprise. 60
David Dinkins had been instrumental in helping to arrange support for ATS. The mayor’s
familiarity with the project dated back to his days as City Clerk, when he affixed the town seal to
the paperwork for the new IBM plant. Dinkins, elected by a reform coalition of African
Americans, Latinos, and white liberals, took office in the midst of a recession and quickly
confronted the discipline of the market. To cover an immense budget shortfall, the mayor
proposed a “doomsday” budget that drastically cut government spending. Thus constrained,
Dinkins turned to the private sector. “Ours is a private-sector-oriented vision, and that means the
mission of government must be to help the private sector,” the mayor told an audience of
business executives in late 1992. In a city that had shed 350,000 private-sector jobs over the
preceding three years, saving IBM Brooklyn must have seemed a political, economic, and public
relations boon. 61
Unfortunately, the commitments from the government and from IBM soon dried up. A
$1.9 million collaboration between the city, the state, the Pratt Institute, and ATS to run a jobtraining program collapsed after Dinkins lost the mayoral election to Rudolph Giuliani in 1993.
Worse, IBM did not live up to its promise to supply ATS with adequate business for five years,
leaving the firm scrambling to find new revenue. In 1996, Ratcliff formed Advanced
Technological Solutions South, an electronics manufacturing and repair firm, in his home state
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of Texas. In 1998, ATS began working with a real estate developer called Octagon Properties to
redevelop the Brooklyn factory. By the turn of the century, the firm was gone for good—a
runaway after all. For a time, ATS South maintained itself through government contracts,
repairing computers at federal buildings in Dallas and for the school districts of Dallas and
Houston. In retirement, Ratcliff devoted his time to raising cattle on his ranch southeast of
Dallas. 62
Back in Brooklyn, after false starts with a supermarket, a hospital, and a pharmaceutical
company, Octagon Properties in 2006 reached an agreement with the Home Depot, the country’s
largest home-improvement chain, to open its nineteenth New York City outlet in the old IBM
Brooklyn plant. By then, Bedford-Stuyvesant had become a very different place. During the
early days of Restoration, board chairman Thomas Jones had urged staffers to purchase the
neighborhood’s handsome brownstone homes as investment vehicles. “He insists that if they
don’t they will find that in a few years those who have fled the inner-city will have moved back
in and grabbed them up because of their value and attractiveness for restoration possibilities,”
program evaluators noted. Today, contractors and do-it-yourselfers scour the aisles where IBM
once trained the “hard-core.” Few would have predicted just who would reside behind BedStuy’s brownstone walls, however. Today, the neighborhood is one of the most intensively
gentrifying places in America, median home values having risen by nearly two hundred percent
in some zip codes. Today’s Bedford-Stuyvesant is immensely richer and whiter than its 1960s
predecessor. In that more tumultuous but more hopeful era, social scientists and black militants
debated the virtues of “development” versus “dispersal—whether to “gild the ghetto” or to
dissolve its inhabitants into an increasingly undifferentiated American mainstream. The growing
Engelskirchsen, “Meeting the Challenge of Economic Development,” 258–59; Rosalie R. Radomsky, “Bringing a
Big-Box Store to a Tough Area of Brooklyn,” New York Times, January 18, 2006.
62

288

class stratification among Bedford-Stuyvesant residents and black Americans more generally
worked to scuttle these neat categories. 63
IBM recovered too, but on its own terms. After the bloodbaths of the 1990s, a
restructured IBM returned to prominence. Having once shed nearly three-quarters of its US
workforce, the company once again employs hundreds of thousands. The difference is that
relatively few of them live in the United States. In recent years, the firm has become known as
one of the most aggressive practitioners of outsourcing, despite its efforts to conceal the practice.
By 2009, three-quarters of IBM employees lived outside the United States. India alone has more
IBM workers than the US. In that country, where IBM is the second-largest employer, salaries
range anywhere from one-fifth to one-half those paid Americans for similar work, the New York
Times reported in 2017. Back at home, IBM has become a poster child in recent years for its
abusive employment practices, especially age discrimination and coercive subcontracting
arrangements. 64
Promises
“The basic purpose of the program is to create jobs,” Robert Kennedy had argued as he
wooed businessmen to join what would become Restoration. “There isn't enough money to solve
the problems of the ghettos,” he asserted. “Private enterprise must be brought into the area.” In
terms of both funding and public profile, Restoration was the flagship of the early community
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development corporations. The organization began with big plans to revive private-sector
employment in Bedford-Stuyvesant. Few of these came to fruition. IBM Brooklyn, with all its
limitations, was in the end the most successful of these efforts. Beyond that, job development
was “almost nil,” as one early student of the project put it. 65
Each Restoration economic development program had a dual objective—“to plan and to
put into effect (thru the inducement of capital investment where necessary) a socially and
economically beneficial development of industrial and commercial private enterprise in BedfordStuyvesant but whose overriding purpose will be to create new training and employment
opportunities for residents of that community,” as a Department of Labor report put it in 1967.
The African American staff of Restoration clashed with the mostly-white D&S team over how
best to conduct the experiment. The former argued for black capitalism, or “the development of
an economic base that was controlled by minorities,” as program evaluators put it. D&S staff
favored trying to repeat the IBM trick by attracting outposts of large, established firms, which
were almost never black-owned. The competing strategies formed part of the struggle for control
in a CDC that in its early years suffered from a kind of “schizophrenia.” “There is not much,”
researchers concluded, “to demonstrate that such a companion structure … is an effective
instrument of economic development.” 66
For its part, Restoration tried to jump-start a black capitalism by arranging for no-interest
loans to black entrepreneurs, forgivable in part or whole if they met certain objectives for
training workers. The program also provided comprehensive management coaching and the
connections to private lenders and government contracts that might smooth these small firms’
road to prosperity. By the middle of 1970, nearly fifty such firms had created between four and
65
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five hundred new jobs, although evaluators expected a significant portion of these to fail.
Program sponsors harbored special hopes for manufacturing, since these companies would
presumably employ greater numbers than small retail and service firms. Among the shoe stores,
gas stations, and funeral homes were several garment and metalworking firms of the kind that
had fled New York for decades. The largest of these, the A&K Bag Corporation, a ladies’
handbag manufacturer, had accepted $50,000 of a projected $100,000 in government funds and
employed thirteen of a hoped-for seventy-four people. Corley Originals, a silk-screening
company, had soaked up $100,000 in government money to employ thirteen people. The
Cleveland Freeman Manufacturing Company, a heat-sealing firm, had accepted over $200,000 in
loans but had gone out of business. The firms that did survive were so small that “the impact on
job opportunities cannot be considered substantial,” program evaluators concluded. Moreover,
three-quarters of the jobs they created were unskilled and paid eighty dollars a week or less,
trailing the ninety dollar a week salary “accepted by most job seekers as a minimum decent level
of pay.” In all, the program testified to “the impossibility of accomplishing at one time the goal
of creating new entrepreneurs while simultaneously solving the unemployment problems of the
hard core,” investigators felt. By the middle of 1969, Restoration had given up on extending
loans to new manufacturing firms. 67
Restoration agreements with the federal Department of Labor to place trainees in existing
local manufacturing operations were even less inspiring. These were mostly marginal operations
offering “dead-end, low paying, sweat shop, minimal skill jobs,” evaluators concluded. Two of
the four original factories went out of business during the course of the program. Staffers came
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to resent the owners of these plants, whom they felt were exploiting Restoration, using the
community development corporation as an employment agency to groom and deliver the lowwage labor they craved. Researchers noted the tendency of these plants to end up with a
workforce that was “predominantly Spanish-speaking and female”—like the workforce at P & D
Manufacturing—since the African Americans referred to these jobs often refused to accept them.
Some Restoration staff bluntly called the program a “fraud.” Researchers drew the same
conclusions about a “handshake agreement” with the Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce to
provide an alleged six hundred jobs to Bedford-Stuyvesant residents. This agreement netted a
thirty percent placement rate and left Restoration staffers embittered at the propensity of the
affiliated firms to abuse the agreement to fill low-wage, dead-end jobs. Soon, Restoration culled
the list, restricting it to fifty or so of the four hundred participating Chamber members. 68
Subsidizing small businesses, minority-owned or otherwise, did not occur on a scale that
could make a substantial dent in Bedford-Stuyvesant’s unemployment crisis. The alternative,
championed by D&S, was to attract large “branch plants” along the lines of IBM Brooklyn.
Unfortunately, IBM remained the only company to establish such a factory. Program evaluators
concluded that while “this early feat was thought to be an omen for the future,” the IBM plant
remained an “anomaly” borne of private relationships among elites. After IBM Brooklyn opened,
Restoration solicited four thousand companies, promising help with finding real estate, recruiting
employees, and obtaining federal money from the Office of Economic Opportunity. No one bit.
Federal investigators cited the worsening national economy and “high New York City labor
costs” as the primary reason no company would agree to move to Bedford-Stuyvesant, despite
the promises of assistance. “Prospects for attracting large employment industry to the inner city
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area are slim,” another group of researchers concluded. “There is no reason to believe that
industry, which has been fleeing the inner city in post-World War II years, is anxious to return in
the face of the same, and in some cases, worse conditions which prompted their flight in the first
place.” 69
Even Restoration’s successes were failures on the job front. The Community Home
Improvement Program (CHIP) paid “hard-core” teenagers to restore the exteriors of local
brownstones, Bed-Stuy’s most bankable resource. Planners envisioned the program as a twofer—preserve the neighborhood’s housing stock and discipline the unemployed—“the logical
people to burn the place down,” as Restoration head Thomas put it. “Let’s see if after they’ve
gone up four stories on a scaffold, worked and produced something that’s beautiful to them,” he
said, “that they don’t begin to feel that this is their community and a place to be preserved,”
Thomas told an interviewer. First, Restoration had to “break down resistance to regular working
hours by involving them in highly supervised work experience programs that are literally capable
of getting the trainees out of bed in the morning, if necessary,” reported program evaluators. The
problem, they learned, was that “jobs are temporary and marketable skills are not generally
acquired.” As a result, “no effective placement” transpired.
Evaluators identified a basic problem with the schemes—in an economy characterized by
chronic underemployment, unable to provide living-wage jobs for all who sought them, training
schemes that injected the “hard-core” into the labor force merely exacerbated competition for
“unskilled positions in which there exists a chronic oversupply of labor.” Trainees who did
manage to secure jobs mostly displaced existing workers or narrowed the chances for their
fellow unemployed. In New York City during the early 1970s, it seemed, the market for
Ibid., 160; “Economic Development Programs In Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brooklyn, New York, Under The Special
Impact Program,” 18–20.
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unskilled labor was a zero-sum game. The main beneficiaries of CHIP were the homeowners
themselves, for whom the program provided low-cost renovations and spurred the creation of
block associations. For victims of redlining, who had faced cruel obstacles financing the
purchase and maintenance of their homes, CHIP and Restoration’s associated mortgage pool
must have felt like a deserved redress. At the same time, such programs reinforced the nagging
sense that “the ownership class of the community is better served than the non-proprietary class,”
as a group of independent consultants delicately put it. 70
This statement was apt. Both Restoration in general and the IBM project in particular
served less as vehicles toward a widely-shared prosperity than class projects whose benefits,
while real, were seriously limited in scope. Some who worked on the Restoration project came to
feel that the CDC “got better press than it deserved,” as Carter Burden put it. Beneath the
optimistic coverage, independent evaluations tended to zero in on these limitations. “Being
bourgeois in composition, Restoration's projects reflect middle class values,” wrote consultants
hired by the federal government to evaluate the project. The program, they believed, suffered
from a ‘top-down approach' with its attendant problems, which included “suspicion of the
community.” For this reason, Restoration lacked “legitimacy” among large numbers of Bed-Stuy
residents, especially the poor. The class split expressed itself everywhere, including within
politicians’ own shops. In 1979, state Assemblyman Al Vann, a one-time radical now on
Restoration’s board, praised the organization as “one of the best community development
corporations in the nation.” Meanwhile, an aide who wished to remain anonymous told the same
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researcher that Restoration “ought to be exposed” for what she said it was—a “front for white
people who want to buy up the area.” They were both right. 71
The black middle class fostered by Restoration and other local economic development
efforts was real, but remained frustratingly small. Class polarization registered itself in the
growing income gap between poor and better-off African Americans, while the material wellbeing of African Americans in the aggregate remained mired at levels that demonstrated just how
small the group of the relatively fortunate had been. In Bedford-Stuyvesant and New York City
at large, unemployment remained at crisis levels even as the neighborhood and city shed
population. As historian Karen Ferguson notes, “neighborhood buying power fell 12 percent
between 1970 and 1990, and while the poverty level in greater New York dropped from 14 to 12
percent in the same period, in Bedford-Stuyvesant, it rose from 27.5 to 34 percent, a trend that
matched other inner-city neighborhoods around the country.” 72
Despite these worrying trends, Restoration became a vehicle for the politically ambitious,
signaled by Franklin Thomas’s ascension to the presidency of the Ford Foundation in 1979.
Program evaluators had on the whole taken a dim view of Restoration staff, noting that they were
“keenly concerned about personal mobility and professional security, not their roots in the
community which, for the most part, are non-existent.” Meanwhile, the community development
idea, which sought to marshal private capital to solve the problems of the cities, increasingly
became a default strategy as the federal government retreated from meaningful support for the
urban poor. This trend was institutionalized in the Housing and Community Development Act of
1974, which replaced the War on Poverty programs with Community Development Block Grants
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under mayoral control. The abdication intensified with the Reagan administration, which sliced
the budget of the Department of Housing and Urban Development by sixty-five percent over the
during its first six years. “The national policy we have now is no policy at all,” lamented Mayor
Raymond Flynn of Boston in 1986. “Clearly, urban policy for the remainder of this century and
beyond will be collaboration of community groups, local government and business,” he
shrugged. 73
In all, IBM Brooklyn was a lesson in the limits of reconciliation between postwar
capitalism and the well-being of marginalized people in places like Bedford-Stuyvesant. “What
has occurred gives too little indication of sustained and extended results—no large plants have
come into the area since IBM; the mortgage pool is a compensatory and temporary solution to
the problem of discriminatory lending practices; job creation and development are
disappointingly low; and most important of all, there is little evidence of increased community
capability in any significant area,” researchers concluded with regret. In the end, IBM Brooklyn
could not transcend its origins as an act of charity allowed by a company whose immense power
insulated it from market pressures in a way that few could replicate. American capitalism
continued to mostly fail the black working class of places like Bedford-Stuyvesant. 74
At a ceremony during the early days of IBM Brooklyn, plant manager Ernest Friedli was
presented with a guitar to recognize his service. In his remarks to the assembled crowd, Friedli
declared that were he to tune up the guitar and play it there, he would have chosen “We Shall
Overcome” as the song he felt best epitomized the IBM Brooklyn experience. IBM Brooklyn as
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telos represented a very particular vision of the ongoing struggles by African Americans to
liberate themselves from oppression. As it happened, while the city lurched towards bankruptcy,
IBM Brooklyn became, as some had worried, “a monument to promises never fulfilled.” 75
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Conclusion
“The misery of being exploited by capitalists is nothing compared to the misery of not
being exploited at all.” — Joan Robinson, Economic Philosophy
“Force is the only solution open to capital; the accumulation of capital, seen as an
historical process, employs force as a permanent weapon, not only at its genesis, but
further on down to the present day.” — Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital

By 1975, when New York’s municipal finances collapsed, job loss had reached crisis
proportions. “The economy that had supported the expansive social service sector of the postwar
years was falling apart,” writes historian Kim Phillips-Fein. “For more than a century, New York
had been able to assimilate millions of immigrants in its insatiable demand for human labor, but
increasingly the jobs that earlier generations had held were no longer there.” Between 1950 and
1975, New York lost fully half of its manufacturing jobs. The hemorrhage quickened as the city
careened towards bankruptcy—between 1969 and 1976 alone, manufacturing accounted for
nearly half of the 500,000 jobs that disappeared. Tax receipts shrank while demand for welfare
services increased. “The city found itself providing support and services to the unemployed and,
for a lucky few, jobs to cushion the downturn in the local economy … At the same time, the city
could not possibly employ all those who were left jobless, with the resulting increase in the
welfare rolls,” writes one scholar. 1
Social crises followed upon the employment crisis. During the 1970s, for the first time in
its recorded history, the city began to shed people—800,000 over the course of the decade.
Beneath the aggregates lay profound social cleavages. Many of those who could get out did—the
city lost fully one-quarter of its white population during the 1970s. Those who arrived or
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remained frequently belonged to groups that lacked the accumulated social power associated
with whiteness in the United States. The New York City of the 1970s, Phillips-Fein notes, was
poorer, older, and darker than its counterpart of a generation prior. 2
Working-class neighborhoods on the Lower East Side of Manhattan, in the South Bronx,
and through large swaths of Brooklyn—those dense urban environments that had nurtured
solidarity and militancy—began to hollow out. As the housing market declined, landlords
neglected properties. Banks refused to lend for purchase or upkeep, accelerating the
deterioration. Many landlords pursued what became an economically rational strategy—after
“milking” their buildings by refusing to pay taxes or provide services like heat and hot water,
they walked away from their properties. Between 1965 and 1975, around 200,000 units of
housing were abandoned in this manner. Many burned, whether through arson, with its promise
of an insurance payout, or neglect. 3
A list of addresses for workers at American Safety Razor reveals where workers made
their homes—in Williamsburg, where factories like the hulking Domino Sugar refinery lined the
waterfront; in Bushwick, to the east; in Bedford-Stuyvesant, to the south. One imagines these
factory hands clambering downtown on the old Myrtle Avenue elevated line, closed in 1969 and
dismantled shortly thereafter. This era was coming to a close. “The future looks very bleak,” an
ASR worker told his local union in 1955 after he and 1,200 others lost their jobs. “I don’t know
what is going to happen to my family,” said another. 4
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Their families, if they remained in New York City, often suffered. From an earnings
perspective, the 1950s were an unfortunate time to be born in America’s large cities. By the early
1980s, unemployment in the United States had reached levels not witnessed since the Great
Depression. To be born a person of color was even tougher. Between 1973 and 1986, annual
earnings for American men between the ages of twenty-five and twenty-nine declined by twenty
percent. Among African Americans, the decline was worse, reaching twenty-eight percent. The
wages of those who did not complete high school dropped by a staggering thirty-six percent. For
many, an informal, illegal economy filled the gaps. An anthropologist working on the Lower
East Side during the 1970s and 80s noted that “with the increasing profits and expansion of the
drug trade in cocaine in the early 1980s, the neighborhood became ever more dangerous … The
brutalization of life had become commonplace, and it seemed irreversible.” 5
Factory work, once an option for so many, became harder to find. Criminologists
embedded with teenagers in Williamsburg during the early 1980s found that their interlocutors
were as likely to burglarize the remaining local factories as work in them. “We talked this
morning with the landlord who is on the block every day taking care of his buildings,” they
reported.
He said that when he first came here most of the residents of the block were Irish, Italian, Polish,
and French. He pointed to a warehouse which occupies one side of the far end of the block. He
said that this had once been used for manufacturing but that the company had moved to New
Jersey seven years ago. When he first came to the block, many of the residents were workers in the
factory. Now, that building is used only as a warehouse, and most of the current residents are
Puerto Rican. Some households on the block are still supported by men working in the factories,
but most of the families here now are on welfare.
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The factories that had hung on, the youths complained, preferred “Mexicans”—their term
for the undocumented migrants, often Central American, who worked “off the books,”
permitting employers to circumvent minimum-wage laws, health and safety measures, and
unions. “The bosses play it smart,” one told researchers. “Aliens, they would go work off the
books. They got to, cause they can’t work on the books … If they’re going to make $200 a week,
he [the employer] stays with $100 and give $100 to the guy. The Mexican [sic] can’t do anything
about it. He can’t go to the Board of Work, or whatever, cause they gonna send him back to his
country. He’d rather get gypped.” As we have seen, when the workers at P & D Manufacturing
and UAW Local 259 tried to interrupt such an arrangement, the owners closed the factory rather
than extend the living wage at the heart of the industrial union project to newly-arrived
migrants. 6
Some neighborhoods collapsed with bewildering speed. “During the first two years of our
observations, the housing stock deteriorated severely,” wrote a group of researchers working in
Williamsburg during the early 1980s. “Property began to change hands rapidly, services became
irregular, and most of the buildings eventually burned.” 7 For his 1984 film Los Sures, Diego
Echeverria followed Evelyn, a social worker in Williamsburg, as she scrambled to secure
resources for a family burned out of their tenement home. Later, in the quiet of her apartment,
this fighter confessed despair:
The only thing that's coming now is violence. And I don't want to be in the midst of violence.
Because I would hurt someone. I'd learn how to hurt. It's easy to learn how to hurt. It's been harder
to learn how to love. And that's all my mom and I, my kids, are hoping to have. That's what keeps
us here. It's changed. And it's sad. Because it was a joy once. There was a sadness but there was a
joy. There's no joy anymore. There's only a lot of pain. And the young ones are the ones who are
suffering the most. You can't do anything for them. 8
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For many of these working-class teenagers, growing up in the 80s meant living the shift
in emphasis, in terms of the relationship of working-class people of color to the state, from a
welfare state, broadly defined, to what scholars today call a carceral state, where incarceration
and punishment became what Ruth Wilson Gilmore calls “catchall solutions to social problems.”
“As deindustrialization, recession, and austerity deepened in New York, the DOC [Department
of Corrections] was among few city agencies that escaped extreme budget cuts,” explain criminal
justice scholars Jarrod Shanahan and Jack Norton in their brief history of the Rikers Island jail
complex. Fueled by newly punitive drug laws and newly aggressive policing, politicians in New
York State and across the US built prisons and filled them, caging human beings at a scale
unprecedented in world history. The prisons, largely sited in ailing upstate towns, became
solutions to economic crisis in two ways. The victims of deindustrialization who were black,
brown, and urban filled the cages, while the victims who were white, upstate and rural were
given jobs building and guarding those cages. 9
As the decades ground on, manufacturing persisted in the city only insofar as conditions
there converged with those in the South and the developing world to which factories had fled. As
the city’s heretofore unionized manufacturers departed, what remained was what ILG Education
Director and labor intellectual Gus Tyler called the “tawdry” manufacturing sector—non-union
9
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garment shops, artificial flower workshops, fly-by-night toy factories. The owners of these
factories sought the city’s most vulnerable workers, especially women and recent migrants.
Needing little in the way of capital equipment, they could set up shop with relative ease—and
pull it all down if union organizers got wind of the operation. Sometimes they collaborated with
corrupt, “sweetheart” unions in a common project to appropriate the fruits of workers’ efforts.
But even unions that preferred to act in good faith, like the ILG, found themselves trapped in a
spiral of concessions, breeding ill will among their newest recruits, who increasingly had trouble
distinguishing the union from its “sweetheart” cousins. The overall result was what State Senator
Franz Leichter called “the return of the sweatshop”—the innumerable small manufactories
hidden in basements and backyards, trapping workers with low wages and few benefits. He
might have added that the unionized factories that left New York had become sweatshops, too—
in other places. 10
The gradual subtraction of manufacturing from the city’s economy reshaped the politics
of the union movement in New York. One effect was racial. The experiences of young workers
in mostly-white South Brooklyn in the early 1980s diverged from those of their counterparts in a
place like Williamsburg, Bedford-Stuyvesant, or Brownsville, researchers found. Here, young
people tapped personal networks forged over three or four generations “to gain experience to a
substantial if diminishing supply of desirable blue-collar jobs characterized by high pay, strong
unions, and job protection.” “One friend of mine just went out and got himself a good job on the
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docks,” a young white Brooklynite explained to an interviewer. “Those are pretty scarce
nowadays, aren’t they?” protested the researcher. “Yeah,” the teen admitted:
But his father took him over and talked to a guy he had been in the Merchant Marine with years
ago and got him signed up. He was lucky. That's what most of these guys want, a job like that. A
lot of them are just hanging out now, drinking and getting high all summer, or else they're still
holding on to their little supermarket job or whatever, just waiting for the day they get into that
high-paying union job.

These experiences reflected the resurgence of craft logic, where union jobs became a form of
private property rooted in scarcity and exclusion. The industrial union movement and its broadbased, democratic, and highly politicized ethos had suffered an immense setback in the city’s
private sector. The other big story of these years, the breakneck organization of public workers in
New York City, helped to stem the damage that might have ensued upon a total collapse of
organized working-class representation in the city’s politics. Because of these efforts, organized
labor remains considerably stronger in New York City than elsewhere in the United States. The
typical union worker today, though, is a teacher, health care worker, or public administrator
instead of a factory worker. 11
In his 1993 book The Assassination of New York, Robert Fitch argued that the
breathtaking collapse of manufacturing in New York should be understood less as the result of
“market forces”—what Fitch called “history’s stern, impersonal and inexorable logic”—than “a
conscious policy of structural transformation” led by a coalition of real estate developers and city
planners bent on destroying the city’s manufacturing economy to clear the way for moreprofitable office space. The case studies explored in this dissertation, on the other hand, suggest a
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significant role for these “market forces,” which materialize through an accumulation of
struggles that are anything but impersonal. 12
When we talk about deindustrialization, what we are essentially talking about is the
refusal to re-invest. In each runaway addressed here, disinvestment was a response on the part of
capitalists to the efforts of workers, abetted by the state through its endorsement of collective
bargaining, to win better wages, more humane conditions, health and welfare benefits, and
power, both in the workplace and in politics more broadly. This presented a problem for factory
owners. As Adam Przeworki argues, “increased government intervention means precisely that
non-market rationality is imposed upon the process of accumulation, that is, that capitalists are
forced to make allocations which are suboptimal with regard to profit … Under such
circumstances, rational private capitalists will not invest.” In a postwar environment
characterized by the newfound availability of vast pools of inexpensive labor, such capitalists
found themselves with an out. As the sociologist Claus Offe explains, “the ultimate political
sanction is non-investment or the threat of it … The foundation of capitalist power and
domination is this institutionalized right of capital withdrawal, of which economic crisis is
nothing but the aggregate manifestation.” These decisions in turn exert a disciplining effect on
governments. As Robert Brenner notes, collective bargaining and the social democracies it
buttresses are swallowed much more readily during periods of untrammeled growth. 13 There are,
however, built-in limits that are difficult to transcend, since
the state, in both domestic and overseas policy, is dependent upon capital, because those who
govern (whoever they might be) will tend to find that the realization of their own interests
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(whatever they are) depends on the promotion of capitalist profits and capital accumulation, as the
latter are the sine qua non for economic growth and financial solvency, and thus for stability
domestically and strength internationally. The bottom line, from this standpoint, is that if those in
control of government implement domestic or foreign policies that interfere with and disrupt
profit-making and capital accumulation, they will face slowed growth or even recession,
frustrating the pursuit of whatever goals they are seeking. The general result is the operation of a
kind of homeostatic mechanism, which confines government policy to that which is compatible
with, or falls within the limits set by, the requirements of capital accumulation. 14

At the same time, the integration of once-proscribed workers’ movements into the extant
state machinery demands the suppression of the mass direct action that imbued those movements
with their initial élan in favor of what Brenner calls the “private, passive, individualist” act of
voting. When growth eventually falters, capitalists deploy their extra-electoral power, resorting
to what Offe calls the “ultimate political sanction”—embodied in this case by geographical
relocation—while union leaders and social democratic politicians find themselves without extraelectoral power of their own. This is what Brenner calls “the paradox of social democracy”—that
its conditions of possibility demand that it consent to its own dismantling. 15
The New York City fiscal crisis of the mid-1970s signaled a serious reversal in the city’s
project to build and maintain a municipal social democracy. “Within a few years,” historian
Joshua Freeman explains, “many of the historic achievements of working-class New York were
undone.” New York, as Fitch writes, “wound up as a one-industry town dangerously dependent
on a single highly cyclical product: speculative office buildings.” From the perspective of its
deindustrializing Rust Belt cousins, New York, which could trade on a historical advantage that
made it among the chief centers of global finance, might have counted itself lucky. 16
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The one-dimensional economy fostered a one-dimensional politics. First, city politicians
found themselves bound to prioritize private accumulation at all costs. Gone—or at least
significantly attenuated—was the dual imperative to furnish social welfare, to impose “nonmarket rationality” upon private profit-seeking. In the last instance, the government revenues out
of which social programs could be funded depended on the health of the city’s private capitalists,
who had demonstrated in stark fashion their willingness to punish via disinvestment. Second,
with the withdrawal of manufacturing from the city’s political economy, real estate values
became the default motor of revenue, their inflation the sine qua non of urban politics. The result
was what the geographer Samuel Stein calls “the real estate state,” a phrase meant to express the
swelling dominance of real estate capital over the city’s politics and its everyday life. The
gaudiest emblems of this shift were celebrity developers like Donald Trump, whose extraction of
what Stein calls “one of the largest and most galling commercial tax breaks ever seen in New
York City” to sweeten a hotel deal helped to inaugurate an era of race-to-the-bottom subsidies to
private developers that has only recently shown signs of abating. “Whatever my friends Fred and
Donald want in this town, they get,” declared a chastened Mayor Abe Beame in a private
meeting during the thick of the crisis. 17
Williamsburg, where the homes of the poor once burned, is today one of the most
expensive neighborhoods in New York. Along its once-industrial waterfront, median home
prices approach two million dollars. In 2014, the Domino Sugar refinery, one of the few
surviving relics of New York’s manufacturing epoch, fell to the wrecking ball. At its peak, the
eleven-acre complex had employed 4,500 workers and produced one-eighth of all the sugar
consumed on Earth. During the summer, temperatures in the refinery could reach 125 degrees.
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On bad days, hundreds of workers fainted before completing their twelve-hour shifts. The
unlucky perished. In 1894, the New York Herald Tribune called the refinery an “inferno,” the
lives of its workers “perpetual torture.” During a 1906 strike, managers replaced workers with
Polish immigrants, hoping the language barrier would prevent the newcomers from exposing
working conditions. 18
The American Sugar Refining Company, descendant of the legendary Havemeyer sugar
trust, continued refurbishing its waterfront complex through the early 1960s. During the latter
half of the twentieth century, though, employment at the refinery declined precipitously in the
face of increasing competition from other refineries as well as beet sugar and newer sweeteners
derived from corn. During the early 1980s, the refinery’s parent company fell to a leveraged
buyout. After attacking working conditions at the plant, its private equity owners sold the
business to British-based multinational Tate & Lyle, which determined to make good on its
investment with an even more severe crackdown. The company demanded what predecessors
like American Safety Razor had nearly fifty years prior—the unfettered right to lay off
whomever it wished, to convert workers to part-time status at will, and more generally to
“weaken the union to the point of irrelevance.” Beginning in 1999, workers mounted a heroic
six-hundred-day strike to beat back these terms. Mostly denied the solidarity from organized
labor that would have been required to sustain their efforts, they lost. In 2004, the 220 workers
who remained lost their jobs when the plant’s new owners shuttered the refinery for good. 19

Samantha Sharff, “America’s Most Expensive Zip Codes,” Forbes, November 28, 2017; Vivian Yee, “A Tower in
Brooklyn, But Soon Just a Memory,” New York Times, August 29, 2014; Paul Raphaelson, Brooklyn’s Sweet Ruin:
Relics and Stories of the Domino Sugar Refinery (Atglen, PA: Schiffer, 2017), 105–21; Geoff Cobb, “Horrific
History Lesson: Working Conditions at The Domino Sugar Refinery,” Greenpointers, November 6, 2017,
https://bit.ly/2IK754d.
19
Raphaelson, Brooklyn’s Sweet Ruin, 105–21; Stephen Greenhouse, “At Sugar Refinery, A Melting-Pot Strike,”
New York Times, February 15, 2000.
18

308

Stories told by the discarded workers echoed those of their counterparts of yore. “When
the refinery closed some men lost their jobs, they had a pension but they became alcoholics
because their wives left them, their kids had to drop out of college,” former kiln worker Robert
Shelton told The Atlantic. “I learned this week that I’m a dinosaur,” explained Richard Rednour.
“Having a job for a long time in one place is not necessarily a good thing. It used to mean I was
reliable.” Now it meant something else. John Alschen, a Russian-born refugee who had escaped
the Nazis that enslaved his family, had arrived at Domino ten years prior after losing his job at a
New Jersey iron factory. In the winter of 1999, as the union’s prospects dimmed, Alschen
showed up for picket duty, walked the line for six hours, had a few drinks, and went home to slit
his wrists. 20
News reporting on the strike and shuttering radiated the sense that men like Shelton,
Rednour, and Alschen, as well as their union, Local 1814 of the International Longshoreman’s
Association, had somehow held on too long, that their way of life had become a “relic,” as one
photographer put it. In contemporary New York, these people, their trade, and their goals—
stability, a living wage—felt old, out of place. Today, fragments of the refinery remain,
integrated into a luxury housing and office compound that evokes, in the form of a pastiche, the
city’s past and its gilded present. When we grasp the social history of New York’s industrial
decline, which caused and was caused by workers’ immense and diverse efforts to defend
themselves with what little they had, we can peer beneath the spectacle and grasp how these
relics might instead evoke the ideas that underpinned the industrial union movement—autonomy
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and dignity for all, wrought through solidarity. It remains to us to translate those principles into
the struggles given us by our own times.
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